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ABSTRACT 
 
There is a growing global recognition as to the importance of outlawing malicious computer-
related acts in a timely manner, yet few organisations have the legal and technical resources 
necessary to address the complexities of adapting criminal statutes to cyberspace. Literature 
reviewed in this study suggests that a coordinated, public-private partnership to produce a 
model approach can help reduce potential dangers arising from the inadvertent creation of 
cybercrime havens. 
 
It is against this backdrop that the study seeks to develop a digital forensic readiness model 
(DFRM) using a coordinated, multidisciplinary approach, involving both the public and private 
sectors, thus enabling organisations to reduce potential dangers arising from the inadvertent 
destruction and negating of evidentiary data which, in turn, results in the non-prosecution of 
digital crimes. 
 
The thesis makes use of 10 hypotheses to address the five research objectives, which are aimed 
at investigating the problem statement.  This study constitutes qualitative research and adopts 
the post-modernist approach.  
  
The study begins by investigating each of the 10 hypotheses, utilising a systematic literature 
review and interviews, followed by a triangulation of findings in order to identify and explore 
common themes and strengthen grounded theory results. The output from the latter process is 
used as a theoretical foundation towards the development of a DFRM model which is then 
validated and verified against actual case law.  
 
Findings show that a multidisciplinary approach to digital forensic readiness can aid in 
preserving the integrity of evidentiary data within an organisation. The study identifies three 
key domains and their critical components. The research then demonstrates how the 
interdependencies between the domains and their respective components can enable 
organisations to identify and manage vulnerabilities which may contribute to the inadvertent 
destruction and negating of evidentiary data.  The Multidisciplinary Digital Forensic Readiness 
Model (M-DiFoRe) provides a proactive approach to creating and improving organisational 
digital forensic readiness. 
 
This study contributes to the greater body of knowledge in digital forensics in that it reduces 
  iii 
complexities associated with achieving digital forensic readiness and streamlines the handling 
of digital evidence within an organisation.  
 
Keywords: digital forensics; forensic readiness; computer forensics; planning; investigation; 
risk management, evidence, cybercrime, multidisciplinary approach, triangulation, grounded 
theory, systematic literature review, qualitative research. 
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The integration of information and communication technologies (ICT) into daily life, be it 
commercial, educational or governmental, has not only improved the productivity but also the 
efficiency of these entities.  In the same manner, criminals have identified ways in which 
traditional crimes can be committed using computing power and accessibility to information.  
In these crimes, technology is primarily used either as a tool to commit or a repository of 
evidence related to a crime (Kizza, 2007; Noblett et al., 2000). 
 
Noblett et al. (2000) found that the reality associated with digital forensic science is the lack of 
a consistent methodology. The evolution of digital forensics has proceeded from ad hoc tools 
and techniques, rather than from the scientific community, from which many of the other 
traditional forensic sciences have originated (Reith et al., 2002).  This creates a challenge when 
it comes to ensuring that electronic evidence is discovered using scientific and proven methods.  
It is this challenge that has elevated cybercrime to the crime of choice since the chances of 
being prosecuted are much slimmer than in traditional criminal law matters such as fraud, theft 
and corruption (Curtis, 2012; Interpol, 2013). 
 
In addition, much has been done to define the key steps involved in the digital forensic process. 
Reith et al. (2002) highlight that tools, such as the Coroner’s Toolkit, are based on gaps that 
existed in methodologies related to Unix based systems. Other noteworthy contributors to the 
digital forensic process include the Department of Justice (National Institute of Justice, 2001) 
and the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (Digital Forensic Research Workshop, 2016). 
The result of all the preliminary work has been the development of at least three distinct digital 
forensic models: The Abstract Digital Forensics Model (Reith et al., 2002), The Integrated 
Digital Investigation Model (Carrier et al., 2003) and The Enhanced Integrated Digital 
Investigation Model (Baryamureeba et al., 2004). 
 
Much work has been done to standardise practices relating to the process of digital forensic 
investigations. In its simplest sense, a standard is an agreed-upon way of doing something 
(Spivak et al., 2001) and as such it forms a cornerstone of the modern information economy 
(Greenstein et al., 2007).  Standards are a means of creating order as they denote a uniform set 
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of measures, agreements and conditions (Spivak et al., 2001; Grindley, 1995).  In other words, 
standards act as a form of regulation.  Their usage in the industry may be voluntary, or in some 
cases, mandatory.  Many standards are used voluntarily, but in time they may become adopted, 
or referenced, into mandatory regulations (Spivak et al., 2001). 
 
Over the past decade, well-understood procedures and methodologies have evolved within the 
domain of digital evidence collection (Kenneally et al., 2005; Cooper et al., 2010).  For this 
reason, this study ventures into establishing the effect that a localised digital forensic readiness 
model (DFRM) could have on the admissibility of electronic evidence in a court of law.  As 
Curtis (2012) explains, ICT related crimes go beyond the use of a computer alone but include 
other forms of technologically advanced devices as well.  For the purposes of this study, the 
term digital will be used as an all-encompassing term to refer to electronic devices that may be 
used for the purpose of committing a crime.  
 
This chapter describes the motivation for the thesis, presents a preliminary literature review to 
contextualise the problem statement and the related research objectives and details how a set 
of hypotheses was used to investigate each of the said research objectives (Table 1).  The 
aforementioned is conducted by following a specific research process and in accordance with 
certain philosophical choices (Figure 1).  Finally, the chapter presents a diagram which outlines 
the chapter layout of this thesis (Table 2). 
1.2 Motivation for this research  
The motivating factor for this research was derived from the researcher’s observations 
regarding the challenges which organisations face when they attempt to prosecute digital 
crimes.  McConnel International (2000) and Obuh (2011) found that, at a time when greater 
emphasis is being placed on issues like violent crime reduction and community-based policing, 
the detection and investigation of technology-related offenses remain an elusive goal. Simply 
stated, findings suggest that digital crime is not a priority for police departments around the 
world. 
 
Walsh et al. (2013) found that for digital cases reported to authorities, the prosecution thereof 
raises many issues regarding the consistency of standards, problems with the statutory 
framework and the suitability of the punishments being sought. Walsh et al. (2013) further 
argued that charges against the defendant/s were ultimately often dismissed due to problems 
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with the police investigation or forensic examination. 
 
In addition, Walsh et al. (2013) noted supplementary contributing difficulties which included: 
the lack of timeliness of the computer forensics examination, the lack of equipment or training 
of officers and issues with search warrants.  Goodman (1997) found that the business 
community generally believes that police officers cannot handle computer-related crimes and 
security problems because they think that the police do not grasp the issues. Additionally, 
corporate managers believe that police agencies are ineffective, and their involvement counter-
productive, in prosecuting or restricting computer crime. 
 
McConnell International (2000) and Obuh (2011) state that the prevalence of computer crimes 
will continue to increase because it is easy to learn how to commit them; they require few 
resources relative to the potential damage they can cause; they can be committed in a 
jurisdiction in which the perpetrator is not physically present and they are often not explicitly 
illegal.  
 
This situation is further exasperated by weak penalties which, in turn, provide limited 
deterrence to crimes that can have large-scale economic and social effects (Goodman, 1997; 
Obuh, 2011).  In addition to weak penalties, Obuh (2011) found that mechanisms of 
cooperation across national borders toward solving and prosecuting crimes are not only 
complex, but slow.  
 
Gershowitz (2011) found that, in addition to the challenges already discussed, the prosecutorial 
process favours cyber criminals as it is difficult to convince a typically overburdened 
prosecutorial office to commit resources to see the matter through to conviction. Most 
prosecutors with limited resources devote their efforts to addressing those crimes perceived as 
posing the greatest threat. 
 
A study reported that, in South Africa, businesses generally lack the ability to detect, track, 
prove and prosecute cases of cyber-based fraud (ITWeb, 2013).  Furthermore, investigations 
and prosecutions are hampered by a lack of forensic readiness on the part of the companies 
affected.  ITWeb (2013) reports that “in South Africa, it is estimated that less than 6% of all 
criminal cases are successfully prosecuted. With cyber-based crimes, the conviction rate could 
be even lower due to its technical nature.” 
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Finally, McConnell International (2000, p. 8) established that most countries, particularly those 
in the developing world, “recognise the importance of outlawing malicious computer-related 
acts in a timely manner in order to promote a secure environment for e-commerce. But few 
have the legal and technical resources necessary to address the complexities of adapting 
terrestrial criminal statutes to cyberspace. A coordinated, public-private partnership to produce 
a model approach can help eliminate the potential danger from the inadvertent creation of 
cybercrime havens.” 
 
It is against this backdrop that the study explores the development of a multidisciplinary digital 
forensic readiness model for use in developing economies, utilising South Africa as a case 
study. 
 
The next section will discuss the problem statement. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Derived from the preliminary literature review, as presented above, the problem statement for 
this study can be formulated in the following way:  
 
The organisational risk of inadvertently destroying and negating evidentiary data, due to the 
complexity and multidisciplinary nature of digital crimes, necessitates the development of a 
digital forensic readiness model using a coordinated, multidisciplinary approach involving both 
public and private sectors. Current models are context, technology and/or business process 
specific, and lack the multidisciplinary approach which seeks to investigate inter-discipline 
interactions. 
 
In order to investigate potential solutions to the above problem statement, a set of research 
objectives was developed.  These are discussed next. 
1.4 The Five Research Objectives  
The following research objectives were derived from prominent literature themes that stem 
from the preliminary literature review conducted as part of this research proposal (see italicised 
Sections 1.1 and 1.2 for keywords [literature themes] which led to the development of the 
research objectives). 
i. Research Objective 1 (RO1): To identify common factors associated with both the 
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technical and legal challenges faced in the prosecution of digital crimes.   
ii. Research Objective 2 (RO2): To establish whether organisations in the same legal 
jurisdiction have, and make use of, a standard digital forensics methodology. 
iii. Research Objective 3 (RO3): To determine the extent to which advances in digital 
forensics are meeting the demands of the changing legal and technical landscape.  
iv. Research Objective 4 (RO4): To investigate critical factors preventing human resources 
directly involved in the investigation and prosecution of digital crimes from functioning 
effectively. 
v. Research Objective 5 (RO5): To determine whether organisations are taking the 
necessary steps to proactively manage the rising scourge of digital crimes. 
 
In addition, a series of 10 hypotheses was used to explore the problem statement and associated 
research objectives. These hypotheses are distributed equally and investigated in Chapters 2 and 
4, respectively. For purposes of triangulation, more than one method of data collection on the 
same phenomenon is used (Craig, 2009). This process facilitates the validation of data through 
cross verification from two, or more, sources as a means to increase confidence in the results 
(Yin, 2011). 
 
Each hypothesis is theoretically explored using a literature survey, as presented in Chapter 2.  
In Chapter 4 field interviews with industry experts are presented as the second means of 
exploring each hypothesis.  
 
See Table 1 for a summary of the relationship between the literature themes, research objectives 
(RO) and hypotheses (H). 
 
 
 
Literature Themes Research 
Objectives 
Chapter 2 
(Systematic 
Literature 
Review) 
Chapter 4 
(Data 
Gathering and 
Analysis) 
Technical and Legal 
Challenges 
RO1 H1 H6  
Digital Forensic 
Methodology 
RO2 H2 H7  
Digital Forensic 
Advances 
RO3 H3 H8  
Human Resource 
Management 
RO4 H4 H9  
Digital Crime 
Preparedness 
RO5 H5 H10  
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Table 1: Relationship between literature themes and hypotheses. 
 
The next section discusses the 10 hypotheses investigated in this thesis. 
1.5 The 10 Hypotheses for Investigation 
This section presents the 10 hypotheses and shows their distribution across Chapters 2 and 4. 
 
Chapter 2 presents the following five hypotheses, which were tested by means of a Systematic 
Literature Survey (Sobh, 2010): 
i. Hypothesis 1 (H1): Electronic evidence gathered during a digital forensic investigation 
does not provide sufficient assurance of non-manipulation to the courts. 
ii. Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a lack of standardisation of the criteria against which 
electronic evidence is validated as no consistent digital forensic methodology exists. 
iii. Hypothesis 3 (H3): Forensic technology for gathering digital evidence is increasingly 
lagging behind the advances being made in anti-forensic tools and the rapid changes in 
storage technology. 
iv. Hypothesis 4 (H4): Individuals involved in the digital forensic investigation and 
prosecution process are not sufficiently trained and/or educated. 
v. Hypothesis 5 (H5): An organisation responding to a digital crime, without an incident 
response plan, may take actions that compromise the admissibility of evidence to a 
court of law.  
 
Chapter 4 uses interviews (Teddlie et al., 2009; Kvale et al., 2009) to test the following 5 
hypotheses: 
i. Hypothesis 6 (H6): As a result of the presence of the electronic laws in South Africa, the 
prosecution of digital crimes faces no limitations.  
ii. Hypothesis 7 (H7): South Africa has a standardised digital forensic model and process 
which is used by authorities to investigate and prosecute digital crimes. 
iii. Hypothesis 8 (H8): The Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act of 
South Africa adequately positions the acceptable use of, and extent to which, electronic 
evidence can be used in a civil or criminal proceeding.   
iv. Hypothesis 9 (H9): Those individuals involved in the prosecution of digital crimes are 
knowledgeable, adequately trained and professionally certified.  
v. Hypothesis 10 (H10): South African organisations do not need to concern themselves 
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with digital forensic readiness, as digital crimes are not commonplace.  
 
The next section discusses the purpose statement and the adopted research design. 
1.6 Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study is to develop and explain how a model based, multidisciplinary 
approach to digital forensic readiness can aid in preserving the integrity of evidentiary data 
within an organisation. 
 
According to McConnell International (2000), such a model and approach may help eliminate 
the potential danger posed by the inadvertent destruction and negating of evidentiary data. 
 
For purposes of this research, the scope is limited to the South African legal context. 
1.7 Ethical Considerations 
This research was conducted in strict adherence to the University of South Africa’s Policy on 
Research Ethics (UNISA, 2007).  At the time of thesis submission, a revised version of said 
policy existed, the requirements of which were also taken into consideration to ensure strict 
compliance.  Compliance was achieved in all aspects, particularly regarding the following 
requirements relating to general ethics principles: 
 
i. Essentiality and relevance: the requirement is to consider the scarcity of resources in 
South Africa and to demonstrate that the research is in pursuit of knowledge and public 
good.  In doing so, a rigorous review of South African case studies was analysed, in 
conjunction with the systematic literature review findings, to understand the underlying 
issues relating to the topic under investigation.  The research topic also serves the public 
good in that it addresses a pertinent and relevant issue.  
ii. Maximisation of public interest and social justice: the requirement is to conduct research 
for the benefit of society, with the motive of maximising public interest and social 
justice by sharing the research findings with the public. This thesis specifically 
addresses social challenges, as they relate to the prosecution of digital crimes.  Articles 
on key findings of this research were made public though publications in research 
journals. 
iii. Competence, ability and commitment to research:  the requirement is for the researcher 
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to be both personally, and professionally, qualified for the research which he/she 
undertakes.  In this instance, as at the time of this research, the researcher has over ten 
years of experience as a digital forensic practitioner, and holds relevant international 
certifications and qualifications in the field.  
iv. Respect for and protection of the rights and interests of participants and institutions: the 
requirement is to respect and protect the dignity, privacy and confidentiality of 
participants and institutions alike. To achieve this, the thesis maintains the anonymity 
of both the participants and their institutions.  All personally identifiable data is 
encrypted and stored in a secure location.  
v. Informed and non-coerced consent: the requirement is that individuals freely participate, 
based on informed consent and for a specific purpose. Participants in this study were 
informed of their rights and formal permission to participate required in a written letter. 
Their acceptance was in the form of counter signing the said letter, which was also kept 
safe, in encrypted format as it contains personally identifiable data.  
vi. Respect for cultural differences: the suggestion is for research to be undertaken with the 
members of an identified community, or communities, rather than merely about such a 
community, or communities. No cultural challenges were faced during the selection of 
said participants. 
vii. Justice, fairness and objectivity: the requirement is for the selection criteria of research 
participants to be fair and scientific. The participants in this research were experts in 
the industry, who had met a strict criterion, as further detailed in Chapter 3.   
viii. Integrity, transparency and accountability: the guideline is that researchers should be 
honest about their own limitations, competence, belief systems, values and needs.  To 
ensure adherence to these principles, this thesis details the research approach followed 
(see section 1.7 of Chapter 1), and strictly applies the scientific process associated with 
the interpretive paradigm.  The researcher’s personal opinions are detailed in Chapter 
8, in the form of reflections on the research undertaken. 
ix. Risk minimisation: the requirement is that actual benefits to be derived by the participants, 
or society, clearly outweigh any possible risks, and that participants are subjected only 
to those risks that are clearly necessary for the conduct of the research.  This thesis 
protects the anonymity of the participants and their institutions, thereby avoiding any 
possible backlash resulting from exposure.  
x. Non-exploitation: the requirement is for there to be no exploitation of research 
participants, researchers (including students and junior members), communities, 
institutions or vulnerable people. All participants of this study were treated with respect 
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and in a professional manner.  Careful preparation was conducted, prior to meeting with 
participants, to demonstrate that their time and efforts were valued.    	
All other sections of the Ethics Policy were carefully read and considered.  
 
A copy of the signed ethics clearance is attached to this thesis.  The next section presents an 
overview of the layout of the thesis.  
1.8 An Overview of the Layout of this Thesis 
As per Table 2, this study comprises eight chapters and a conclusion. 
 
Chapter 1: This chapter presents the introduction. It details the problem statement and the five 
research objectives, as derived from the literature survey conducted.  This work is presented in 
Chapter 1, as part of the research proposal.  
 
Chapter 2: This chapter discusses the first set of five hypotheses, each linked to a research 
objective which, in turn, contributes to achieving the requirements of the problem statement.  
A systematic literature review was used as a data gathering method and to test each hypothesis.  
This chapter demonstrates how the relativist ontology, as discussed in Chapter 3, was applied 
to analyse the primary research data.  A new digital forensic conceptual model is presented.  
 
A research paper was published at the conclusion of this chapter. See Appendix 1 for a copy of 
this research article which proposes the conceptual model developed as part of the output from 
Chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 3: Outlines the methodology, ontology and epistemology adopted in this research, and 
provides justification for the same.  
 
Chapter 4: This chapter presents hypotheses 6 to 10, and comprises the main experiment section 
of this research. Interviews were the data gathering method used to test each of the hypothesis 
presented in this chapter, as part of the human experiment to confirm results from Chapter 2 
(systematic literature survey). This chapter demonstrates the application of the interpretivist 
paradigm in order to facilitate the analysis and interpretation of interview data collected.  
Finally, this chapter discusses the triangulation of findings from chapters 2 and 4, in order to 
identify and explore common themes and strengthen grounded theory results. The output from 
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the latter process is used as a theoretical foundation towards the development of  the proposed 
model which is then validated and verified against actual case law. 
 
A research paper was published at the conclusion of this chapter. See Appendix 2 for a copy of 
the research article describing the proposed high-level multidisciplinary model. 
 
Chapter 5: Presents a discussion regarding the significance of the three key environments which 
contextualise digital forensic readiness and each of their respective components, and uses a 
critical literature review to support the assertions made. This chapter forms the foundation upon 
which the proposed multidisciplinary model was developed. 
 
Chapter 6: This chapter takes the cumulative findings from the previous chapters and validates 
them against three case studies, leading to the creation of the M-DiFoRe model.  Principles of 
relativism, as discussed in Chapter 1 (see section 1.7), are applied as the main ontological 
position taken in the validation and verification of the model, as presented in Chapters 6 and 7, 
respectively. 
 
Chapter 7: This chapter contains the details of how the M-DiFoRe model was verified.  This 
verification process served as a basis to assess whether the model meets the requirements, as 
stipulated in the problem statement. 
 
Chapter 8: This is the concluding chapter, which outlines a summary of the key findings of this 
study is presented, along with the research value and opportunities for further research. 
 
Throughout the thesis, a simplistic approach was purposefully adopted in explaining and 
defining certain terms. This was done to make the research more accessible to a broader 
audience.  
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Problem Statement  Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 
The organisational risk of 
inadvertently destroying and 
negating evidentiary data due 
to the complexity and 
multidisciplinary nature of 
digital crimes, necessitates the 
development of a digital 
forensic readiness model using 
a coordinated, 
multidisciplinary approach 
involving both the public and 
private sectors. Current models 
are context, technology and/or 
business process specific, and 
lack the multidisciplinary 
approach that seeks to 
investigate inter-discipline 
interactions. 
1. RO1 H1 H6 (INT Q6, Q10, Q15) 
Part 1: 
Conceptual 
Model 
development 
Part 2: Model 
development 
using a 
coordinated and 
multidisciplinary 
approach  
Model 
assessment 
2. RO2 H2 H7 (INT Q5, Q7, Q11) 
3. RO3 H3 H8 (INT Q8, Q9, Q4) 
4. RO4 H4 H9 (INT Q12, Q13, 14) 
5. RO5 H5 H10 (INT Q1, Q2, Q3)  
Chapter 3 - Approach: Postmodernism 
Chapter 3 - Ontology: Relativism 
Chapter 3 - Epistemology: Interpretivism 
Chapter 3 - Paradigm: Interpretivist 
Chapter 3 - Methodology: Grounded Theory 
Introduction  
Systematic 
Literature 
Review  
Data Gathering and 
Analysis 
Foundational 
Principles 
Towards Model 
Development 
Realisation of the 
Conceptual Model 
Model Validation 
Approach 
[ROn – Research Objective; Hn – Hypothesis; INT Qn – Interview Question] 
Table 2: Overview of the layout of this thesis. 
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1.9 Conclusion 
This chapter presented an introduction to this research, and outlined the motivation for this 
research, problem statement, research objectives, and the purpose statement. 
 
The research objectives were divided equally (into sets of five) and spread across Chapters 2, 
and 5, for further investigation and testing. Each of the hypotheses was linked to a research 
objective and collectively they formed the basis for investigating the problem statement.   
 
Finally, this chapter concludes with a presentation on the layout of the thesis and briefly 
discusses the contents of the eight chapters. 
 
Chapter 2, which contains a systematic literature survey, is presented next. 
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2. Chapter 2: Systematic Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter comprised the research proposal and presented the layout of this thesis. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to establish whether challenges experienced with the digital forensic 
process have any empirical grounding in literature. This is done by investigating hypotheses 1 
to 5 and making use of a systematic literature survey, as a research method, in the investigation 
process. The hypotheses under investigation are:  
i. Hypothesis 1 (H1): Electronic evidence gathered during a digital forensic investigation 
does not provide sufficient assurance of non-manipulation to the courts. 
ii. Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a lack of standardisation in the criteria against which 
electronic evidence is validated as no consistent digital forensic methodology exists. 
iii. Hypothesis 3 (H3): Forensic technology for gathering digital evidence is increasingly 
lagging behind the advances being made in anti-forensic tools and the rapid changes in 
storage technology. 
iv. Hypothesis 4 (H4): Individuals involved in the digital forensic investigation and 
prosecution process are not sufficiently trained and/or educated. 
v. Hypothesis 5 (H5): An organisation responding to a digital crime, without an incident 
response plan, may take actions that compromise the admissibility of evidence to a 
court of law.  
 
The results from testing these hypotheses provided a theoretical foundation to understanding 
existing literature relating to the research objectives and also facilitated the extrapolation of 
common themes and patterns in literature which, in turn, guided the development of the digital 
forensic ready (DFR) conceptual model, as detailed in the published research paper attached 
herein as Appendix 1. 
 
The chapter concludes with a discussion on the outcome of each hypothesis. 
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2.2 The Systematic Literature Review Protocol  
A systematic literature review is used to conduct the literature review.  Unlike conventional 
literature reviews, a systematic review follows a predefined protocol.  It is defined as a way to 
“identify, evaluate and interpret the available research that is relevant to an issue or discipline, 
or phenomenon of interest of a specific research domain” (Sobh, 2010, p. 99). 
 
Systematic reviews require the researcher to systematically collect all the search on a given 
topic, select studies according to pre-determined quality criteria, abstract the same information 
from each included study, display the results in evidence tables and then interpret the results in 
light of the totality of the evidence (Lang, 2010). 
 
Fox et al. (2007) summarised the steps for a systematic literature review as follows: 
i. Step 1: Define and refine a topic.  A literature review starts with a clearly defined, well-
focused research question and a plan.  Keywords are used to aid the search for related 
research material for review.   
ii. Step 2: Design a search.  It is important to decide on the type of literature review, its 
extent and the types, or forms, of literature to include (parameters). 
iii. Step 3: Locate the research literature.  Locating the relevant literature will depend on the 
type of literature being sought.   
iv. Step 4: Evaluate the results and determine what to record.  Located literature must be 
evaluated and recorded in a suitable way. If sources do not provide sufficient 
information, it is important to revisit the retrieval system and use a different approach.  
Whatever the method used, the search must be systematic and organised. 
v. Step 5: Write the review.  A systematic literature review requires planning and good, 
clear writing. 
 
This protocol is adopted with the aim of achieving a high level of scientific rigour, thus 
enhancing the reliability of the research output.  The next section discusses the way in which 
these steps were applied in the thesis. 
2.2.1 Step 1: Define and refine a topic 
The research question governing this chapter is: do the challenges experienced with the digital 
forensic process have any empirical grounding in literature? 
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The following keywords were used:  
i. Digital forensics;  
ii. Computer forensics;  
iii. Forensic readiness;  
iv. Digital forensic methodology and  
v. Digital forensic process. 
2.2.2 Step 2: Design a search 
The scope of our research was limited to material available on the University of South Africa 
Online Library (UNISA, 2010a). This library is said to be one of the largest libraries in Africa, 
with information sources in excess of 1.5 million. The library also subscribes to an increasing 
number of electronic journals, which are available at all times to Unisa students (Ramalibana, 
2005; UNISA, 2010a). 
 
A detailed search of relevant databases was conducted.  The relevance was determined by using 
the library’s A - Z list of electronic resources (UNISA, 2010b).  From this, databases containing 
the most relevant material were selected and analysed further in search of articles and other 
publications.  The databases used were selected based on them being classified under the 
following categories: 
i. Multidisciplinary; 
ii.  Computing; 
iii.  Law; 
iv. Information Science and  
v. Engineering.  
 
Furthermore, the databases used were those which contained the majority of search hit results.  
The search word used was digital forensic.  This keyword was used as the basis of the search 
as it directly relates to the topic under investigation. 
 
Only English written material (published 2002 – 2017) was reviewed. The reasons for this 
being that firstly, Unisa’s online library is available in English and it is one of South Africa’s 
most commonly spoken languages in business, politics and the media (Webb, 2002; South 
Africa, 2013). 
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Secondly, there was no law on digital crimes in South Africa prior to the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act in 2002 (Government Gazette, 2002; Kabanda et al., 
2010).  Therefore, only articles written after promulgation of this law were taken into 
consideration. 
 
The decision for reviewing only articles was based on the logic that articles usually flow from 
books, dissertation and theses. Therefore, by looking at articles, content from the latter is also 
covered.  The next section discusses the methodology for the screening of articles for inclusion. 
2.2.3 Step 3: Locate the research literature 
Table 3 shows the seven disciplines from which the included articles were obtained.  This table 
also shows the database searched under each discipline.  In order to ensure that the process of 
identifying articles for inclusion was comprehensive, the following methodology was 
followed: 
i. Open the UNISA online library link (UNISA 2010a); 
ii. Search for resources according to subject; 
iii. Select the subject/discipline topic; 
iv. Identify and select the relevant journal; 
v. Search entire journal collection for articles with keywords “digital forensics, computer 
forensics, forensic readiness, digital forensic methodology, digital forensic process”; 
vi. Read the abstract of the first 100 articles appearing on the results page; 
vii. Export only the full text of articles selected for inclusion, based on the relevance 
established from the abstract and 
viii. Detailed analysis of articles of inclusion. 
 
The use of these eight steps ensured that every article, in each journal, found in every database 
of inclusion, was reviewed for relevance. 
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# Discipline Database Name Journal 
1 Computing Association of Computing Machinery ACM Digital Library All 
2 Engineering ProQuest Technology Journals All 
3 Law Oxford University Press Journals (current and archive) All 
4 Consumer Science  ScienceDirect All 
5 Library & Information Science ScienceDirect All 
6 Police Practice  Criminal Justice Periodicals All 
7 Science and Technology Scitopia All 
Table 3: Reference materials used to identify articles for inclusion. 
2.2.4 Step 4: Evaluate the results 
Since this systematic literature review is aimed not only at publication purposes, but also for 
instrumental utilisation, an additional screening process was undertaken to increase the 
reliability of the results.  The researcher and supervisor conducted the screening process on a 
subset of articles, independently of each other, and then met to compare results.  In order to 
ensure that this process was scientific, the Cohen’s Kappa (K) inter-rater was used for 
measuring reliability of this process.  Inter-rater reliability is the degree of agreement between 
two observers who have independently observed and recorded behaviours at the same time 
(Gravetter et al., 2009; Mathews, 2010).  The basic formula for Cohen’s Kappa (K) is computed 
as illustrated below: 
 
Cohen’s Kappa =  PA (0.77) – PC (0.50) 
      1 – PC (0.50) 
         = 0.54 
 
Where PA is the observed percentage agreement and PC is the percentage agreement expected 
(Gravetter et al., 2009). 
 
The goal in this study was to produce a PA value above 75% from the total reviewed articles.  
This was computed in the following way: 
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PA =   Articles which both Researcher and Supervisor agree on for inclusion   > 75% 
   Total number of articles reviewed 
 
The overall application of Cohen’s Kappa (K) inter-rater in the review of articles for inclusion 
is shown in Table 4. 
 
  Supervisor's Decisions  
  Articles Included 
Articles 
Excluded  
Researcher's Decisions 
Articles Included A B A + B 
Articles Excluded C D C + D 
  A + C B + D A+B+C+D 
Table 4: The application of Cohen's Kappa (K) to this study. 
 
As stated before, the goal was to produce a PA value above 75% from the total reviewed 
articles.  This was done to ensure that all relevant articles were included for detailed review 
and to archive a kappa value above 0.50.  The said kappa goal is generally considered to be 
satisfactory (Gravetter et al., 2009; Mathews, 2010). 
 
Both authors met to calculate the inter-rate reliability by calculating a percentage agreement.  
This process was repeated until the percentage agreement exceeded 75%. Abstracts of 459 
articles were reviewed, resulting in the identification of 130 relevant articles for possible 
inclusion.  The review process was refined further and the result was an agreement on the final 
100 articles for inclusion. 
 
The next section discusses the articles reviewed and their relevance to this study. 
2.2.5 Step 5: Write the review 
Since the advent of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2002 (Government 
Gazette, 2002), electronic evidence has increasingly been accepted in the modern South 
African courtroom.  A paradigm shift from the traditional law of evidence had to take place in 
order to accommodate the unique complexities that digital evidence carries  
(Gershowitz, 2011, Walsh et al., 2013).  With the rapid development of technology more 
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challenges were introduced to the already complex concept of digital forensics as per Noblett 
et al. (2000). 
 
In an attempt to encourage organisations to be proactive in achieving digital forensic readiness, 
pioneers such as Rowlingson (2004) and Kenneally et al. (2005) have sought to demystify the 
concept of forensic readiness.  Their work has provided a base for other researchers to produce 
models and frameworks that seek to make organisational digital forensic readiness a reality. 
 
Based on Rowlingson’s (2004) research, Jordaan et al. (2010) proposed the following as 
thematic categories, essential to achieving digital forensic readiness: 
i. Strategy; 
ii. Policy and Procedures;  
iii. Technology; 
iv. Digital Forensic Response and  
v. Compliance and Monitoring. 
 
On the other hand, Elyas et al. (2014) take the known thematic categories further by seeking to 
understand their relationships. They propose a theoretical framework that comprises two main 
parts, namely: 
i. The state of forensic readiness and the capabilities that characterise forensic readiness 
and  
ii. Factors that contribute to making an organisation forensically ready. 
   
With this categorisation, Elyas et al. (2014) identify forensic factors as being: 
i. Strategy; 
ii. Top Management Support; 
iii. Governance;  
iv. Culture; 
v. Policy; 
vi. Technical and non-technical stakeholders; 
vii. Training; 
viii. Technology; 
ix. System Monitoring and  
x. System Architecture. 
 
Finally, Elyas et al. (2014) state that these forensic factors collectively interact with the 
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following forensic readiness capabilities: 
i. Legal-evidence management; 
ii. Internal investigations and  
iii. Regulatory compliance.  
 
While not necessarily approached from a broader organisational level, as does Rowlingson’s 
(2004), Jordaan et al. (2010) and Elyas et al. (2014), other noteworthy research relating to 
digital forensic readiness include those discussed in the next section. 
2.2.5.1 A Review of Existing Digital Forensic Models  
A total of 13 prominent models, which were developed in the 21st Century, were reviewed as 
part of this study. However, due to the length of the thesis, diagrams and theoretical 
underpinnings of said models are not included in this Chapter.  As can be seen in Table 5, only 
the model name, year of publication and author are noted. The decision to include models from 
the period 2001 to 2017 is in line with the research design, as detailed in section 2.2.2 of this 
Chapter.  In addition, this covers a transitionary period whereby earlier models appear to have 
been isolated when compared to later models which show attributes of inter-connectedness, as 
is explained next.  
 
Findings show that in principle, the models reviewed in this study all agree on the key phases 
of the digital forensic process [1-13].  They attempt to standardise the digital forensic process 
by defining and refining it [1-13].  Early 21st Century, or traditional models [1-4], attempt to 
define the digital forensic process whilst those ascribed to the latter 21st Century, or modern 
models [4-13],  attempt to refine said process. The reviewed models also focus on the sequence 
of the phases in the digital forensic process, thereby making their execution sequential in nature 
[1-13].  
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Period 
of 
Model 
Name of Model  Model Relationships  Authors  
 
Ref 
2001 DFRWS Investigative Model    Palmer (2001)  1 
2001 Forensic Readiness    Tan (2001) 2 
2002 The Abstract Digital Forensics Model  
Derivative of 
Palmer (2001)1   Reith et al. (2002)  3 
2003 Integrated Digital Investigation Process    Carrier et al. (2003) 4 
2004 Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model 
Derivative of 
Carrier et al. 
(2003)4 
Baryamereeba et al. 
(2004)  5 
2004 A Ten Step Process for Forensic Readiness  
Based in Tan 
(2001)2 Rawlingson (2004) 6 
2004 
A Hierarchical, Objectives-
Based Framework for the 
Digital Investigations Process  
  Beebe et al. (2004) 7 
2009 A Model for Introducing Digital Forensic Readiness to XBRL 
Derivative of 
Rawlingson 
(2004)6 
Kotze et al. (2009) 8 
2011 Generic Computer Forensic Investigation Model    Yusoff (2011)  9 
2012 
The Modelling of a Digital 
Forensic Readiness Approach 
for Wireless Local Area 
Networks 
  Ngobeni et al. (2012) 10 
2013 Integrated Digital Forensic Process Model  
Derivative of 
Rawlingson 
(2004)6 
Kohn et al. (2013) 11 
2014 Digital Forensics as a Service (DFaaS) Process Model    
van Baar et al. 
(2014) 12 
2016 
On digital forensic readiness in 
the cloud using a distributed 
agent-based solution: issues and 
challenges  
  Kebande et al. (2016) 13 	Table	5:	Digital Forensic Models reviewed. 
 
A key trend noted in some modern models is that they are context and use-case specific [5,7-
10,13].  A typical example of these are the models by Ngobeni et al. (2012) and Kebande et al. 
(2016). This means that they are aimed at solving a specific technical problem, such as the 
analysis of volatile memory data, or a problem within a specific context, such as digital 
forensics in cloud computing.  
 
Unlike traditional models which were primarily concerned with defining the digital forensic 
technical process [1-4], more recent modern models [5-13] are integrated and 
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multidisciplinary in nature. These models start to recognise other stakeholders in the digital 
forensic process, including concepts such as forensic readiness (Rowlingson, 2004) and the 
role an organisation plays in the digital forensic process (Kenneally et al., 2005). 
2.2.5.2 Challenges noted with reviewed models  
While modern models show elements of being integrated, or multidisciplinary in nature, they 
neither illustrate nor explain the interdependencies between the various stakeholders and/or 
components across the different disciplines. Findings also show that modern models improve 
on earlier ones by refining the digital forensic process.  However, in so doing they inadvertently 
end up being more process and/or use case specific. This limits their application within their 
intended multidisciplinary environment. 
 
This study recognises the contributions of the models, as listed in Table 5, and seeks to provide 
a truly multidisciplinary and non-sequential approach to organisational digital forensic 
readiness, taking into account the existing literature, with an aim of illustrating and explaining 
the interdependencies between the various stakeholders across the different disciplines.  
Additionally, instead of the core of the model being the digital forensic process, the proposed 
model seeks to elevate this to digital forensics as a discipline. 
2.2.5.3 Proposed Model Requirements  
As previously discussed, existing models are context, technology and/or business process 
specific, and lack the enhanced multidisciplinary approach which seeks to investigate inter-
disciplinary interactions. 
 
In line with the problem statement, as derived from literature review, the proposed model 
intends to address gaps and challenges noted in existing models, with the aim of reducing the 
organisational risk of inadvertently destroying and negating evidentiary data due to the 
complexity and multidisciplinary nature of digital crimes.  The proposed model was developed 
through the use of a coordinated, multidisciplinary approach involving both public and private 
sectors. 
 
The next section unpacks the meaning of what constitutes digital forensics.  
2.3 An evolutionary practice 
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Over the past decade or so, well-understood procedures and methodologies have evolved 
within the domain of computer forensics digital evidence collection (Kenneally et al., 2005; 
Cooper et al., 2010).  Kenneally et al. (2005) noted that computer forensic post-mortems are 
no longer performed on single machines with small storage capacities. Rather, the scope for 
potential evidence now includes networks of interconnected computers, each with immense 
storage capacities containing potential artifacts of legal relevance.  
 
This is fast becoming a reality.  Garﬁnkel (2010, p. 64) stated that the “golden Age of computer 
forensics is quickly coming to an end.”  While computer forensic practice is diminishing, a 
new era of the digital forensic practice is slowly dawning. 
 
In addition, Garﬁnkel (2010, p. 64) added that “without a clear strategy for enabling research 
efforts that build upon one another, [digital] forensic research will fall behind the market, tools 
will become increasingly obsolete, and law enforcement, military and other users of computer 
forensics products will be unable to rely on the results of forensic analysis.” 
 
Many definitions of digital forensics exist. Due to an early saturation point, this section limits 
the scope to only four definitions from different sources which will be analysed for similarities 
and differences.  The objective is to establish whether available definitions are in harmony and 
to identify a single definition that can be adopted for the purposes of this study.  
 
The selected process definitions are: 
i. Definition 1: According to Reyes et al. (2007, p. 7) “digital forensics includes preserving, 
collecting, confirming, identifying, analysing, recording and presenting crime scene 
information.” 
ii. Definition 2: Reyes et al. (2011, p. 9) explained digital forensics as “the scientiﬁc 
acquisition, analysis, and preservation of data contained in electronic media whose 
information can be used as evidence in a court of law.” 
iii. Definition 3: Coopman (2009, p. 1) defined digital forensics as “the collection, 
examination, preservation and recording of information found on computers and 
information networks.” 
iv. Definition 4: According to Cooper et al. (2010) digital forensics involve “scientifically 
derived and proven methods toward the preservation, collection, validation, 
identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation and presentation of digital 
evidence derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the 
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reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized 
actions shown to be disruptive to planned operations.” 
2.3.1 Components of the definition 
The common denominator in the definitions discussed is the use of the actual digital forensic 
process as the basis for the definition.  Table 6 tabulates the common elements found in each 
of the four definitions which have been discussed. The uniqueness of each element is reflected 
by the super-script value appearing at the end of each component. 
 
Definition 1 Definition 2 Definition 3 Definition 4 
Preserving 1 Preservation 1 Preservation 1 Preservation 1 
Collecting 2 Acquisition 2 Collection 2 Collection 2 
Confirming 3   Validation 3 
Identifying 4   Identification 4 
Recording 5  Recording 5 Documentation 5 
Presenting 6   Presentation 6 
 Analysis 7 Examination 7 Analysis 7 
   Interpretation 8 
Table 6: Elements of the digital forensics definition. 
 
As seen in Table 5, while there are commonalities in the elements embedded in each of the four 
definitions, there are also some differences.  These differences and commonalities are 
discussed further in the next section. 
2.3.2 Gaps in the definitions 
From Table 6, eight unique elements of the definition are found.  From this, findings show that 
elements 1 (Preserving) and 2 (Collection/Acquisition) are the only explicitly common 
elements to the four definitions. 
 
Furthermore, definitions 2 and 3 do not possess the same level of detail when compared to 
definitions 1 and 4.  Definition 2 lacks explicit mention of five elements, while definition 3 
lacks mention of four.  For the purposes of this study, these definitions will therefore be 
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excluded. 
 
From definitions 1 and 4, findings show six common elements.  These are preserving, 
collecting, confirming, identifying, recording and presenting.  
 
Definition 4 adds further detail by including two additional elements: analysis and 
interpretation. 
 
2.3.3 Propositioned definition 
While all the proposed definitions provide a good understanding of what digital forensics is, 
for the purposes of this study, the definition that best provides clarity is definition 4 by Cooper 
et al. (2010).  
 
For the purposes of this study, definition 4 was thus adopted in its entirety.  
 
With this definition in mind, the next section explores available literature on digital forensics 
in order to address the research hypothesis as presented earlier in this chapter.  
2.4 Findings 
This section investigates the five hypotheses listed in the introduction of this chapter. 
2.4.1 Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis states: electronic evidence gathered during a digital forensic investigation 
does not provide sufficient assurance of non-manipulation to the courts. 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, rapid changes and advances in technology and related 
crimes have necessitated the need to review and improve on digital forensic models and 
processes.  Reyes et al. (2007) also observed that, unlike other forensic sciences, digital 
forensics theories continue to evolve, as do the techniques. 
 
In the view of  recent advances in technology, Bell et al. (2010) argue that it would be 
imprudent and potentially reckless to rely on existing evidence collection processes and 
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procedures.  They added that conventional assumptions about the behaviour of storage media 
are no longer valid.  Unlike traditional storage media, modern storage devices can operate under 
their own volition in the absence of computer instructions (Kenneally at al., 2005; Chen et al., 
2009). Such operations can be highly destructive of traditionally recoverable data.  This process 
has the potential to contaminate evidence and can further obfuscate and hamper the validation 
thereof (Kenneally at al., 2005). 
 
For the purposes of this study, the use of the term traditional approaches denotes forensic 
procedures undertaken from the dawn of computer forensic practice to 2005 (Kenneally et al., 
2005).  On the other hand, the use of the term modern approaches refers to digital forensic 
procedures post 2005 (Garﬁnkel, 2010).  As discussed earlier in this chapter, traditional 
approaches are starting to diminish and, at the same time, modern approaches are being adopted. 
This period of co-existence of the two approaches affords one a great opportunity to compare 
these two practices and so appreciate the various strengths inherent in them. This process is 
explained in detail in the paragraphs that follow.  Firstly, we need to explain the basic concept 
of the traditional approach, also termed dead forensics. 
2.4.1.1 Dead Forensic Acquisition Processes 
To meet the desired goal of preserving original evidence, one of the ﬁrst steps in traditional 
evidence collection procedures includes taking the evidence-containing computer system 
ofﬂine and creating a bit-stream image of the entire original evidence disk (Kenneally at al., 
2005).  Figure 1 presents a summary of the computer forensic process and its objectives 
according to The Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence. 
 
The process begins with the preservation of digital evidence by pulling the power cord in 
preparation for the physical removal of the storage device for imaging purposes.  Security 
becomes an important consideration to ensure the logical and physical safety of the evidence.  
At the conclusion of the imaging process, a hashing tool is used to authenticate the forensic 
image.  This is then followed by the analysis and reporting phases. 
 
If, during the reporting phase, data is required to be re-authenticated, a cryptographic hash 
(commonly an MD5 of SHA) is re-calculated to allow parties to show that the data has not 
changed. 
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Figure 1: SWGDE Data integrity within computer forensics (SWGDE, 2006). 
 
A change between hash values (suspect/target drive hash vs. destination drive hash) would 
show that data has been modified and would raise an alarm as to the integrity of the forensic 
image.  The recovery of data must be completed without any data alterations, thereby 
minimising future challenges during legal proceedings.  If a change were to occur, the nature 
and cause of the change must be explained and described convincingly (Kenneally at al., 2005; 
Bell et al., 2010). 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the reality is that these well-understood procedures and 
methodologies have evolved (Cooper et al., 2010; Garﬁnkel, 2010). The scope for potential 
evidence has expanded from standalone computers to networks of interconnected computers, 
each with vast storage capacities containing potential artifacts of legal relevance, making the 
dead forensic acquisition process increasingly obsolete. 
 
If applied to new storage technologies, dead forensic acquisition processes can negate the post 
recovery forensic analysis.  This challenge is brought about by modern storage devices, such 
as solid-state drives (SSDs) (Chen et al., 2009; Bell et al., 2010).  One can therefore no longer 
blindly apply dead forensic processes, by pulling the power cord from a computer running a 
Digital	Evidence	 Digital	Evidence	submitted	for	examination	should	be	maintained	in	such	a	way	that	the	integrity	of	the	data	is	preserved.
Security Security,	both	logical	and	physical,	is	used	to	prevent	the	contamination.
Acquisition	Hash Hashing	of	the	original	data,	commonly	referred	to	as	an	acquisition	hash,	should	be	done	when	an	image	of	the	data	is	being	created.
Verification A	verification	hash	of	the	image	is	done	after	the	completion	of	acquisition.
Analysis	 Analysis	is	conducted	on	the	imaged	copy.
Ensure	Data	not	Compromised If	a	re-examination	is	requested,	hashing	can	be	performed	to	authenticate	the	image.
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SSD, and assume that evidence will remain intact and unchanged.  In addition, the presence of 
anti-forensic tools on a modern, or traditional drive, can also have the same destructive effect 
on electronic evidence if the power cord is pulled during computer seizure. 
 
The next section discusses an approach that is being adopted in an effort to counter the 
limitations of dead forensics. 
2.4.1.2 Live Forensic Acquisition Processes 
Also known as Fast Forensics, this concept was deﬁned by Reyes et al. (2007) as investigative 
processes that are conducted within the ﬁrst few hours of an investigation.  As information 
needs to be obtained within a relatively short timeframe, fast forensics usually involves an 
onsite/ﬁeld analysis of the computer system in question. 
 
Live forensic analysis techniques use software that existed on the system during the timeframe 
being investigated. This is in comparison to dead forensic analysis techniques, which use no 
software that existed on the system during that timeframe (Carrier, 2006). 
 
Avoiding contamination during the recovery process is paramount and depends on effective, 
error free data recovery from digital devices.  Traditionally, write-blocking hardware combined 
with bit-stream image copying processes served this purposes.  Some live forensics techniques 
utilise Linux or other forensic boot disks to perform on scene/site searches and data extraction. 
The boot disks run in memory only and mount the hard drives as read only so as not to corrupt 
the evidence (Reyes et al., 2007). 
 
Live forensic analysis focuses on preserving and analysing volatile data.  Volatile data is any 
data that is stored in memory, or in transit, which will be lost when the computer loses power, 
or is powered off. It resides in registers, cache and Random Access Memory (Adelstein, 2006; 
Sutherland et al., 2008). 
 
Sutherland et al. (2008, p. 65-73) argue that there is no way to avoid making changes, since in 
order to conduct a live examination it is necessary to deploy tools on the live system to capture 
data, and such tools will make changes to the running system. 
 
This argument was later supported by Chan et al. (2010) who ascertained that current forensic 
tools are limited by their inability to preserve the hardware and software state of a system 
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during investigation.  Existing tools can overwrite evidence present in memory, or alter the 
contents of the disk causing forensic taint which, in turn, lowers the integrity of the evidence. 
 
On the other hand, taking a snapshot of the system can result in a phenomenon known as 
forensic blurriness where an inconsistent snapshot is captured because the system is running 
while being observed.  Forensic blurriness affects the ﬁdelity and quantity of evidence acquired 
and can cast doubt on the validity of the analysis, resulting in the court’s increased reluctance 
to accept such evidence (Chan et al., 2010). 
 
Although forensic techniques can collect signiﬁcant amounts of vital information, investigators 
are weary of anti-forensic techniques which can hide, or intentionally obfuscate information 
gathered, thus affecting the veracity and ﬁdelity of the evidence collected (Wiles et al., 2007; 
Chan et al., 2010). 
 
We can conclude that both dead and live forensic acquisition processes do not provide 
sufficient assurance of non-manipulation.  This proves the first hypothesis to be correct. 
Therefore, if existing computer forensic procedures ultimately render evidence inadmissible, 
then the need for a redefinition of the methodology is paramount. 
 
The next section discusses the digital forensic process. 
2.4.2 Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis states: there is a lack of standardisation in the criteria against which 
electronic evidence is validated as no consistent digital forensic methodology exists. 
 
Studies suggest that while many processes have been defined for both live and dead forensics, 
there remains a lack of a common standardised process (Hoolachan et al., 2010; Hunton, 2010).  
This section discusses the related literature and draws a conclusion based on the findings. 
 
2.4.2.1 Global lack of standardisation 
In a study conducted by Rogers et al. (2004), findings indicated that both the law enforcement 
community and the private sector/academia are concerned with the lack of a standardised, or 
even a consensus approach, to the training of computer forensics practitioners. The latter was 
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found by Taylor et al. (2007) and Hoolachan et al. (2010) to have a negative impact on an 
organisation’s forensic readiness.  The concept of forensic readiness is discussed later in this 
chapter.  
 
Hunton (2010) acknowledged that there are many rigorous and robust cybercrime and digital 
investigation models already in existence that can provide valuable guidance and structure. 
However, many of these models focus on the recovery of digital evidence from already 
identified technology.  On the other hand, they are abstract in nature and lack direct support 
and alignment to the broader needs of law enforcement investigations. 
 
In addition, Coopman (2009) stated that until now, most law enforcement agencies have 
tailored their computer forensic responses to meet their individual departmental needs.  This is 
a challenge experienced by most organisations offering digital forensic services.  Hoolachan et 
al. (2010, p. 33) also found that “the digital revolution has profoundly affected how both private 
and law enforcement organisations handle digital evidence.” Hence, digital forensic practices 
and the handling of digital evidence is an issue pertinent to many organisations, not just in 
South Africa, but throughout the world. 
 
2.4.2.2 Standardisation: A South African perspective 
In South Africa, the issue of a common standard is being investigated extensively by a Cyber 
Forensic Forum, formed by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners SA (ACFE SA, 
2011).  This forum also found that many organisations, including law enforcement, approach 
digital forensic investigations based on their own internal processes as there is no common 
standard.  Some of the standards being reviewed by this Forum are listed in Table 7. 
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Abbreviated 
Name 
Full Organisation Name Document Title 
CSIR Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research 
Process Flows for Cyber Forensics 
Training and Operations 
DFCB Digital Forensics Certification 
Board 
DFCP/DFCA – KSA Domains (v1.3) 
IACIS International Association of 
Computer Investigative 
Specialists 
Certification Competencies (v 2) 
IOCE International Organisation for 
Computer Evidence  
Guidelines for Best Practice in the 
Forensic Examination of Digital 
Technology (Draft v1.0) 
SWGDE Scientific Working Group on 
Digital Evidence Standards 
Best Practices for Computer Forensics 
(v 2.1) 
SANAS  South African National 
Accreditation System 
Criteria for Laboratory Accreditation in 
the field of Forensics (TG 01-01) 
ACPO Association of Chief Police 
Officers 
Good Practice and Advice Guide for 
Managers of e-Crime Investigation: 
Managers Guide (v 0.1.4)  
Table 7: ACFE SA reference resources for the creation of a common digital forensic standard 
in South Africa. 
 
The ACFE SA Cyber Forensic Forum has identified the lack of a common digital forensic 
standard as a challenge and has embarked on a mission to formulate one.  From this we can 
conclude that the second hypothesis, which states that there is a lack of standardisation in the 
criteria against which electronic evidence is validated as no consistent digital forensic 
methodology exists, is true. With the first hypothesis also having proven true, this adds further 
severity to the enormous risk the digital forensic practice faces. 
 
The next section discusses the third hypothesis which investigates the impact of various 
advances in technology on the practice of digital forensics. 
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2.4.3 Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis states: forensic technology for gathering digital evidence is increasingly 
lagging behind the advances being made in anti-forensic tools and the rapid changes in storage 
technology. 
 
As previously mentioned, the traditional concept of dead forensics has for many years been 
accepted and practiced in the computer forensic field.  According to Bell et al. (2010), the long-
established and accepted procedures cover situations such as the automated recovery of court-
submissible evidence which a defendant has previously attempted to delete. Indeed, the 
peculiarity of deleted, but not forgotten data which so often comes back to haunt defendants in 
court is in many ways a bizarre artefact of hard drive technology. This stems from the reality 
that traditional hard disks have slow access speeds relative to their capacity for storage. The 
latter makes complete erasure very inconvenient, and from the fact that there is no performance 
penalty incurred for writing over existing data (which makes complete erasure unnecessary). 
 
This situation is in the process of changing (Garﬁnkel, 2010).  Newer technologies, such as the 
Solid-state drives (SSD), are much faster and more complex.  However, these complexities are 
not limited to only SSDs, but extend to other storage forms such as Raid Arrays, Storage Area 
Network (SAN) and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices as well. 
 
For purposes of explaining these challenges in detail, this chapter only elaborates on the 
changes in storage systems, as they apply to the SSD. 
2.4.3.1 Basic Operation of a Solid-state drive (SSD) 
SSDs operate by storing data in (typically) 512kb blocks, subdivided into (typically) 4kb pages. 
These pages/blocks are comprised of large arrays of Negative-AND (NAND) digital logic. 
These NAND transistors are, in essence, very similar to the NAND logic chips used to build 
computer processor units (CPUs). They have an extra gate, known as a floating gate, which is 
used to trap charge (to store charge on an extremely limited scale as a capacitor might). This 
arrangement is stable and can allow microscopic quantities of charge to be stored for years 
without leakage and without requiring a supply of power. The term solid-state refers to the fact 
that the data is stored in fixed arrangements of electronic transistors which are, in turn, part of 
fixed materials. These transistors can be read to in tens of microseconds and written to in 
hundreds of microseconds, which compares very favourably with hard disks, whose latency for 
read/writes is usually 3 - 10 milliseconds, i.e. 30 - 3 000 times slower.  Chen et al. (2009) and 
Bell et al. (2010) offer a detailed explanation of  the technical functionality of an SSD. 
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As SSD drives fill up, even a change to a single byte may result in an entire block needing to 
be read/erased and rewritten, resulting in an overt slowdown in performance. Many 
manufacturers have therefore added routines to the drive controller chip that can pre-emptively 
act to ameliorate the reset problem. One common strategy is known as Garbage Collection or 
‘Self-Healing’. The underlying philosophy is to cautiously identify areas that are not in use, 
and to then reset them as soon as possible. 
 
If garbage collection were to take place before (affecting dead forensics) or during (affecting 
live forensics) forensic extraction of the drive image, it would result in irreversible deletion (or 
corrosion of evidence) of potentially large amounts of valuable data that would ordinarily be 
gathered as evidence during the forensic process. 
 
We can thus conclude that advances in storage technology are bringing about new challenges 
to the digital forensic practice domain.  The next section discusses the threat of anti-forensic 
tools to the practice of digital forensics. 
2.4.3.2 Anti-Forensic Tools 
According to Doherty et al. (2008), an increasing number of private investigators are declining 
various digital forensic investigation work because the required tools are very expensive and 
have a short lifespan. This is mainly as a result of the increasing and changing variety of digital 
devices available on the market each year. 
 
Commensurate changes that need to be made in the forensic tool manufacturers to 
accommodate or address new file systems, operating systems and connectivity demands also 
contribute to the short lifespan of forensic tools. Doherty et al. (2008) ascertained that in the 
United States of America (USA) many municipal law enforcement personnel face challenges 
as their departments cannot justify the acquisition of expensive tools (with a short lifespan) that 
may, or may not, work with seized devices in lawful investigations. 
 
The issue of tools and other technical resources becomes even more pertinent as anti-forensic 
efforts continue to increase.  Anti-forensics can be defined as “the movement to exploit 
weaknesses in the forensic process or tools” (Reyes et al., 2007, p. 246). It can also involve 
various acts of hiding data from the forensic examination. Older techniques were as basic as 
running a simple script to perform a touch command on every ﬁle to alter file attributes (date 
and time stamps), or deleting log and temporary ﬁles (Wiles et al., 2007). 
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While one may still encounter these types of anti-forensic measures, other tools and techniques 
have emerged that are far more sophisticated.  This section discusses only a few of these to 
provide a basis for positioning the extent to which anti-forensic measures have advanced. 
 
Table 8 illustrates a sample of available anti-forensic tools and describes their functionality. 
 
The rising surge of anti-forensic tools and their ease of access on the internet directly impacts 
on an organisation’s ability, or lack thereof, to effectively respond to digital crimes (Taylor et 
al., 2007). 
 
If one explores the risks which an organisation are exposed to if not forensic ready, Casey 
(2006, p. 48-55) comments that “sophisticated intruders take full advantage of the lack of 
forensic readiness. To respond more effectively to such attacks, computer security 
professionals and digital forensic investigators must combine talents and work together.  The 
ability to apprehend sophisticated perpetrators depends in large part on the ability of 
investigators to follow the cyber trail left by the culprits.”  
 
Some functionality offered by security products have a dual function.  Intrusion detection 
systems (IDSs), centralised logging and forensic software are some examples of software tools 
that are deployed to detect an incident and which can also gather evidence in subsequent phases 
as part of forensic readiness (Khurana et al., 2009).    While the latter is true, the hypothesis 
that forensic technology for gathering digital evidence is increasingly lagging behind the 
advances being made in anti-forensic tools and the rapid changes in storage technology is true. 
There is a need to find a balance between the functionality that security applications provide 
(e.g. secure deletion) and the reverse engineering capability required from digital forensic tools.   
 
Findings show that security applications have advanced far beyond digital forensic tools, 
rendering some forensic tools obsolete against (anti-forensic) actions undertaken using security 
tools. 
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Anti-Forensic 
Tool 
Source Website Description 
Evidence 
Eliminator 
www.evidence-eliminator.com/ Commercial tool for secure deletion. 
While it can be used to protect 
company intellectual property, this tool 
can also be used to destroy evidence. 
Metasploit www.metasploit.com/ Offers penetration testing tools. 
Includes a suite of tools to secure data. 
These tools can also act as anti-
forensic applications. 
Sam Juicer http://downtown.trilo.de/svn/do
wnloads-20080101/_20081011-
0601_metasploit-
antiforensics_/_20081011-
0602_www-metasploit-com---
antiforensics_.mht 
A Meterpreter module that dumps the 
hashes from the SAM file. While this 
is a good feature for investigations, it 
can be used to illegally gather data 
from the SAM file. 
Slacker http://www.forensickb.com/200
7/10/enscript-to-detect-use-of-
slackerexe.html 
Allows a user to hide ﬁles within the 
slack space of the NTFS ﬁle system. 
This being an anti-forensic practice.  
Timestamp www.anti-
forensics.com/tag/timestompexe 
Allows you to modify all four NTFS 
timestamp values: modiﬁed, accessed, 
created and entry modiﬁed. Thereby 
altering the integrity of data.  
The Deﬁler’s 
Toolkit 
http://www.securitywizardry.co
m/index.php/products/forensic-
solutions/anti-forensic-tools/the-
defiler%27s-toolkit/visit.html 
Toolkit consisting of a pair of tools that 
allow a more secure deletion of ﬁles on 
UNIX systems.  The same set of tools 
can be used to destroy evidence. 
Transmogrify www.blackhat.com/.../bh.../BHU
SA09-Blunden-AntiForensics-
PAPER.pdf 
Tool to defeat forensic tools’ ﬁle 
signaturing capabilities by masking 
and unmasking your ﬁles as any ﬁle 
type. A common anti-forensic practice.  
Window 
Washer 
http://www.webroot.com/En_US
/consumer-products-
windowwasher.html 
Commercial tool for secure deletion. 
While it can be used to protect 
company intellectual property, this tool 
can also be used to destroy evidence. 
Table 8: A sample of modern anti-forensic tools and their functionality. 
 
This challenge presents an opportunity, not only for new forensic tools, but also for the 
enhancement of the overall digital forensic model. This will be further discussed in the chapters 
that follow. 
 
The next section investigates the validity of the fourth research hypothesis as presented earlier 
in this chapter. 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR 
EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Chapter 2: Systematic Literature Review 36 
2.4.4 Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 states: individuals involved in the digital forensic investigation and prosecution 
process are not sufficiently trained and/or educated. 
2.4.4.1 Education, Training and Certification 
Firstly, a distinction between education, training and certification is required.  Cross (2006) 
stated that “education is generally measured by tenure: you spent a day in the seminar or four 
years in college. Training, on the other hand, is measured by what you can do when you've 
completed it.” 
 
Certification, in the ICT world, involves the extensive testing of a person's abilities in their area 
of specialisation (Schlichting et al., 2004). With this in mind, this section explores the impact 
of education, training and certification of digital forensic practitioners. 
2.4.4.2 Impact of human resource limitations 
In a study conducted by Rogers et al. (2004), ﬁndings show that education, training and 
certiﬁcation were the most reported inherent challenges in computer forensics.  This is 
consistent with the ﬁndings from the previous law enforcement study conducted by Stambaugh 
et al. (2001). The study also ascertained that both the law enforcement community and the 
private sector/academia, are concerned with the lack of a standardised, or even a consensus 
approach, to training computer forensics practitioners. As previously mentioned, Hoolachan et 
al. (2010) are of the opinion that this can negatively impact the organisation’s Forensic 
Readiness. 
 
One of the main strengths of Rowlingson’s (2004) forensic readiness model is the recognition 
of the range of personnel within an organisation who can become involved in a legal inquiry 
(Taylor et al., 2007; Hoolachan et al., 2010).  This model identifies no less than eleven different 
departments and their associated personnel that must be considered in an investigation. 
 
Although the variety of staff involved generally varies, depending on the magnitude of the 
investigation, Hoolachan et al. (2010) argue that there are a multitude of people who need to 
understand the correct protocol within a digital investigation. 
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Venter (2006) found the situation in South Africa regarding the need for education, training and 
certification similar to how Rogers et al. (2004) explained it.  According to Venter (2006), 
candidates with adequate technical background and training are not always available or retainable 
and he adds that the training of Cyber First Responders is therefore a challenge. 
 
Venter (2006) further stated that in order to meet the requirement to expand the Cyber Forensics 
capability within the South African government, training in Cyber Forensics was necessary. 
He attributes complications to the lack of sufficient resources with a background or formal 
training in ICT. 
 
From the above findings, the hypothesis that the people involved in the digital forensic 
investigation and prosecution process are not sufficiently trained and/or educated, is therefore 
proven to be true.  As it will become evident in the section that follows, this inadequacy of 
human resources directly impacts not only on the admissibility of evidence, but also on the 
forensic readiness of an organisation. The next section explores the concept of forensic 
readiness in more detail. 
2.4.5 Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 states: an organisation responding to a digital crime, without an incident response 
plan, may take actions that compromise the admissibility of evidence to a court of law. 
 
As Reith et al. (2002) point out, that which leads to the prevalence of cybercrimes in today’s 
world, is the reality that there is a small chance of ever being caught. This means that in order 
to catch and prosecute criminals involved in such a crime, investigators need to employ 
consistent and well-defined forensic procedures (Campbell, 1998; Page, 2002). 
 
Moreover, countless instances of computer crimes around the world remain vastly 
underreported (Obuh, 2011; Gershowitz, 2011) as victims fear the exposure of vulnerabilities, 
the potential for copycat crimes and the loss of public confidence (McConnell International, 
2000).  Gershowitz (2011) adds that private firms, concerned with the potential negative 
publicity or that proprietary information may be required by investigators, are particularly 
hesitant to report computer crimes.  
 
Rowlingson (2004, p. 1) defines forensic readiness “as the ability of an organisation to 
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maximise its potential to use digital evidence whilst minimising the costs of an investigation.”  
Garcia (2005, p. 6) later modified this definition to state forensic readiness as the “art of 
maximising the environment's ability to collect credible digital evidence.” 
 
From the perspective of law enforcement agencies, the forensic process begins when the crime 
has been committed, or when a crime has been discovered and reported. The concept of forensic 
readiness, according to Hoolachan et al. (2010), is that an organisation can pre-empt the 
occurrence of a crime by gathering evidence in advance and in doing so, organisations will 
benefit not only in instances where prosecution becomes an issue, but also in limiting their own 
business risks. 
 
The business requirement to gather and use digital evidence has been recognised in a number of 
studies. Rowlingson (2004) notes that enterprise policies can enhance computer and network 
forensics. In addition, they propose six categories of policies to facilitate digital forensic 
investigations. Their categories are designed to help organisations deter computer crime and 
position themselves to respond to successful attacks by improving their ability to conduct 
investigations. The six categories of policies that facilitate digital forensic investigations are: 
i. Retaining Information – Policies that relate to the storage of information by an 
organisation; 
ii. Planning the Response – Policies that guide the organisation’s plans to respond to various 
incidents and situations; 
iii. Training – Policies that address the training of staff members and those affiliated to the 
organisation;  
iv. Accelerating the Investigation – Policies that address operational aspects of 
investigations;  
v. Preventing Anonymous Activities – Policies that address the organisation’s proactive 
efforts against the risk of fraud and 
vi. Protecting the Evidence – Policies that address the handling and protection of evidence 
and other vital data. 
 
While these underline the importance of cohesion of policies in an organisation, the problem 
with the categorisation, as proposed by Rowlingson (2004), is that an organisation needs to have 
six policies in place and this may result in possible duplication and/or conflicting policy 
statements. Furthermore, the latter may lead to confusion in identifying the authority/governing 
policy regarding the facilitation of digital investigations. As an alternative, a central point of 
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reference (policy) would therefore best serve the purpose of communicating the organisation’s 
position on digital forensic investigations. 
 
From the above discussion, the concept of forensic readiness, as explained by Rowlingson 
(2004), was found to have two main objectives:  
i. Maximising an environment’s ability to collect credible digital evidence and 
ii. Minimising the cost of forensics during an incident response. 
 
While policies are important, they alone will not guarantee an organisation’s overall forensic 
readiness. An implementation plan (incident response) must be developed and tested.  The next 
section discusses this plan and how it should be developed in order to enhance the 
organisation’s digital forensic readiness.  
2.4.5.1 Incident Response Plan 
According to Jaatun et al. (2009) incident response is the process of responding to security-
related incidents involving information and communications technology infrastructure. 
Incident response has traditionally been rather reactive in nature, focusing mainly on technical 
issues (Shinder et al., 2008; Jaatun et al., 2009).  An incident can be anything from an attack 
that crashes all the servers and cuts off all network communications to an intrusion that causes 
no actual damage, but demonstrates the vulnerability of the organisation's systems (Shinder et 
al., 2008; Lillard et al., 2010). 
 
According to Taylor et al. (2007) although all security incidents should be taken seriously, they 
do not all have the same severity.  An Incident Response Plan should therefore deﬁne how 
incident severities will be determined and what this means in terms of incident handling. 
2.4.5.2 Incident Management 
David (1999) suggests that prior to dealing with the incidents that have been deemed worthy 
of treatment, there are three significant points that should be made. Firstly, all events should 
be logged, and the logging should be in as much detail as possible. This makes allowance for 
things, such as later treatment of the non-priority items, detecting patterns leading up to 
incidents and a ready source of information regarding events that are action items. 
 
The second important step is that there should be an escalating set of responses, when and if 
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appropriate. The benefits derived from this step are what can be called quick and dirty initial 
reactions to certain incidents, providing follow-up actions if the earlier ones fail to accomplish 
their goals. Lastly, David (1999) suggests that events, including those not selected as incidents 
to be treated in the incident response plans, should be treated with reasonable promptness. 
 
If the above steps are not taken to stop events of lesser importance, those initiating these events 
can continue doing them without fear of reprisal, and they might even try more severe attacks 
(David, 1999; Lillard et al., 2010). 
2.4.5.3 Response Team 
In an attempt to be proactive, many organisations form incident response teams, called 
Computer Incident Response Teams (CIRTs).  These teams are made up of trained individuals 
whose goal it is to react speedily to occurrences of incidents (Lamis, 2010). 
 
Each team member is responsible for a pre-assigned area, thus decreasing the amount of 
damage and increasing the likelihood of apprehending the perpetrator of the incident (Shinder, 
2008; Jaatun et al., 2009).  An Incident Response Manager, whose responsibility includes 
coordinating notiﬁcations, escalations as well as ensuring that the incident response team is 
properly assembled, usually leads this team (Taylor et al., 2007). 
 
Lamis (2010) added that communication between team members, including external 
stakeholders, is essential to creating a resourceful environment to effectively combat and 
handle incident responses.  
 
Research suggests that building a response team should involve many different organisational 
departments such as legal and public relations (Taylor et al., 2007; Lamis, 2010).  These 
additional parties sometime include external parties who provide support and possess skills that 
may not be present in the organisation. These external parties should also be readily available 
to assist internal teams in the event of an incident (Shinder, 2008; Lillard et al., 2010). 
 
We can thus conclude that the hypothesis that an organisation responding to a digital crime 
without a forensic readiness plan, will take actions that compromise the admissibility of 
evidence, is true.  This means that while there may be a desire to be forensically ready within 
the organisation and in relation to evidence gathering, there is also a need for forensic readiness 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR 
EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Chapter 2: Systematic Literature Review 41 
amongst all staff members. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to investigate hypotheses 1 to 5, utilising a systematic literature 
review as a research method for the investigation process. This chapter and demonstrated the 
use of a systematic literature survey. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the 5 
hypotheses investigated, which can be summarised as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: During this section we discussed traditional and modern approaches to digital 
forensics, including the evolution of computer forensics. The result of this discussion was the 
finding that existing digital investigation methodologies (Live and Dead forensic acquisition 
processes) do not provide sufficient assurance of non-manipulation of evidence. The study 
found that the latter is due to the rapid changes/advances in storage technologies. 
 
Hypothesis 2: In this section we investigated literature relating to standardisation in the digital 
forensic profession. Findings show that the digital forensic industry lacks standardisation in 
the criteria used for collecting evidence, which has resulted in a lack of innovation synergy, 
limited regulation and misalignment of education and certification relating to digital forensics.  
This as a result of the various legal systems, which have varying requirements. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Here we discussed the impact of recent advances in storage technologies on 
existing digital forensic processes.  This section demonstrates that a trade-off exists between 
the functionality of information security and digital forensic tools. Findings show that forensic 
technology for gathering evidence is increasingly lagging behind due to rapid advances in anti-
forensics and changes in technology and this is negatively impacting on the successful 
prosecution of electronic crimes. 
 
Hypothesis 4: In this section we explored Education, Training and Certification as three distinct 
concepts. The findings show that people involved in the digital forensic process are not 
adequately trained and educated, thereby contributing to the inadvertent destruction of 
evidentiary data. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Here we explored the concept of forensic readiness and the factors that have an 
impact on it. Findings show that a mature technical environment alone is not the only factor 
impacting on the organisation’s forensic readiness, and that without an incident response plan, 
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an organisation will take actions that compromise the admissibility of evidence.  In addition, 
the study found that existing literature does not define the concept of digital forensic readiness 
sufficiently well for it to be implemented and, that it also lacks a framework to guide said 
implementation. 
 
In the light of all the research hypotheses having been proven true, we can conclude that there 
is a need to revisit the underlying principles of digital forensics.  This further highlights the 
need for a multidisciplinary digital forensic model, geared particularly at addressing challenges 
faced by law enforcement and corporates in developing economies. 
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3. Chapter 3: Research Design  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research design adopted for this study, and the justification thereof.   It 
begins with a discussion of the research approach and then explains the ontology, epistemology 
and the different paradigms considered in this study which is followed by the justification of the 
choice of the different research methods and their associated data gathering and analysis methods.   
The next section discusses the research design.  
3.2 The Research Design 
This research adopts a post modernistic approach, a philosophical position which proposes that 
reality is constructed within belief systems, and that the observer is an integral part of what is 
being observed (Kvale, 1992; Bergmann, 2011).  This approach was found appropriate as the 
researcher is a digital forensic practitioner, and as such, an integral part of this research process. 
 
On the contrary, positivism science adheres to the view that only factual knowledge, gained 
through observation and measuring, is trustworthy (Weber, 2004; Teddlie et al., 2009). In 
positivism studies the role of the researcher is limited to data collection and interpretation. 
Research findings garnered from such an approach are observable and quantifiable (Kvale, 1992).  
Since most of the data collected for this research is qualitative in nature, this approach was not 
found to be suitable.  
 
Similarly, a post normal science approach was not adopted as its strength is in the management 
of complex science-related issues (Funtowicz et al., 2003). It focuses on aspects of problem 
solving that tend to be neglected in traditional accounts of scientific practice: uncertainty, value 
loading and a plurality of legitimate perspectives (Funtowicz et al., 2003; Weber, 2004). 
 
The application of said research approach was based on Kyrö’s (2014) outline of the paradigm 
and methodological choices in scientific research.  See Figure 2 for a graphical representation 
of the paradigm and methodological choices.  This also formed a foundation for the thinking 
process adopted during the development of the M-DiFoRe Model. 
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Source: Kyrö (2014)  
 
Figure 2: The paradigm and methodological choices in scientific research (adapted). 
 
The next section presents the theory behind each layer of the research process, discusses the 
application thereof in this study and provides an outline of the thesis. 
3.2.1 Ontology  
Philosophical assumptions and beliefs about reality form our ontology (Mitchell, 2005).  
According to Morgan (2007) and Mack (n.d), ontology can be thought of as one’s view of 
reality, or as Kyrö (2014) suggests, ontology refers to ideas of reality and how it is constituted. 
 
The practical application of ontology in research is that one cannot study something one does 
not believe exists. Kyrö (2014) added that “the essential questions of how we believe that what 
we believe exists can be: do we believe that what exists is stable or do we believe that it changes, 
or is it unique or universal and what is the relationship between human existence and the world?” 
 
This study considered the critical realist and relativist ontologies as the main contrasting 
positions. According to Levers (2013, p. 2), “critical realism is a contemporary uptake of the 
realist ontological perspective that reality exists independent of the human mind regardless of 
whether it is comprehendible or directly experienceable.”  On the other hand, Levers (2013) 
added that relativist ontology is the belief that reality is a finite subjective experience and 
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nothing else exists outside of our thoughts. Reality from a relativist perspective is not 
distinguishable from the subjective experience of it. 
 
This study was undertaken based on the view, or belief, that organisational digital forensic 
readiness can be achieved through a multidisciplinary approach, which seeks to understand 
inter-disciplinary interactions between key stakeholders.  As the latter delves into the subjective 
views of stakeholders, and forms the basis for the development of the M-DiFoRe Model, the 
relativist ontology applies.  
3.2.2 Epistemology 
According to Morgan (2007) and Mack (n.d), epistemology relates to how one acquires 
knowledge.  Kyrö (2014) also added that epistemology is interested in how we can acquire 
knowledge about reality.  
 
Weber (2004) asserts that positivists view reality as separate from the individual who observes 
it, or in other words, the subject (the researcher) and object (the phenomena in the world that 
are their focus) are two separate, independent things. To achieve this, positivists generally rely 
on qualitative data to investigate social issues (Weber, 2004).  On the other hand, interpretivists 
believe that reality and the individual who observes it cannot be separated and that reality is 
subjective and based on meanings and understanding (Weber, 2004; Mitchell, 2005). 
 
This study adopts the epistemological view that the reality or belief (ontology) under 
investigation needs to be interpreted, rather than measured, in order to discover the underlying 
meanings and activities associated with the inter-disciplinary interactions between key 
stakeholders involved in the digital forensic readiness process.  Furthermore, that the subject 
and object of this research are not dualistic in nature, and as such, the interpretivist paradigm 
applies as the data used is of a qualitative nature.  The latter is discussed in the sections that 
follow.  
3.2.3 Paradigm 
According to Kyrö (2014), a paradigm “is manifested as a group of theories and definitions 
suitable for describing the field of study, or in a large the phenomenon and a group of methods, 
suitable for studying this field.”  Levers (2013) argues that it is imperative for researchers to 
choose a research paradigm that is congruent with their beliefs regarding the nature of reality. 
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This section presents literature which relates to the use of five paradigms namely: the 
transformative, pragmatic, integrated, post positivist, interpretivist and constructionist research 
paradigms. It concludes with a justification for the paradigm adopted in this study. 
3.2.3.1 Transformative paradigm 
The 2007 National Science Board’s report on Enhancing Support of Transformative Research 
at the National Science Foundation (NSB-07-32) defined transformative research as “research 
driven by ideas that have the potential to radically change our understanding of an important 
existing scientific or engineering concept or leading to the creation of a new paradigm or field 
of science or engineering. Such research is also characterised by its challenge to current 
understanding or its pathway to new frontiers” (NSB, 2007, p.v). 
3.2.3.2 Pragmatic paradigm 
On the other hand, pragmatism focuses on the what and how of the research problem, it places 
the research problem centrally and applies all approaches to understanding the problem, and it 
is not committed to any one system of philosophy or reality (Creswell, 2011). Armitage (2007) 
proposes that since research is often multipurpose, adopting a “what works” tactic will allow 
the researcher to address questions that do not sit comfortably within a wholly positivistic or 
interpretivist paradigm. 
 
Mackenzie at al. (2006) added that early pragmatists rejected the scientific notion that social 
inquiry “was able to access the truth about the real world solely by virtue of a single scientific 
method.”  Pragmatism places emphasis on abduction, inter-subjectivity and transferability 
(Morgan, 2007).  This creates new opportunities for thinking about classic methodological 
issues in the social sciences: 
i. Abductive Reasoning: the pragmatic approach is to rely on a version of abductive 
reasoning that moves back and forth between induction and deduction. Here the 
inductive results from a qualitative approach can serve as inputs to the deductive goals 
of a quantitative approach, and vice versa. 
ii. Inter-subjectivity: a researcher has to work back and forth between various frames of 
reference in order to achieve a sufficient degree of mutual understanding with, not only 
the people who participate in our research, but also the colleagues who read and review 
the products of our research.  
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iii. Transferability: We cannot simply assume that our methods and approach to research 
make our results either context-bound or generalisable; instead, we need to investigate 
the factors which affect whether the knowledge gained can be transferred to other 
settings. 
3.2.3.3 Integrated paradigm 
Hall (2012) argues that while transformative and pragmatic paradigms remain amongst the 
most dominant in mixed methods research, these single paradigms do not provide an adequate 
rationale for mixed methods research.  Furthermore, Hall (2012) proposes that for mixed 
methods research, a realist or integrated perspective is needed to overcome inherent limitations 
found in the said single paradigms. 
 
Regarding the limitations of single paradigms, Bergmann (2011) suggested that the ideal would 
be a paradigm that does not limit the range of topics researched, nor the methods that can 
legitimately be used to conduct research. 
 
When applying this paradigm, one can adopt a scientific realist ontology in the conduct of 
evaluation (Pawson et al., 1997).  Alternatively, one can adopt an emergent realist ontology, in 
which Henry et al. (1998) argue that the objective of said views of reality is best aided by a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods.  
 
Mingers (2001) and Jones (2000) noted that there are inherent problems when attempting to 
mix philosophical approaches.  These include cultural barriers (the QUAL approaches are 
more commonly employed by EU research groups, while North American researchers lean 
towards the QUAN approaches), psychological barriers (a lack of expert support regarding 
unpopular approaches can lead to reduced confidence and create psychological barriers) and 
practical barriers (single-method research is a tried and tested approach, with literature and 
experts readily available while, on the other hand, establishing coherent philosophical 
foundations for an integrated approach can prove to be a time-consuming exercise, making it 
impractical to adopt this approach). 
 
It is with the previous in mind that Zachariadis et al. (2010) propose critical realism as a middle 
way to address challenges associated with the mixing of philosophical approaches. It 
simultaneously confronts the challenges posed by both the natural and social science regimes, 
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making critical realism significantly relevant to IS research as it addresses technological 
characteristics (natural science) which exist within an organisation (social science) (Mingers, 
2004; Zachariadis et al., 2010). 
3.2.3.4 Post positivist paradigm 
According to Levers (2013), this paradigm accepts that truth and universal laws exist but that 
the discovery of these truths is near impossible. Post positivists expect to progress closer to the 
truth while recognising that discoveries are only partial segments, or approximations, of truth 
(Levers, 2013).  As a result of its critical realist ontology, the post positivist paradigm accepts 
that knowledge is fallible as it is shaped by contextual influences (Zachariadis et al., 2010; 
Levers, 2013). 
3.2.3.5 Interpretivist paradigm 
The interpretivist paradigm is said to be conceptualised as having a relativist ontology with a 
subjectivist epistemology, and is aligned with postmodern thought process (Levers, 2013). This 
suggests that interpretivist research relies on the researcher’s set of beliefs about the world. The 
interpretive paradigm’s key focus is the recognition and narration of the meaning of human 
experiences and actions (Mingers, 2004; Levers, 2013). 
3.2.3.6 Constructionist paradigm 
According to Levers (2013, p. 3), the constructionist paradigm is “conceptualised as having 
aspects of both the post positivist and interpretivist paradigms - ontological critical realism 
with epistemological subjectivism. Meaning is created through an interaction of the interpreter 
and the interpreted. The interpreter, though not entirely objective, is separate from the 
phenomena to be observed and the meaning-making interaction is strongly influenced by the 
phenomena and society.  Knowledge of the observed is constructed rather than discovered.” 
3.2.3.7 The Paradigm Adoption Rationale 
This research adopts the interpretivist paradigm for the following reasons: 
i. The study adopted a relativist ontology together with a subjectivist epistemology, a 
combination which is best suited for the interpretivist paradigm. 
ii. The subject and object of this research are not dualistic in nature, and as such the 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR 
EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Chapter 3: Research Design  49 
interpretivist paradigm applies. 
iii. The data used in this study is primarily of a qualitative nature. 
3.2.4 Methodology  
Weber (2004, p. 100) proposes that methodology is tied to ontology and epistemology in that 
“given the nature of reality and beliefs about knowledge of that reality, it shows how to generate 
new knowledge that is consistent with the epistemology and ontology.”  At this level, a 
methodology provides a systematic and theoretical analysis of the methods applied to a field 
of study (Levers, 2013). 
 
The above suggests that the way in which one views the constructs of reality and knowledge, 
affects how one will set about uncovering knowledge regarding relationships among the noted 
phenomena and social behaviour, and how one evaluates one’s own and other’s research 
(Mackenzie, 2006; Morgan, 2007; Mack, n.d). 
 
Patel (2015) states that methodology answers the question: “What procedure can we use to 
acquire knowledge?” He further proposes that in order to remain consistent with the relativist 
ontology and the interpretive paradigm, grounded theory can be adopted as an appropriate 
methodology. 
 
Charmaz (2014) added that grounded theory methodology is amongst the most influential and 
widely used modes for carrying out qualitative research, especially when the researcher’s 
principle aim is to generate theory.  
 
As explained in justifying the choice of ontology and epistemology, this study seeks to discover 
the underlying meanings and activities associated with the inter-disciplinary interactions 
between key stakeholders involved in the digital forensic readiness process. As such, grounded 
theory was adopted as methodology as it allowed for the use of research methods that aided in 
achieving the research objectives.  The latter (research methods) is discussed in the next section. 
 
As part of the process of applying grounded theory, a systematic literature review was 
conducted (Chapter 2), along with an analysis of interviews (Chapter 3) and case law data 
(Chapter 4).  A qualitative research tool was used to facilitate the coding, analysis and 
interpretation (Chapters 3 to 7) of said interviews and case law data. This led to the generation 
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of new theory, the M-DiFoRe model, and its workings. 
3.2.5 Research Method 
Patel (2015) states that method answers the question: “What tools can we use to acquire 
knowledge?” 
 
Since this study has adopted the epistemological view that the reality or belief (ontology) under 
investigation needs to be interpreted, rather than measured, and assumes a relativist ontology 
with a subjectivist epistemology, the method of choice is qualitative in nature.  The choice of 
a qualitative research method is consistent with the subjectivist epistemology and relativist 
ontology (Patel, 2015). 
 
The use of a systematic literature review (Chapter 2), along with an analysis of interviews 
(Chapter 4), facilitated the theoretical triangulation necessary to strengthen the grounded theory 
results (Yin, 2011).  As Craig (2009) and Yin (2011) explain, the triangulation process involves 
the application of different methods on different types of data.  The said triangulation was 
successfully applied and completed, and is detailed in section 4.4 of this thesis. 
3.2.6 Data Gathering Method  
Creswell (2011) and Patel (2015) argue that qualitative research provides for varying data 
gathering methods which include, but are not limited to interviews, observation, case study, 
focus groups, action research and ethnography.    
 
Data gathering methods affect the quality, quantity, adequacy and appropriateness of data and 
are dictated by practical considerations such as the nature of the research problem, cost (time 
and money), availability of data and access to it (Pawar, 2004). 
 
This study employs a pluralistic approach to data gathering through the application of a 
systematic literature review, interviews and case studies as methods to investigate the problem 
statement. The interviews conducted provided a means to capture current views of industry 
experts, as they relate to pertinent aspects of this research.  A review of case law added a 
pragmatic perspective to the issues being investigated and facilitated the theoretical 
triangulation necessary in grounded theory methodologies; the result being the formation of a 
foundation upon which the M-DiFoRe model was developed.   
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3.2.7 Analysing Method  
As Miles et al. (1994, p. 12) stated, the “strengths of qualitative data rests very centrally on the 
competence with which their analysis is carried out.” They further added that the qualitative 
data analysis method consists of three concurrent flows of activity, namely: 
i. Data reduction: refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and 
transforming source data. When applied, it means deciding on which data to code, and 
which to exclude, and identifying patterns that are meaningful for further reflection. 
ii. Data display: refers to “an organised, compressed assembly of information that permits 
conclusive drawing and action.” Examples of this include newspaper headlines and 
summary dashboards.  These help us understand what is happening and prompt us to 
either analyse further, or take another action, based on our understanding.  
iii. Conclusion drawing/verification: takes place during, and after analysis, and is comprised 
of meanings that emerge from the data.   
 
Qualitative data analysis is a continuous and iterative process which needs to be documented 
in order to facilitate reflection and usability by others (Miles et al., 1994; Craig, 2009). 
 
To meet the requirements of a qualitative data analysis method, this study used Atlas.ti which, 
as Friese (2012) explained, is computer software for qualitative analysis of large bodies of 
textual and multimedia data, designed to explore complex phenomena hidden in data, and 
facilitate the reduction, display and conclusion drawing process.  The application of the 
analysis method and process is detailed in section 3.2.6.  Appendices 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this thesis 
serve as auditable records to confirm the output generated using Atlas.ti, and to facilitate 
reflection and usability by others. 
3.3 Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter is to present the research methodology that was used in this study, 
and to motivate as to why the specific approaches were adopted.  The chapter presented the 
ontology and epistemology used, along with the research paradigm of choice.  It further 
expands on the methodology, research method, data gathering method and analysing method 
selected. 
 
As discussed in section 1.4 of this study, it was necessary to use different research methods in 
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order to strengthen grounded theory results.  This chapter therefore positioned how a literature 
review, along with interviews would be used as research methods to facilitate the triangulation 
of results.    
 
The chapter concludes with a mention of Atlas.ti, which was used as a quantitative data analysis 
tool.  The details of how the said tool was applied are found in the specific chapters where 
analysis took place.  
 
The next chapter uses interviews as a research method to gather real life experiences and 
opinions of South African industry experts regarding the various hypotheses stated.  This 
chapter also includes the coding, analysis and interpretation of said interview data, using 
Atlas.ti. 
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4. Chapter 4: Data Gathering And Analysis  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues with testing the research hypotheses presented in Chapter 1. Unlike 
Chapter 2, which made use of a systematic literature review to test the hypotheses, this chapter 
adopts a different approach in that interviews are used as the data gathering method to 
investigate hypotheses 6 to 10. This course was adopted to validate findings, drawn from the 
literature survey, with the real-life experiences of South African digital forensic practitioners. 
 
Interviews are a data gathering method which involve one person (the interviewer) posing 
questions to another person (the interviewee).  Research suggests that interview questions may 
be open-ended, closed ended, or both (Teddlie et al., 2009; Creswell et al., 2011).  Both types 
of questions were used in this study, largely because they provided ample opportunity for the 
interviewer to ask for further explanations of vague answers and to provide clarification where 
a question was not clear (Teddlie et al., 2009).  This was particularly important as the 
interviewees hailed from different industries and had different personalities. 
 
The 5 hypotheses being investigated are: 
i. Hypothesis 6 (H6): South African organisations do not need to concern themselves with 
digital forensic readiness, as digital crimes are not commonplace.  
ii. Hypothesis 7 (H7): The Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act of 
South Africa adequately positions the acceptable use of, and extent to which, electronic 
evidence can be used in a civil or criminal proceeding.   
iii. Hypothesis 8 (H8): South Africa has a standardised digital forensic model and process 
which is used by authorities to investigate and prosecute digital crimes. 
iv. Hypothesis 9 (H9): As a result of the presence of the electronic laws in South Africa, the 
prosecution of digital crimes faces no limitations.  
v. Hypothesis 10 (H10): Those individuals involved in the prosecution of digital crimes are 
knowledgeable, adequately trained and professionally certified.  
 
 
This chapter commences with a discussion regarding the way in which interviews were used 
in this study as a data gathering method.  The core of this chapter is a discussion of the results 
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garnered from the interview process, which includes a discussion on the coding process of 
interviews as well as the analysis and interpretation of coded data.  The chapter concludes with 
a summation on the results of the five hypotheses discussed. 
4.2 Data Gathering Method  
The next section discusses interviews as a data gathering method used to further test the 
hypotheses. 
4.2.1 Choice of Interview Types 
Patton (2002) defined four types of open-ended interviews, ranging from the least structured 
(informal conversational interview) to more structured (general interview guide approach) to 
most structured (standardised open-ended interview).  He also described the closed fixed-
response interview but did not advocate its use. Below is a summary of Patton’s four types of 
interviews: 
i. Type 1: Informal conversational interview – Questions emerge from the immediate 
context and are asked in the natural course of things; there is no predetermination of 
the question topics or wording.  
ii. Type 2: General interview guide approach – Topics and issues are specified in advance, 
in outline form; interviewer decides sequence and working of questions in the course 
of the interview. 
iii. Type 3: Standardised open-ended interview – The exact wording and sequence of the 
question are determined in advance.  All interviewees are asked the same basic question 
in the same order.  Questions are worded in a completely open-ended format.   
iv. Type 4: Closed fixed-response interview – Questions and response categories are 
determined in advance.  Responses are fixed; respondent chooses from amongst those 
fixed responses. 
 
For purposes of this study, a mixture of Type 1 and Type 3 open-ended interviews was used.  
Teddlie et al. (2009) state that researchers employing the INT-QUAL strategy may use one of 
the open-ended interview approaches, as described by Patton (2002).  He also noted that it is 
possible to combine the interview types.  His suggested sequence of qualitative interview 
techniques, as used in this study, is as follows: 
i. Start with the unstructured informal conversational interview approach, which can be 
used to build a rapport and elicit spontaneous responses; 
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ii. Move on to the interview guide approach that provides a more comprehensive outline of 
topics, yet maintains a conversational tone and 
iii. Finish with the highly structured, standardised open-ended interview approach, which 
greatly increases response comparability.  
 
For the purposes of this study, the structure followed was to begin with an unstructured 
informal conversational interview approach, followed by a highly structured, standardised 
open-ended interview approach.  The latter formed the core of the interview, while the 
unstructured, informal conversational component was mainly used to build a rapport with the 
interviewees. 
 
The next section contains the application of the interview method in designing the interview 
questions. 
4.2.2 The Interview Instrument 
The questions, as contained in Appendix 3, were designed using the method discussed in the 
previous paragraph (The Research Method). Questions were designed to address the five 
hypotheses, as presented earlier in this chapter.  
4.2.3 The Interviewees  
This section discusses the criteria followed in order to select the interviewees, the 
communication channels used in conducting the interviews and the ethical considerations 
underscoring the interview process. 
4.2.3.1 Interviewee Selection Criteria 
The interviewees were selected based on the following criteria: 
i. A multidisciplinary selection of individuals from the Legal, Business/Private Sector and 
Law Enforcement disciplines; 
ii. Individuals with experience in digital law and/or digital forensics and 
iii. Individuals who have been involved in digital forensic investigations in South Africa for 
a period of no less than three years. 
 
These criteria were used to ensure that the interviewees would provide a mixture of opinions 
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from varying experiences gained in different working environments. In line with UNISA’s 
ethics guidelines, as discussed in Chapter 1, consent letters were sent to the interviewees. See 
Appendix 4 for a template of the blank consent letter. 
 
The sample size was limited to 7 respondents, who led national digital forensic teams from 
within the public and private sector.  To ensure quality and accuracy of results, it was decided 
to limit respondents to national team leaders, rather than operational staff, as they could provide 
insight into decisions affecting policy and strategy.   Given the design and research objective 
of this study, this number of respondents was found to be acceptable and appropriate as it 
yielded the desired quality data (Scott, 2005). 
4.2.3.2 Communication Medium 
As discussed earlier, studies have shown that while open-ended interviews traditionally 
occurred face-to-face, they may also take place over the telephone and via the Internet 
(Crichton et al., 2003; Teddlie et al., 2009; Salmons, 2010).  
 
A total of seven interviews were conducted using the following three ways: 
i. Face-to-face (4); 
ii. Via telephone (1) and 
iii. Via email (2). 
 
The reasons for using three different approaches were: 
i. Where possible, the first preference was to conduct face-to-face interviews.  This was 
especially important where the researcher had little or no prior knowledge of the 
interviewees.  
ii. The interviewees resided in different and wide-spread geographical locations within 
South Africa.  In order to conveniently and timeously access the interviewees, email 
and telephone were used as contact methods.  
iii.  Lastly, given the interviewees’ seniority in their respective organisations, it was not 
always possible to conduct face-to-face interviews.  In order to maintain open 
discussions and constant contact (and thus keep interviewees interested in the study), 
telephone and email communication mediums were used.  
4.2.4 Ethical Considerations 
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To ensure structure and adherence to good research ethical practices, an ethical clearance was 
obtained from UNISA.  This clearance procedure takes an in-depth approach to ensuring that 
the research is conducted in ways which uphold the university’s ethical policies.  
 
In addition, prior to the commencement of the interview process, each interviewee signed a 
consent form to indicate his/her willingness to participate in the research process.  This 
documentation is stored for a period of five years, as stipulated by UNISA’s research guidelines.  
 
The ethical considerations, identified as being directly relevant to the interview process, were 
the protection of the autonomy of participants, obtaining informed permission from the 
gatekeepers/employer and the protection and disposal of sensitive data/samples obtained from 
the interview. 
 
The above countermeasures were taken to address the identified ethical concerns: 
i. The protection of the autonomy of participants was done by the use of an informed 
consent form, which specifies all relevant facts relating to the research being undertaken. 
ii. A consent form was also used to ensure that the interview participants, where necessary, 
obtain permission from their employers to participate in the interview. 
iii. All information obtained during the interview was stored in a secure facility and 
additional security measures, such as encryption and access control, were used to 
protect this data from unauthorised access for a period of five years, as required by the 
university.  At the end of this time electronic files will be securely deleted and physical 
records shredded. 
 
In conclusion, the logic and relevance of the research instrument content was pre-checked by 
a digital forensic expert and this resulted in changes being made to some of the questions.  The 
final revision of the research instrument was then double-checked by both the researcher and 
research supervisor. In addition, the final interview instrument was submitted to UNISA’s 
ethical committee for approval. 
4.3 Analysing Method  
This section discusses the method used to analyse interview data. 
4.3.1 The Data Analysis Tool 
To thoroughly analyse the data gathered during the interviews, an appropriate tool was needed 
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to facilitate the analysis process.  Whilst this process could be done manually, based on the 
volume of data gathered during the interview process, it would prove to be a tedious process.  
It was therefore necessary to find a tool that would: 
i. Assist in the process of identifying and making sense of the opinions and perspectives 
expressed in the interviews; 
ii. Assist in the correlation and analysis of the different sources of information and 
iii. Allow the researcher to retain control and methodological freedom from hypotheses 
testing to grounded theory. 
 
The research tool selected for this purpose was Atlas.ti (Atlas.ti, 2011). This product is 
described as one of a new generation of qualitative data analysis software packages which 
can be used to analyse interviews, field notes, textual sources and other types of qualitative 
data.  It offers different licensing models for various applications (Casasempere, 2007; 
Contreras, 2011; Friese, 2011).  For the purposes of this study, a student license was 
obtained. 
4.3.2 The Data Analysis Process 
The coding process began with the creation of a Hermeneutic Unit (HU) within the Atlas.ti 
application.  The HU can be best described as a “container that holds the sources of information 
of all of the analytical work done around them” (Contreras, 2011). The tool requires that every 
research project is assigned an HU holding the sources of information to be analysed. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the Hermeneutic Unit created contained the following objects: 
i. Primary documents: This comprised the consent form and other physical documents 
obtained from the interview participants. In addition, electronic recordings of the 
interviews were also included as primary documents in the project HU. 
ii. Quotations, Codes, Memos, Networks and Families: This is data generated from the 
transcribed interviews during the analysis process. 
4.3.2.1 Quotations 
Once the HU was created, the first step was to load each primary document for analysis. During 
this process, Quotations were created.  These quotations were segments of the text, from the 
transcribed interviews, which were selected and deemed interesting for further analysis. The 
quotations created varied from single words to complete paragraphs.  Once all the quotations 
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were created, they were semantically analysed across the different primary documents and 
hyperlinks were created to identify patterns of similar concepts.  
4.3.2.2 Codes 
The patterns of similar concepts were then further marked as Codes within Atlas.ti.  Codes are 
“concepts that can either drive from frameworks or reference or emerge from the text” 
(Contreras, 2011).  Once codes were formed in each primary document, and across the various 
transcribed interviews, they were further correlated into one to identify shared conceptual 
characteristics.  The result of this process is the formulation of what this thesis later refers to 
as Components of the M-DiFoRe model. 
4.3.2.3 Memos 
A further Atlas.ti feature which was used during this study is Memos.  This feature allows for 
reflections or commentaries (in the form of notes) to be made on quotations and codes.  For the 
purposes of this study, commentaries were made on the shared conceptual characteristics 
derived from individual codes and quotations.  These memos are embedded in each code and 
quotation, and were used in this thesis to serve only as a means to jot the researcher’s notes 
and/or comments on key points to remember about each code or quotation. 
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4.3.2.4 Families 
In order to organise the shared conceptual characteristics found, Families of codes were created 
by grouping related codes together and assigning a name to each group.  This was a critical 
step towards the interpretation of data and the linking of findings of this process towards the 
objectives of the study. The result of this process is the formulation of what this thesis later 
refers to as Domains of the M-DiFoRe model. 
4.3.2.5 Networks  
Once the families were created, data could be interpreted in full.  This phase entailed the use 
of HU Networks that Atlas.ti automatically created from the codes and families that were 
created during the analysis phase.  These networks are a graphical representation of the coded 
data and they depict the relationships between the codes and families created.   
 
The above process is graphically summarised in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Data analysis process summary using Atlas.ti 	
For evidence of the application of the above process refer to Appendix 5, the HU report 
generated by Atlas.ti. 
4.4 Findings 
This section presents the profile of the interviewees, discusses how the data analysis method 
was applied and presents results from the analysis process. 
4.4.1 Interviewee Profiles 
Table 9 presents a summary of the seven interviewee profiles, where INT1 is the abbreviation 
used to denote the first interviewee and INT2 the second interviewee, and so forth.  Table 9 
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also shows an evaluation of the interviewees in relation to the selection criteria presented earlier 
in this chapter. 
 
Interviewee Experience > 3 Years 
Law 
Enforcement 
Private Sector 
Experience 
Management 
Position 
INT1 Yes Yes No Yes 
INT2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INT3 Yes No Yes Yes 
INT4 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INT5 Yes No Yes Yes 
INT6 Yes Yes No Yes 
INT7 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 9: Summary of interviewee profiles. 
 
Findings show: 
i. All interviewees had industry experience in excess of the required three years; 
ii. Five of the seven interviewees had law enforcement experience; 
iii. Five of the seven interviewees had private sector experience; and  
iv. All interviewees held a managerial position. 
 
Owing to the executive levels held by the respondents in their respective organisations, a 
sample size of 7 respondents was accepted as it was sufficiently representative of the digital 
forensic community in South Africa (Mathews, 2010). 
 
The iterative coding process made it possible for focus/immersion to be applied to each 
individual question, and for the emergence and crystallisation of themes to take place.  
Differences in findings (codes and themes) between the interviewees were also resolved using 
said iterative process. 
4.4.2 Interview Responses 
The questions were aligned with the five hypotheses which, in turn, were aligned with the 
research objectives and literature themes, as depicted in Table 10. 
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Literature Themes Research 
Objectives 
Hypothesis Interview 
Questions 
Technical and Legal Challenges RO1 H6 Q6, Q10, Q15 
Digital Forensic Methodology RO2 H7 Q5, Q7, Q11 
Digital Forensic Advances RO3 H8 Q8, Q9, Q4 
Human Resource Management RO4 H9 Q12, Q13, 14 
Digital Crime Preparedness RO5 H10 Q1, Q2, Q3 
	Table	10:	Summary of the relationship between hypotheses 6 to 10, interview questions and 
related research objectives.  
 
This section describes the results of the seven interviews.  Questions were not asked 
sequentially as this would hamper the natural flow of the conversation (interview).   See 
Appendix 3 (Interview instrument) which details Questions 1 to 15, as asked during the 
interviews. 
4.4.3 Hypothesis 6  
Hypothesis 6 states: as a result of the presence of the electronic laws in South Africa, the 
prosecution of digital crimes faces no limitations. The following interview questions were 
asked to garner opinions which would help investigate this hypothesis: 
i. Does electronic evidence provide sufficient assurance of non-manipulation (Q6)? 
Respondents were of the opinion that the law makes it possible for electronic evidence 
to be relied upon. 
ii. What are the factors that contribute to electronic evidence being rendered inadmissible 
(Q10)? Respondents pointed to digital forensic processes and procedures as a good 
foundation for ensuring the admissibility of evidence. 
iii. What do you think should be done to increase the prosecution rate of digital crimes in 
South Africa (Q15)? Responses included special courts, education, training, 
certification, focused research, development of law and defined models and processes.  
 
The above findings suggest that the hypothesis is not true, as a lack of processes, procedures, 
education, training and certification can act as limitations during the prosecution of digital 
crimes. 
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4.4.4 Hypothesis 7  
Hypothesis 7 states: South Africa has a standardised digital forensic model and process that is 
used by authorities to investigate and prosecute digital crimes.  The following interview 
questions were asked to gather opinions that would help investigate this hypothesis: 
i. Do you, or your organisation, have a digital forensic model which has been adopted (Q5)? 
Respondents indicated that they use their own entity-specific model, which may differ 
from those used by other organisations. 
ii. Is there a standard process for electronic evidence gathering (Q7)? Respondents indicated 
that, while processes adopted in their individual organisations were similar, no process 
standards specific to South Africa exist. 
iii. Have you noted any challenges that prevent digital crime investigators from correctly 
applying the digital forensic model or framework (Q11)? Respondents indicated that a 
single point of reference was needed. Other points noted were that South Africa needs 
a specific model, which must enable and support legal processes, and that this model 
must be flexible.  
 
Findings suggest that the hypothesis is not true, as no single common model or process is in 
place within the South African legal context.  
4.4.5 Hypothesis 8  
Hypothesis 8 states: The Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act of South 
Africa adequately positions the acceptable use of, and extent to which electronic evidence can 
be used in a civil or criminal proceeding.  The following interview questions were asked to 
gather opinions that would help investigate this hypothesis: 
i. Does the law adequately position the acceptable use of/or extent to which electronic 
evidence can be used in civil or criminal proceedings (Q8)? Respondents stated that the 
law (ECT Act) makes it possible to present electronic evidence in a South African court 
of law. However, contradictions were noted in responses as some respondents felt that 
existing laws support the ECT Act, while others felt that discrepancies exist between 
the ECT Act and existing laws.   
ii. Does the law cater for the complexities of modern IT devices (Q9)? Respondents 
indicated that the law lagged behind technology. While the ECT Act was regarded as 
strong legislation, respondents suggested that it was in need of periodic review. 
iii. Have you noted any challenges regarding the prosecution of digital crimes (Q4)? 
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Challenges noted included the lack of knowledge regarding digital forensic principles 
among the stakeholders, a lack of understanding of legal requirements and a lack of 
resources. 
 
Findings suggest that this hypothesis is true, as the ECT Act makes it possible to present 
electronic evidence in a court of law. 
4.4.6 Hypothesis 9  
Hypothesis 9 states: those individuals involved in the prosecution of digital crimes are 
knowledgeable, adequately trained and professionally certified. The following interview 
questions were asked to garner opinions that would help investigate this hypothesis: 
i. Do you think digital forensic investigators are sufficiently trained to do their work (Q12)? 
Respondents identified a need for more training for local digital forensic investigators. 
ii. Have you noted any challenges that prevent prosecutors from successfully prosecuting 
digital crimes (Q13)? Respondents identified challenges to include a lack of interest in 
digital crimes, high caseloads, a lack of digital forensic training and/or awareness and 
a lack of cooperation amongst stakeholders.  
iii. Do you think state prosecutors are sufficiently trained to do their work (Q14)? 
Respondents opined that a need to train state prosecutors exists. 
 
Findings suggest that this hypothesis is not true, as credentials were noted as being a general 
limitation amongst prosecutors and investigations alike. 
4.4.7 Hypothesis 10  
Hypothesis 10 states: South African organisations do not need to concern themselves with 
digital forensic readiness, as digital crimes are not commonplace.  The following interview 
questions were asked to gather opinions that would help investigate this hypothesis: 
i. Should South African organisations be concerned about digital crimes (Q1)?  Responses 
included varying opinions, pointing to views that digital crimes were on the increase. 
The intangible nature of data in electronic format causes people to lower their 
defences; modern criminals are technologically literate and have access to good legal 
representation; the immaturity of the digital forensic profession allows criminals to go 
free and following correct investigative processes to preserve evidence is important. 
ii. Which three types of digital crimes do you find to be the most prevalent (Q2)?  Responses 
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indicated: financial crimes, child pornography, hacking and illegal access, malware-
related crimes, 419 scams and Internet misuse. 
iii. Which sector do you find to be the most targeted (Q3)? Respondents listed the following 
sectors: banks/financial sector, large corporates, private individuals, mining sector 
and general businesses/corporates at large.  
 
This hypothesis was proven untrue as findings point to a prevalence of various types of digital 
crimes.  
 
With the exception of number eight, all other hypotheses were proven untrue.  The next section 
discusses how the above information was interpreted, based on the coding process that took 
place using Atlas.ti. 
4.5 Interpretation of Findings 
As previously discussed, this study made use of Atlas.ti to code and analyse interview data. 
 
Figure 4 shows the resulting network map of the coded data.  To achieve the results presented 
in this section, all interviews were transcribed and each transcript repetitively read in order to 
identify codes for each question answered by the participants.  
 
From Figure 4, three code families are noted: Corporate Environment (with six codes), Industry 
Environment (with three codes) and Legislative Environment (with three codes).  
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Figure 4: Summary of network maps formed from analysis of interview data. 
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Techniques from both immersion/crystallisation and constant comparison (grounded theory) 
were applied in order to assist with the interpretation and development of the initial and final 
codes. These codes resort under each of the said environments (Borkan, 1999; Corbin et al., 
2008). 
 
Findings relating to the codes and families are discussed next. 
4.5.1 Corporate Environment 
For the purposes of this study, the corporate environment is defined as comprising of juristic 
persons who participate and contribute to the economy.  
 
A total of six codes (corporate culture, reporting, industry targets, prevalence of crime, risks 
and common crimes) were identified and classified into a common code family. Key findings 
from the correlation of results from each interview revealed the following: 
i. Corporate Culture: A large proportion of organisations were found to have a habit/culture 
of ignoring/overlooking small crimes.  A general lack of governance, policies and 
procedures, as regards fraud risk management, was found to exist.  Additionally, a lack 
of resources (human and financial) was also noted.  Finally, a lack of awareness (digital 
crime prevention and detection) was also identified. 
ii. Reporting: The reporting of digital crimes was found to be low. Reasons identified for 
this included the culture of ‘sweeping things under the carpet’, a lack of education, 
ignorance and the lack of effective Law Enforcement. 
iii. Risks: The following risk areas were identified: 
a. The intangible aspect of technology causes people to lower their defences. This is 
evident in the various types of white-collar crimes committed using technology. 
b. Modern IT criminals are technologically literate and possess financial, and other 
resources, including access to good lawyers. 
c. Advances in mobile technology innovations pose a risk as criminals are quick to 
exploit them. 
d. The digital forensic industry is not fully matured, enabling criminals to take 
advantage of loopholes in global legal structures. 
e. DFIs, not following due process, contribute to the low prosecution rate of digital 
crimes.  
iv. Prevalence of crime: Findings show that the number of digital crimes is on the increase. 
Those affected are all current, and future, users of technology.  The high prevalence of 
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crime is also attributed to legal gaps.  These will be discussed later under the topic, 
Legislative Environment.  
v. Common crimes: The following crimes were identified as common across all industries 
affected by digital crimes: 
a. Child Pornography; 
b. 419 Scams; 
c. Wire/EFT fraud; 
d. Asset misappropriation;  
e. Card skimming; 
f. Malware related crimes; 
g. IP theft; 
h. Illegal access and  
i. Internet misuse. 
vi. Industry targets: It was generally conceded that criminals target organisations where there 
is a perceived big gain.  These targets are mainly situated in the financial services sector 
and include large corporations.  Lastly, individuals were also ascertained to be easy 
targets. 
4.5.2 Industry Environment 
For the purposes of this study, the industry environment is defined as a branch of economic or 
commercial activities relating to digital forensics.  
 
The code family, Industry Environment, contains three codes namely Knowledge, Credentials 
and Methodology which relate to the Corporate Environment family of codes. Key findings 
from the correlation of results from each interview revealed the following: 
i. Knowledge: Knowledge was found lacking amongst those involved in the investigation 
value chain, including prosecutors, judges, industry experts and private as well as public 
sector organisations.  Training of all stakeholders was noted as essential.  Specific 
weight was placed on legal requirements as superseding technical processes.  It was 
found that industry experts lacked an understanding of legal requirements and were not 
correctly applying their technical knowledge.  The lack of clear policies and processes 
contribute to the latter. 
ii. Credentials: Lack of cohesion between the academic sphere and industry was identified.  
While interviewees noted that no single qualification served as a prerequisite to qualify 
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as an industry expert, the need for specialised training and the maintaining of a balance 
between education and experience were determined necessary. A digital forensic model 
was also deemed essential towards guiding the required training.   
iii. Methodology: While various versions of methodologies exist, the need for a single point 
of reference was noted.  This extended to the need for consistency in country specific 
(South African) standards, processes and a digital forensic model.  The absence of such 
was identified as an inhibiting factor to the prosecution of digital crimes.  An open 
culture of information sharing, was noted, would serve to promote the maturity of the 
digital forensic profession.  Specific to a digital forensic model, this would not be 
considered a law, but rather a guideline as it would enable and support the legal process, 
while remaining flexible enough to accommodate advances/changes in the law and/or 
technology.  Lastly, awareness of academic models, and the alignment of the correct 
methodology and digital forensic model to the appropriate law, was identified as being 
necessary.  
4.5.3 Legislative Environment 
For the purposes of this study, the legislative environment is defined as a branch of commerce 
that is responsible for drafting and enforcing laws.  
 
The last code family to emerge from the iterative coding process is that of the Legislative 
Environment.  This comprises three codes: Legal culture, Judiciary and the ECT Act/Laws. 
i. Legal culture: Findings show a lack of interest in digital crimes among prosecutors and 
judges. A lack of cohesion between law enforcement and the prosecuting authorities 
was also noted.  The disinterest was attributed to possible high caseloads and limited 
resources.  A mind-shift is needed if this culture is to change. Training and awareness 
making were suggested as effective drivers of this change. In addition, the study 
ascertained that the creation of special interest groups and special courts could 
introduce positive reforms. 
ii. Judiciary: Findings suggest that the judiciary is presented with two problems which result 
in a reluctance to prioritise on digital evidence - high caseloads and a lack of knowledge 
(DF processes and methodologies). 
iii. eCrime Law: Specific to the South African laws on electronic evidence (ECT Act), 
findings show the key strengths of the law to be that it is a strong piece of legislation 
which provides a good baseline.  On the other hand, findings indicate that some suggest 
that the law has low penalties, lacks awareness, is not well understood by many and is 
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overly complex in its use of technical terminology.  Lastly, the ECT Act, written to 
cater for the next 10 to 20 years of technological advances, was perceived as 
satisfactorily.  
 
This information can be tabulated in the following way:  
Corporate Environment Industry Environment Legislative Environment 
Corporate Culture Knowledge Legal culture 
Reporting Credentials Judiciary 
Risks Methodology eCrime Law 
Prevalence of crime   
Common crime   
Industry targets   
	
Table 11: Code themes developed from analysis of interview data. 
 
Table 11 was derived through the application of techniques extracted from both 
immersion/crystallisation and constant comparison (grounded theory) to assist with the 
interpretation and development of the codes.  Table 11 is therefore aligned with the findings as 
per Figure 4.  
 
Due to the nature of the relationship between the codes within each environment, as represented 
by code links (see comments in lines joining two or more codes in Figure 4), further analysis 
was conducted. This analysis resulted in the consolidation and renaming of codes to best 
represent analytic findings gained from the interview process and from the grounded theory 
investigation of hypotheses 6 to 10. 
 
The cumulative findings are presented in the next section as the final list of codes and families. 
This final list represents, what this thesis considers to be, the main artifacts and activities 
necessary to be performed by identified stakeholders in the digital forensic readiness process.  
This final step was also conducted using Atlas.ti, as described earlier. 
4.5.4 Development of final themes from code families and networks 
The final stage of the data analysis phase was to interpret code families and networks, in order 
to extrapolate key themes from each environment as discussed above.  This process resulted in 
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the development of final themes and codes, which identify the three domains (derived from 
code families as previously discussed), from which key stakeholders in the digital forensic 
investigation originate. These include critical artifacts and activities, collectively referred to in 
this thesis as components (derived from codes from interviews and the analysis process) for 
each of the said domains.  Finally, each code is assigned an abbreviation for ease of referencing. 
4.5.4.1 Components of the Corporate Environment  
From the review of findings relating to hypothesis 7, the deduction made is for organisations 
to establish a common standard for evidence handling, including associated procedures and 
policy.  This in is line with the code Corporate Culture and its related findings as discussed in 
the preceding section. 
 
Additionally, as deduced from hypothesis 6 in relation to the organisation, employees within 
the organisation are to be educated, trained and certified to properly prevent and detect digital 
crimes within the organisation. In this way employees will make themselves, and their 
organisations, less of a target for criminals.  This is in line with the code Industry targets as 
discussed in the preceding section. 
 
Finally, the deduction made from hypothesis 10 is that organisations need to be proactive (thus 
adopt digital forensic readiness) in managing the rising scourge of digital crimes.  Focusing on 
digital forensic readiness addresses challenges noted in the preceding section relating to the 
codes: risks, prevalence of crime and industry targets. Table 12 summarises the transition from 
preliminary codes to final codes, as used in this study. 
 
Corporate Environment 
Preliminary Codes Analysis Final Codes 
Corporate Culture and 
Reporting  
Managed by enforcing 
Standards, Policies and 
Procedures 
Standards, Policies, 
Procedures 
Risks Managed by empowered 
Human Resources 
Human Resources (ETC) 
Prevalence of crime, 
Common crime and 
Industry targets 
Managed by proactive use of 
Digitally Forensic Ready 
Technologies 
DFR Technologies 
 
Table 12: Corporate Environment - transition from preliminary to final codes. 
The next section discusses the analysis of codes relating to the Industry Environment. 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR 
EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Chapter 4:  Data Gathering and Analysis 72 
4.5.4.2 Components of the Industry Environment 
Derived from the results of hypothesis 6, in order to avoid the risk of rendering evidence 
inadmissible, it is necessary that those individuals processing evidence possess the necessary 
knowledge and credentials to apply the digital forensic methodology.  This is in line with codes, 
as discussed in the preceding section under Industry Environment. Finally, the final list of 
codes relating to this domain are derived from the adopted definition of digital forensics.  These 
final codes represent activities associated with the digital forensic methodology and were found 
to be comprehensive enough in addressing challenges identified during the analysis of 
interview data relating to this domain and hypothesis 6. Table 13 summarises the transition 
from preliminary codes to the final codes as used in this study. 	
Industry Environment 
Preliminary Codes Analysis Final Codes 
Knowledge Knowledge relating to all key 
phases of the digital forensic 
methodology, derived from 
Chapter 2, section 2.3 
Preservation 
Credentials Collection 
Methodology Validation 
 Identification 
Analysis  
Interpretation 
Documentation 
Presentation 
Retention 
Table 13: Industry Environment - transition from preliminary to final codes. 
4.5.4.3 Components of the Legislative Environment 
The preceding section identified legal culture, judiciary and eCrime law as codes that were 
noted during the analysis of interview data.  The discussion of these codes point to challenges 
faced by this domain, in the prosecution of digital crimes.  Combined with the results, as drawn 
from the discussion of hypothesis 6, findings show that the admissibility of electronic evidence 
is affected by factors which include: the presence of electronic laws, correct application of the 
criminal process by law enforcement and others during the investigation phase, a justice system 
that accommodates the nuances associated with digital crimes and justice personnel that are 
competent in prosecuting such crimes.  Table 14 summarises the transition from preliminary 
codes to the final codes used in this study. 
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Legislative Environment 
Preliminary Codes Analysis Final Codes 
Legal culture, Judiciary Willingness and ability to 
investigate/prosecute digital 
crimes 
Law Enforcement Agents, 
Justice Personnel 
eCrime Law Establishment of specific 
laws relating to electronic 
evidence, in line with 
existing criminal processes.   
Criminal Process, Electronic 
Laws 
	
Table 14: Industry Environment - transition from preliminary to final codes 
 
The next section presents the consolidated final list of codes. 
4.5.4.4 Final literature themes  
The final list of codes, as shown in Table 15, are discussed at length in Chapter 5 where a 
literature review is used as research method in an effort to gain a deeper understanding of their 
meaning and application in their respective domains. 
 
 
Corporate Environment 
(CE) 
Industry Environment 
(IE) Legislative Environment (LE) 
Ref Component Ref Component Ref Component 
CE1 Standards IE1 Preservation LE1 Electronic Laws 
CE2 Policies IE2 Collection LE2 Criminal Process 
CE3 Procedures IE3 Validation LE3 Justice System 
CE4 Human Resources (ETC) IE4 Identification LE4 
Law Enforcement 
Agents 
CE5 DFR Technologies IE5 Analysis  LE5 Justice Personnel 
  IE6 Interpretation   
  IE7 Documentation   
  IE8 Presentation   
  IE9 Retention   
	
Table 15: Final code themes developed from analysis of the interview data and literature 
relating to hypothesis 6 to 10. 
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4.6 Triangulation of Findings  
Findings from this chapter were analysed in conjunction with those from the literature survey 
(Chapter 2) and a summary of the results is as per Table 16 below.  
 
Chapter 1  
(Research 
Objective) 
Chapter 2 
(Literature review) 
Chapter 4 
(Interviews) 
 Triangulation 
Outcome 
RO1 - To identify 
common factors 
associated with 
technical and legal 
challenges faced in 
the prosecution of 
digital crimes. 
H1 - Electronic 
evidence gathered 
during a digital 
forensic 
investigation does 
not provide 
sufficient assurance 
of non-manipulation 
to the courts. 
= True 
H6 - As a result of 
the presence of the 
electronic laws in 
South Africa, the 
prosecution of 
digital crimes faces 
no limitations. 
= False 
Findings show 
activities associated 
with ensuring data 
integrity to be a 
common technical 
challenge. The most 
common legal 
concern is the scope, 
or extent to which 
the law makes 
provision for the 
admissibility of 
electronic evidence 
in a court of law. 
RO2 - To establish 
if organisations in 
the same legal 
jurisdiction possess, 
and make use of, a 
standard digital 
forensics 
methodology. 
H2 - There is a lack 
of standardisation in 
the criteria against 
which electronic 
evidence is validated 
as no consistent 
digital forensic 
methodology exists.  
= True 
H7 - South Africa has 
a standardised 
digital forensic 
model and process 
that is used by 
authorities to 
investigate and 
prosecute digital 
crimes. 
 = False 
Findings show that 
no common 
standard is used as a 
methodology, 
however, that 
organisations opt to 
develop internal 
methodologies from 
industry best 
practice guidelines. 
RO3 - To determine 
the extent to which 
advances in digital 
forensics are 
meeting the 
demands of the 
changing legal and 
technical landscape. 
H3 - Forensic 
technology for 
gathering digital 
evidence is 
increasingly lagging 
behind the advances 
being made in anti-
forensic tools and 
rapid changes in 
storage technology.  
= True 
H8 - The Electronic 
Communications 
and Transactions 
(ECT) Act of South 
Africa adequately 
positions the 
acceptable use of, 
and extent to which, 
electronic evidence 
can be used in a 
civil or criminal 
proceeding.   
Findings suggest 
that digital forensics 
are lagging behind 
the rapid changes in 
anti-forensics and 
storage 
technologies. This is 
exasperated by the 
lack of legal 
resources and 
stakeholder 
awareness of DFR 
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Chapter 1  
(Research 
Objective) 
Chapter 2 
(Literature review) 
Chapter 4 
(Interviews) 
 Triangulation 
Outcome 
= True principles. 
RO4 - To 
investigate critical 
factors preventing 
human resources 
directly involved in 
the investigation and 
prosecution of 
digital crimes from 
functioning 
effectively. 
H4 -  The people 
involved in the 
digital forensic 
investigation and 
prosecution process 
are not sufficiently 
trained and/or 
educated. 
= True 
H9 – Those involved 
in the prosecution of 
digital crimes are 
knowledgeable, 
adequately trained 
and professionally 
certified. 
= False 
Findings show 
common limitations 
as being user 
education, training 
and certification. 
RO5 - To determine 
if organisations are 
taking the necessary 
steps to proactively 
manage the rising 
scourge of digital 
crimes. 
H5 – An organisation 
responding to a 
digital crime 
without, an incident 
response plan, may 
take actions that 
compromise the 
admissibility of 
evidence to a court 
of law. 
= True 
H10 – South African 
organisations do not 
need to concern 
themselves with 
digital forensic 
readiness, as digital 
crimes are not 
commonplace. 
= False 
Despite the growing 
trend of digital 
crimes against 
organisations across 
all industries, 
findings show a 
general lack of 
digital forensic 
planning and 
readiness. 
 
Table 16: Summary of results from Chapters 2 and 4. 
 
From the first research objective (RO1), this study found technical challenges to exist in 
activities associated with ensuring data integrity with the most common legal concern the scope, 
or extent, to which the law makes provision for the admissibility of electronic evidence in a 
court of law. This is an important finding as it directs efforts to specific data integrity issues 
which organisations need to be concerned with when undertaking a digital forensic 
investigation.  For developing countries, this finding enforces the value that can be derived 
from extensively applying existing laws of evidence/common law, in the absence of laws 
specific to digital crimes.  
 
Findings from the second research objectives (RO2) highlight the importance of the existence 
of industry best practice guidelines.  Findings further show that countries which have not 
established and/or adopted a common digital forensic methodology, greatly benefit from 
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industry best practice guidelines.   
 
The third research objective (RO3) speaks to the dynamic nature of the digital landscape.  
Findings suggest that digital forensics lag behind the rapid changes in anti-forensics and storage 
technologies. This situation is further exasperated by the lack of legal resources and stakeholder 
awareness of DRF principles.  More importantly, these findings identify practical solutions that 
can be put into place at an organisational level, in order to address the identified gaps. 
 
Findings from the fourth research objective (RO4) emphasise the importance of education, 
training and certification by human resources directly involved in the investigation and 
prosecution of digital crimes.  This study also shows the detrimental effect which the lack of 
adequate education, training and certification can have on the admissibility of electronic 
evidence in the court of law, and the prosecution of cases involving digital evidence. 
 
Finally, despite the challenges identified during the investigation of the preceding research 
objectives, findings from the fifth research objective (RO5) point to the critical nature of digital 
forensic planning and readiness as a proactive countermeasure to managing the rising scourge 
of digital crimes. 
 
This study uses the above cumulative findings as a foundation to what the proposed model 
needs to address. 
 
The next section presents the conclusion of this chapter.  
4.7 Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to validate findings from the literature survey by making use of 
interviews as the key data gathering method. While the interviewee selection criteria appeared 
stringent, it attracted high calibre participants, representing multiple related disciplines.   
 
The interpretive paradigm, applied with the assistance of Atlas.ti as the qualitative data analysis 
tool, provided a means to employ principles of immersion and crystallisation to the coded data.  
From this process, three families of themes (domains) emerged namely: Corporate 
Environment, Industry Environment and Legislative Environment. Additionally, this chapter 
presented key components which belong to each of the aforementioned domains, as detailed in 
Table 15. 
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A summary of the results of the investigation into the validity of hypotheses 6 to 10 are: 
i. Hypothesis 6 (H6): Findings show that the hypothesis is not true. This suggests that a 
lack of processes, procedures, education, training and certification can serve as 
limitations during the prosecution of digital crimes. 
ii. Hypothesis 7: Findings show that the hypothesis is not true, as no single common model 
or process is in place for the South African legal context.  
iii. Hypothesis 8: Findings suggest that this hypothesis is true, as the ECT Act makes it 
possible to present electronic evidence in a court of law.  
iv. Hypothesis 9: Findings suggest that this hypothesis is not true, as credentials were noted 
as being a common limitation amongst prosecutors and investigations alike. 
v. Hypothesis 10: Findings suggest that this hypothesis is not true, as findings point to a 
prevalence of various types of digital crimes. 
 
The next chapter presents the proposed conceptual model based on the above findings.  
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5. Chapter 5: Foundational principles towards model development 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on triangulating results from the systematic literature review 
(Chapter 2) and the interviews (Chapter 4).  Findings presented confirmed, amongst others, 
that the three domains and their respective components, as shown in Table 15, are sufficiently 
inclusive for the purposes of this study. 
 
This chapter is a continuation of Chapter 4, but with the goal of establishing the significance 
of each component of the model, as it relates to its respective domain.  A further literature 
review is used to investigate the significance of each component.  The components are 
discussed in the order in which they appear in Table 15. 
 
This chapter concludes with a discussion on the multidimensional effect which each component 
of the model has. 
5.2 Overview of the components of the proposed model 
This section provides depth and clarity to each component listed in Table 15.  
5.2.1 The Corporate Environment (CE) 
As previously discussed, the corporate environment refers to a code family (domain) that 
houses all identified components, which directly relate to activities and artifacts (components) 
that are under the control of the corporate, or organisation. These were identified as being 
standards, policies, procedures, human resources and digital forensic ready technologies.   The 
next section uses a literature review to discuss the significance of these five components of the 
corporate environment. 
5.2.1.1 Standards (CE1) 
In its simplest sense, a standard is an agreed-upon way of doing something (Spivak et al., 2001) 
and, as such, it forms a cornerstone of the modern information economy (Greenstein et al., 
2007).  Standards are a means to create order and they denote a uniform set of measures, 
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agreements and conditions (Spivak et al., 2001; Grindley, 1995).  In other words, standards act 
as a form of regulation. 
 
Their use in the industry may be voluntary, or in some cases mandatory.  Many standards are 
initially used voluntarily but over time they become adopted, or referenced, into mandatory 
regulations (Spivak et al., 2001).  Egyedi et al. (2008) argue that when most people talk about 
standards, they usually refer to de facto standards.  In economic terms, de facto standards are 
those that are widely adopted and with a significant market share (Bresnahan et al., 2007; 
Egyendi et al., 2008). 
 
Greenstein et al. (2007) warn that standards affect firm strategy and market performance.  
Grindley (1995) adds that compatibility standards guide organisational strategy and policy, and 
affect overall business success.  Therefore, it is vital that organisations be fully aware of 
industry standards and align their strategy and policies to those de facto standards that can 
adversely affect the organisation’s competitiveness and compliance status.  
 
The above suggests that standards form the foundation upon which policies and procedures are 
developed. As such they must be carefully researched to ensure that what the organisation or 
corporate finally creates, or adopts, is aligned to industry best practice (de facto) as it relates to 
the various aspects of digital forensic readiness. 
5.2.1.2 Policies (CE2) 
Ben-Gera (2009) describes a policy as a “definite course or method of action selected from 
among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future 
actions.” Simply put, policies are guidelines that regulate organisational action (Campbell, 
1998). 
 
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, organisational policies must be aligned to industry 
standards and organisational strategy.  Peltier (2005) adds that to ensure that business 
objectives are met in a timely and efficient manner, effective policies and standards must be in 
place. As with standards, policies play a critical role in ensuring order in the way an 
organisation operates.  
 
Page (2002) compares policies and procedures to a road map.  At a glance, a map shows areas 
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of interest and the general direction in which to travel in order to reach a destination.  The roads 
on the map are possible paths, or choices, one can take to reach a destination.  Reaching a 
destination means that one needs to follow the correct roads.  Similarly, a policy points out the 
general direction, or objective, to reach a certain destination or goal.  On the other hand, a 
procedure provides the road or method to accomplish the objectives.  It lays out steps to follow 
when performing repetitive work.   
 
This suggests that policies can be an effective tool for organisations in that they document the 
correct path to travel, or actions to take, in the event of an incident.   
 
The next paragraph further discusses the significance of organisational procedures. 
5.2.1.3 Procedures (CE3) 
If policies are the organisational guidelines, procedures are the workhorses (Campbell, 1998). 
They are action-oriented and supplement the policy with specifics, thus completing the 
information that users need (Campbell, 1998; Page, 2002). 
 
To fulfil their objectives, McConnel (2005) suggests that procedures (together with policies) 
should: 
i. Be clear, specific and provide adequate flexibility to meet changing conditions; 
ii. Comply with all appropriate laws and regulations and 
iii. Agree with one another and promote fairness and equality amongst employees.  
 
Within the context of forensic readiness, organisational procedures provide a blueprint of how 
certain tasks are to be done, in the event of an incident. Additionally, procedures (coupled with 
policies) are a tool to manage employees. McConnel (2005) suggests that they serve numerous 
purposes, such as: 
i. Providing clear communication between the organisation and its employees; 
ii. Forming a basis for promoting fairness and equality;  
iii. Serving as guidelines for employees and management; 
iv. Serving as a basis for developing employee handbooks; 
v. Forming a basis for regular reviews of changes that affect employees and 
vi. Forming a context for employee training and orientation programmes.  
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Delaney et al. (1993) add that organisations must emphasise the management of employees 
(Human Resource Management), if they are to gain a competitive edge. He further states that 
modern, or progressive Human Resource Management policies and procedures, are positively 
associated with the economic performance of organisations. 
 
The above suggests that the development of procedures is a forethought process that can help 
ensure that an organisation carefully considers and adopts actions that can serve to reduce the 
risk of inadvertently destroying and negating evidentiary data, whist navigating the complex 
and multidisciplinary nature of digital crimes.  
 
The next section discusses the significance of Human Resource Management. 
5.2.1.4 Human Resources (CE4) 
Prince (2011) states that human resources encompass the people in an organisation (employees) 
and the human potential, or capital, available to a business.  Human capital can be thought of as 
a stock of accumulated knowledge, skills and experience (Randhawa, 2007).  It is a term that is 
increasingly used to refer to the philosophy, policies, procedures and practices related to the 
management of an organisation’s employees (Wilson, 2005; Prince, 2011). 
 
Human resource management (HRM) is concerned with all the activities that contribute to 
attracting, developing, motivating and maintaining a high performing workforce which results 
in organisational success (Randhawa, 2007).  
 
Specific to the forensic readiness model presented in the last chapter, employee training and 
development were identified as critical components of the said model.  Sims (2007) states that 
training and development, recently referred to as human resource development (HRD), consists 
of planned learning experiences that teach employees how to perform their jobs. It is concerned 
with orientation, performance management skills training and productivity enhancement.  
Randhawa (2007) adds that the objectives of HRD include: 
 
i. Training and developing staff to meet technological and social changes;  
ii. Ensuring a ready pool of competent staff at all levels to meet organisational needs at all 
times; 
iii. Preparing junior staff for future replacement; 
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iv. Preventing staff obsolescence by inculcating new concepts in their areas and 
v. Promoting a high morale among employees. 
 
Wilson (2005) argues that the proper management of HRD can improve organisational 
effectiveness and forensic readiness.  
5.2.1.5 Digital Forensic Ready Technologies (CE5) 
Elliot et al. (2010) describe digital resilience as “the capability that an organisation develops to 
either withstand or recover from digital threats, and deal in an effective manner with the 
consequences of interruptions, failures or deliberate violation of digital systems.” Earlier in 
Chapter 2, the definition of digital forensic readiness was presented as the art of maximising 
the organisation’s ability to collect credible evidence, whilst minimising the impact to business 
operations whilst keeping investigative costs low.  
 
Digital resilience and forensic readiness are concepts that are centred with the use of 
organisational data (Gladney, 2007). Franks (2012) argues that using organisational data 
appropriately will drive competitive advantage but he warns that ignoring organisational data 
will put an organisation at risk and cause it to fall behind the competition. 
 
Therefore, the above suggests that organisations should use technologies that not only facilitate 
daily operational activities, but should also be concerned with protecting and preserving the 
integrity of organisational data, thereby increasing the organisational digital forensic readiness, 
or its ability withstand or recover from digital threats and incidents.  
 
In addition to preserving organisational data for economic reasons, Runardotter et al. (2005) 
and Gladney (2007) argue that organisational data has to be available for future society for 
legal, historical and democratic reasons.  The latter directly applies to this thesis as Chapter 3 
was developed using case law which had been preserved and consequently benefited this study 
in the reaching of conclusions. 
 
The next section discusses the significance of having investigative methodologies.  
5.2.2 The Industry Environment (IE) 
The industry environment refers to a code family (domain) that houses all identified 
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components, which directly relate to activities and artifacts (domains) that relate to the forensic 
process of handling digital evidence. These components were previously identified as being: 
preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation and 
preservation.    
 
The significance of each component of the digital forensic process is discussed next. 
5.2.2.1 Preservation (IE1) 
Rice (2005) states that unless required by law, an entity is not obliged to preserve records. In 
addition, the duty to preserve evidence usually arises at the point when an incident has already 
occurred, or is suspected of having already occurred.  However, this does not prevent an 
organisation from taking proactive measures in identifying critical information that can support 
an investigation in the event of an incident (Cooper et al., 2010). 
 
Since electronic evidence may reside in numerous locations throughout an organisation’s 
technological infrastructure, it is important to ensure that all possibly relevant sources for 
electronic data are identified (Nelson et al., 2006). These locations can include: 
i.  Cloud Storage; 
ii.  Servers and Mainframes;  
iii.  Desktops and Laptops; 
iv.  Mobile devices; 
v.  Voice mail; 
vi.  Printers and copiers; 
vii.  Backup Media; 
viii.  Removable and other portable storage devices and 
ix.  Digital cameras and other multimedia devices.  
 
Vacca (2005) warns that if the preservation stage is poorly implemented, it gives rise to 
numerous possibilities for error in the form of destruction, mishandling and contamination.  
Therefore, it is imperative that this step of the methodology be carried out with exactness to 
ensure that the integrity of the evidence is maintained. 
 
Once evidence is preserved, the next step is to isolate it from the crime scene for purposes of 
analysis.  This is discussed in the next step. 
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5.2.2.2 Collection (IE2) 
Shavers (2013) argues that digital forensic investigations follow the same rules of evidence as 
any other investigation.  Additionally, that digital evidence must be seized according to 
evidentiary procedures of the investigators agency and legal rules of evidence. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the acquisition of electronic evidence has different implications and 
objectives when compared to the method of seizure and preservation of non-physical evidence. 
Furthermore, based on the type of evidence, a common decision to make is whether the 
evidence should be collected using live or dead forensic techniques, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Since each case is different, it is up to the investigator to decide which method is most 
reasonable when approaching the computer systems at the particular scene (Kizza, 2005; 
Shavers, 2013). 
5.2.2.3 Validation (IE3) 
The objective in a digital forensic investigation is to present evidence in such a way that it can 
be used as evidence in a court of law (Vacca, 2005).  This means that, unlike other computing 
areas where speed is the main concern, the priority in digital forensics is accuracy.  To verify 
data integrity, methods such as the use algorithms are available (Nelson et al. 2010).  In addition 
to using hashing algorithms, as discussed in Chapter 2, Vacca (2005) proposes the following 
four considerations to validating electronic evidence: 
i. Authenticity: establishing if electronic evidence comes from where it purports. 
ii. Reliability: establishing if there are any reasons for doubting the correct working of the 
computer. 
iii. Completeness: establishing if evidence obtained represents the complete picture. 
iv. Freedom from interference and contamination. 
 
Only once the evidence is correctly validated can the investigator invest time to unpack the 
content of the digital evidence piece in question. The significance of this step is discussed next. 
5.2.2.4 Identification (IE4) 
Nelson et al. (2010) state that in litigation cases, the investigator is often required to recover as 
much as possible, resulting in scope creep. They further warn that scope creep increases the 
time and resources needed to extract, analyse and present evidence.  As discussed in Chapter 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR 
EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Chapter 5: Foundational Principles Towards Model Development 85 
4, this situation may lead to the discovery of evidence that is out of scope, which may harm the 
admissibility of evidence and credibility of the investigator (Hypothesis 1, Chapter 4). 
 
Once the identification of evidence that falls within the parameters defined by the scope has 
taken place, analysis may begin.  
5.2.2.5 Analysis (IE5) 
During this step, it is important to understand the chronology of events and to link together key 
artifacts in order to understand the complete picture.  Making use of the correct forensic 
technology will not only expedite the analysis phase, it will also create a safety net that ensures 
and confirms that the investigator did indeed operate within the parameters set by the 
investigation scope.  Daniel et al. (2012) propose that the following be considered when using 
technology for forensic analysis.  For a tool to be forensically sound, it must be: 
i. Definable: enable the investigator to state the problem, articulate the desired outcome, 
develop an algorithm to describe the process and have a measurement system to validate 
the process; 
ii. Predictable: the tool must be predictable. If it is used to find pictures of certain format, 
then the prediction is that it will always find those types of files and 
iii. Verifiable: the ability to verify results and arrive at the same conclusion.  
 
The output of the tool must be interpreted to establish its relevance to the investigation (Daniel 
et al., 2012).  Interpretation is discussed next.  
 
5.2.2.6 Interpretation (IE6) 
The interpretation step is concerned with contextualising the results of the analysis phase in a 
way that demonstrates the logical flow of events. It is during this step of the methodology that 
the true value of a forensic expert is realised.  Daniel et al. (2012) argue that failing to make a 
decision to hire an expert early in the process can lead to sanctions, or inadmissibility, of 
evidence critical to a case. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, an error in interpretation by the expert witness may harm the 
admissibility of evidence, and tarnish the expert’s credibility (Hypothesis 1, Chapter 4). 
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5.2.2.7 Documentation (IE7) 
This step entails the documentation and presentation of findings in an appropriate manner. The 
examiner’s final report is a document which is delivered to the prosecutors, opposing counsel 
and other relevant parties, towards the end of the investigation.  Sammons (2012) suggests that 
this document typically consists of: 
i. The identity of the reporting agency; 
ii. A case identification reference number; 
iii. Identity of the submitting person, including the case number; 
iv. Dates of the receipt and report; 
v. Detailed description of the evidence items submitted; 
vi. Identity of the examiner; 
vii. Description of the steps taken during the examination process and 
viii. Detailed findings and conclusions.  
 
The aim of this step is to provide the reader with a document that is understandable and 
accurately represents the forensic process followed (Daniel et al., 2012). 
5.2.2.8 Presentation (IE8) 
Following the presentation of results in a report, the next necessary step is to preserve the 
evidence for a period as determined by the law. With digital evidence, it is up to the investigator 
to consider how and on what type of media to store it and what storage media is best to secure 
it (Nelson et al., 2010).  Additionally, the decision regarding the storage media used will also be 
determined by how long the evidence needs to be stored for. This means it is important that the 
correct media is used in order to prevent the risk of device obsolescence. 
 
It is important to remember that all records, whether electronic or not, should be retained for at 
least the minimum period stated in any applicable statute or regulation (Francis, 2004; Nelson 
et al., 2006). 
 
Specific to the South African law, the Criminal Procedure Act (Lawlibrary, n.d) stipulates that 
“the judge or judicial officer presiding at criminal proceedings shall at the conclusion of such 
proceedings, but subject to the provisions of this Act or any other law under which any matter 
shall or may be forfeited, make an order that any article referred to in section 33” and offers 
the following conditions for the disposal of articles after commencement of criminal 
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proceedings: 
i. That the article be returned to the person from whom it was seized, if such person may 
lawfully possess such article;   
ii. If such person is not entitled to the article or cannot lawfully possess the article, be 
returned to any other person entitled thereto, if such person may lawfully possess the 
article or  
iii. If no person is entitled to the article or if no person may lawfully possess the article or, if 
the person who is entitled thereto cannot be traced or is unknown, be forfeited to the 
State. 
 
Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that organisational policy and legal requirements be 
considered when dealing with the destruction or disposal of assets, articles or evidence that is 
no longer needed for preservation and retention (Nelson et al., 2006).  
 
The next section discusses the significance of the components found in the legislative 
environment.  
5.2.3 The Legislative Environment (LE) 
As INTERPOL Secretary General Ronald K. Noble once commented, “global efforts against 
cybercrime and to enhance cyber security require law enforcement and private sector Internet 
security companies to work more closely together, as well as harmonised regulations across 
countries” (Interpol, 2013).  
 
This notion supports the theme of this study namely that forensic readiness can only be 
achieved through cooperation and collaboration between parties from varying domains, as 
shown in Table 15.  
 
The legislative environment refers to a code family (domain) that houses all identified 
components, which directly relate to activities and artifacts (domains) that relate to the judicial 
system in the prosecution of digital crimes. These components were previously identified as 
being: electronic laws, criminal process, justice system, law enforcement agents and justice 
personnel. 
 
The next section discusses the significance of the judicial system in the forensic readiness 
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process. 
5.2.3.1 Electronic Laws (LE1) 
As discussed in Chapter 4, traditional laws were not developed with the cyber society in mind.  
Shalhoub et al. (2010) argue that while a number of countries around the world have reformed 
their existing laws and legislation to cater for digital crimes, this has provided vague and 
inefficient solutions. Additionally, that for ethical standards to be established in cyber space, 
new laws have to be legislated to deal with cybercrimes. 
 
Mambi (2010) proposes the following paradoxes for consideration when developing electronic 
laws: 
i. Such laws must include almost all branches of law. However, in order to be meaningful, 
it must be narrowed down and delimited; 
ii. Electronic laws must include be technologically neutral, but be able to steer and regulate 
technology and its various uses; 
iii. The development of electronic laws requires broad, as well as deep understanding of 
machinery and methods. However, legal solutions must be simple to understand and 
apply and 
iv. Such laws require foresight. However, it is difficult to predict future developments, 
situations, applications and issues in the technology sector.  
 
The above points suggest that, while traditional laws may serve to facilitate the admissibility 
of electronic evidence in a court of law, such attempts are inefficient solutions.  This dilemma 
can be resolved by legislating new laws that specifically deal with cybercrimes. 
5.2.3.2 Criminal Process (LE2) 
Chapter 4 presented a discussion which supports the view that digital evidence is collected 
differently than eyewitness testimony or physical evidence, and as such, a proposed that a 
process was required to address digital evidence.  
 
The criminal procedure under the traditional law has evolved to regulate the mechanisms 
common to the investigation of physical crime, namely the collection of physical evidence and 
eyewitness testimony.  Kerr (2005) warns that digital evidence will trigger new rules of 
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criminal procedure simply because computer related crimes feature new facts, and that these 
facts demand new laws.  To that, Krige (2012) added that electronic evidence still needs to pass 
the legal scrutiny of relevance and authenticity. 
 
This suggests that while it is possible to prosecute digital crimes under the traditional laws and 
processes (see Hypothesis 11, Chapter 4), technological advances continue to introduce 
limitations that make it necessary to not only develop electronic laws, but to ensure that 
complimentary criminal processes exist.   
 
These processes will enable law enforcement to conduct their investigations in a forensically 
sound manner. 
5.2.3.3 Law Enforcement Agents (LE3) 
As discussed in Chapter 2, education, training and awareness of law enforcement agents and 
justice personnel is necessary to enable them to attain the competencies required to effectively 
deal with digital crimes (Hypothesis 4, Chapter 2). 
 
Digital forensic experts specifically need to obtain certification in the tools and techniques used 
during the digital forensic process.  Schlichting et al. (2004) explained that certification 
involves the extensive testing of a person's abilities in his/her area of specialisation. 
 
Finally, while awareness can be achieved during the education, training or certification process, 
its goal is simply to change one’s sensitivity towards a given topic or issue (Rogers et al., 2004; 
Cross, 2006). 
 
Rogers et al. (2004) stated that education, training and certiﬁcation were the most reported 
inherent challenges facing digital forensic practitioners and law enforcement alike.  Hoolachan 
et al. (2010) added that the problem is compounded by the lack of a standardised, or consensus, 
approach to training computer forensics practitioners which can negatively impact on an 
organisation’s Forensic Readiness. 
 
The above points to a need for law enforcement and digital forensic practitioners to be 
frequently exposed to the necessary opportunities to develop and maintain their skills through 
various education, training and awareness programmes.   
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5.2.3.4 Justice Personnel (LE4) 
The findings in Chapter 4 show that the judiciary is presented with two problems that result in 
a reluctance to prioritise on digital evidence: high caseloads and a lack of knowledge (see 
Chapter 4, section 4.4.6, Question 13). 
 
Efforts, such as the United States Department of Justice hosting a conference on this subject 
(The US Department of Justice, 2009), create interest in dealing with digital crimes, but also 
aid in encouraging international cooperation.  This can contribute to addressing the lack of 
knowledge problem. 
 
Furthermore, this is a challenge that many organisations face and it requires organisational 
commitment to invest in empowering staff with knowledge and tools in order to perform their 
duties (see Hypothesis 4, Chapter 2). 
 
Lienhard et al. (2011) argue that in most countries of the world the judiciary experience 
increasing workloads, while scarcely any additional resources are available to cope with the 
problem. They propose that a truly effective system of court management could address the 
problem.  This suggests that the high caseload is a systemic problem and requires looking at 
the system. 
5.2.3.5 Justice System (LE5) 
Chapter 4 identified high caseloads and a lack of knowledge as the two factors contributing to 
inefficiencies when prosecuting digital crimes. The topic of knowledge was addressed earlier in 
this chapter.  In addition, respondents interviewed indicated that one of the possible solutions to 
addressing high caseloads was the development of special cybercrime courts. This suggestion was 
found to be in harmony with studies conducted by Fox et al. (2013).  In this study, Fox et al. (2013) 
identify the following as measures for improving case processing in the courts of law: 
i. Flexible court sittings, including early morning, evening and weekend sittings for certain 
types of hearings; 
ii. Reducing the number of continuances; 
iii. Setting time limits on case processing for detainees; 
iv. Cooperation and collaboration between judges, prosecutors, defence attorneys and law 
enforcement and 
v. Fast tracking cases where a guilty plea is anticipated. 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR 
EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Chapter 5: Foundational Principles Towards Model Development 91 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, advances in the judicial system are required to ensure robustness, 
maturity and effectiveness in dealing with digital crimes. The latter is a view shared by United 
Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon who stated that “we cannot expect to gain our goals 
of peace, development and respect for human rights without promoting and supporting a robust 
system of international criminal justice. That is our shared responsibility. It is our common 
interest” (United Nations Radio, 2013). 
 
The above discussion serves to provide the context and meaning behind the components as 
listed in Table 15.  Figure 4 is a graphic representation which seeks to provide both a summary 
of the above discussion and a foundation upon which the proposed model will be built.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Building blocks for the proposed model. 
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5.2.4 The Multidimensional Effect 
Analysis of the literature suggests that the components and domains discussed in this chapter, 
have a multidimensional effect.  At an application level, it is therefore necessary to establish 
the locality of each component, preceded by considerations on interdependencies that may exist.  
As per Table 17, findings suggest that when determining the locality of each component, the 
following three categories and their respective definitions serve as guidelines: 
i. Local Component: A component whose attributes are unique to a single entity (company 
and/or country) and whose scope is limited to its immediate environment.  
ii. Global Component: A component whose attributes are common across multiple entities 
(countries), and whose scope is not limited to its immediate environment.  
iii. Hybrid Component: A component possessing attributes of mixed origins (Local and 
Global) and whose scope satisfies (in part or in full) its immediate and broader 
environments. This component is characterised by customisation, with emphasis on 
either the local or global scope. 
 
 
Corporate Environment Industry Environment Legislative Environment 
Ref Component Locality Ref Component Locality Ref Component Locality 
CE1 Standards Hybrid IE1 Preservation Global LE1 Electronic Laws Hybrid 
CE2 Policies Local IE2 Collection Global LE2 Criminal Process Hybrid 
CE3 Procedures Local IE3 Validation Global LE3 Justice System Hybrid 
CE4 Human Resources (ETC) Local IE4 Identification Global LE4 
Law Enforcement 
Agents Local 
CE5 DFR Technologies Hybrid IE5 Analysis Global LE5 Justice Personnel Local 
   IE6 Interpretation Global    
   IE7 Documentation Global    
   IE8 Presentation Global    
	
Table 17: Characterisation of components. 	
5.2.4.1 Local Components 
As shown in Table 17, local components exist in both the Corporate Environment (CE) and the 
Legislative Environment (LE). While local in scope, the foundations (CE1, LE1, LE2 and LE3) 
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of these components contain attributes of mixed origins.  This interdependency suggests that 
while local components have limited scope, their attributes must not be isolated from the global 
environment but must be expandable and in harmony with the surrounding environments 
(customisation and adaptation). However, the expandability and harmonisation of local 
components to the global environment is not a one-way process, as discussed in the next 
paragraph. 
5.2.4.2 Global Components  
Global components only exist in the Industry Environment (IE).  This suggests that while a 
digital forensic methodology can be localised, its design principles remain largely governed by 
global/international best practices.  Furthermore, findings suggest that while localisation can 
take place at a granular level, the guiding global principles remains. This localisation of global 
components creates a two-way process that facilitates harmony between local and global 
components. 
5.2.4.3 Hybrid Components 
As depicted in Table 17, hybrid components exist in both the Corporate Environment (CE) and 
the Legislative Environment (LE).  An analysis of these components shows that they are largely 
foundational in nature, and form the basis from which the attributes of local components are 
derived. Hybrid components are testament to the interdependencies that exist between local 
and global components. 
5.2.4.4 Conflict Management 
In a perfect system, all components work in harmony, without any conflict. However, literature 
review findings suggest that this may not always be the case.  The challenge is to create 
harmony between the corporate, industry and legislative environment thereby increasing the 
probability of the admissibility of electronic evidence in a court of law. 
 
It is with the above in mind that the assumption that conflicts between the local, global and 
hybrid components will exist, is made. In such a situation, careful consideration must be 
applied to establishing the source and nature of the conflict, whilst giving priority to the laws 
of the land, followed by industry regulations and finally organisational needs. 
 
The next section discusses how this information on domains, and their respective components, 
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was used in developing the M-DiFoRe model.  
5.3 The Conceptual Modelling Process  
As Verdonck (2014) explained, conceptual modelling is an activity concerned with 
representing aspects of the physical and social world for communication, learning and problem 
solving among human users. Hoppenbrouwers (2005) added that in conceptual modelling, the 
fundamental assumption is that viewers perceive a universe and then produce a conception of 
that part which they hold as relevant. Furthermore, that the conceptions harboured by a viewer 
cannot be communicated and discussed with other viewers unless they are articulated in some 
form. In other words, a conception needs to be represented. 
 
The conceptual modelling process was found to align with the research approach (post 
modernism) adopted in this study, as discussed in section 1.7.  As already noted, the post 
modernism approach assumes a philosophical position which proposes that reality is constructed 
within belief systems, and that the observer is an integral part in what is being observed.  The 
adopted conceptual modelling process provided a practical way of communicating the reality 
under investigation by presenting it in a demystified and simplified manner towards solving the 
problems investigated in this study.   
5.3.1 Procedural Guidelines  
Verdonck (2014) opined that the quality of conceptual models can be improved by applying a 
defined conceptual modelling process. The following six steps to conceptual modelling are 
proposed:  
i. Step 1: Recognising the need for a conceptual model.   A conceptual model must be 
developed for the purposes of communication, learning and problem solving.   A 
conceptual model must seek to answer a specific question, or set of questions.  
ii. Step 2: Determining the modelling strategy. The general guidelines for this step is that 
the modelling strategy should accompany the modeller throughout the path of 
developing a conceptual model. Such a strategy serves to retain the modeller from 
making sudden changes or modifications during the modelling process, which could 
lead to a lower quality conceptual model.  
iii. Step 3: Conception of the conceptual model. This requires the modeller to form a first 
conception of the model. During the formation of a conception, the modeller identifies 
the main objects of the real world that need to be modelled. In other words, a blueprint 
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of the conceptual model is created, where the main objects and their relationships or 
dependencies are identified.  
iv. Step 4: Choice of an ontology. Ontologies can be used as a basis for a modeller’s 
perception of the real world, which will have an impact on the actual modelling of the 
real world. The ontology will give the modeller a perception of the real world, which 
can then be used to correctly create a representation of the real world.  
v. Step 5: Choice of a conceptual modelling language. The choice of the conceptual 
modelling language depends on the modelling strategy and the preferred ontology.  
Conceptual modelling is deeply rooted in communication, involving language as a 
means to achieve communication. 
vi. Step 6: Realisation of the conceptual model: As a final step, the conceptual model can be 
created to represent the chosen aspect of the real world. The developed model should 
fulfil two sets of demands on quality, one related to verifiability (i.e. internal quality) 
of a model and the other related to validity (i.e. external quality) of a model. 
 
By formulating, and applying, a modelling strategy as part of the conceptual modelling process 
and carefully linking the modelling needs/requirements to a certain ontology and conceptual 
modelling language, the developed conceptual model will result into a valid model, achieving 
both verification and validation (Grady, 1998; Unhelkar, 2005; Verdonck, 2014). 
5.3.2 Applied Modelling Process  
In developing the M-DiFoRe model, this thesis applied the above mentioned steps, as follows: 
i. Step 1: Recognising the need for a conceptual model. Chapter 1 of this thesis sets out the 
problem statement (section 1.3), research objectives (section 1.4) and its accompanying 
hypotheses (section 1.5) and proposes the development of a model to solve the 
identified problem/need.   
ii. Step 2: Determining the modelling strategy. As applied in Chapters 6 and 7, the strategy 
adopted in developing the M-DiFoRe model was to: 
a. Review literature in the form of case law, as documented by the South African 
courts.  The cases selected meet a specific criterion, as described in Chapter 6, 
section 6.2.1. 
b. Analyse the literature using Atlas.ti, following the process as detailed in Chapter 
4. 
c. Interpret results of the analysis process and establish the existence and nature of 
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the interdependencies that exist in the codes and families (domains and 
components) as per Chapter 4, Table 15. 
d. Develop the model using an integrated testing approach, in which verification 
and validation take place throughout the development process, and not at the 
end of the model development phase (Cook et al., 2005; Debbabi et al., 2010; 
Verdonck, 2014). 
iii. Step 3: Conception of the conceptual model. This thesis identified the blueprint, or main 
objects of the real world that need to be modelled as those contained in Table 15. Table 
15 lists the main objects (domains and components), whose inter-dependencies are 
investigated as part of model development and testing (Chapters 6 and 7).  
iv. Step 4: Choice of an ontology. The ontology adopted in this study is presented in Chapter 
3.  In order to meet the ontological quality requirements for completeness, accuracy and 
cognitive adequacy, an iterative process was followed in reviewing and coding selected 
case law, until theoretical saturation was reached.  The latter is discussed in section 
6.2.1. 
v. Step 5: Choice of a conceptual modelling language. The M-DiFoRe model is developed 
using the Natural Conceptual Modelling Language (NCML), focusing on the primary 
syntactic elements of natural language, namely: nouns, verbs and the prepositions 
associated with verbs (Boyd, 1998).  In line with NCML guidelines provided by Boyd 
(1998), this thesis shows the elements of NCML as rectangles, labelled arrows and lines. 
Labelled rectangles represent sentence subjects and objects, while labelled arrows 
represent verbs and labelled lines represent prepositions that contribute to the predicates 
of the verbs. Chapter 6, Table 18, contains a summary of the arrows and lines used in 
this thesis, and their respective meanings. 
vi. Step 6: Realisation of the conceptual model: The representation and explanation of the 
M-DiFoRe model is documented in Chapter 6, sections 6.3 and 6.4. In order to meet 
quality demands, verification and validation activities can occur throughout the model 
development phase in addition to, and/or as an alternative approach to testing post 
development (Cook et al., 2005; Debbabi et al., 2010; Verdonck, 2014). This thesis 
presents the application of the abovementioned Steps 5 and 6, which detail the model 
development process and continuous verification in Chapter 6, followed by the 
validation of the M-DiFoRe model in Chapter 7. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a continuation of Chapter 4, but with the goal of establishing the 
significance of each component of the model, as it relates to its respective domain.   
 
A literature review was used to investigate the significance of each component.  Table 15 was 
used as a basis for the literature review presented in this chapter. Findings serve to provide a 
theoretical foundation for the development of the proposed model presented in Chapter 6.  This 
was followed by a discussion on the multidimensional effect of each component under the three 
domains, as shown in Table 17.  
 
Finally, this chapter concludes with a presentation of the literature relating to the conceptual 
modelling process and details how this process was applied towards developing the M-DiFoRe 
model. 
 
The next chapter presents the application of the model development and testing process, as 
described in section 5.3.2. 
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6. Chapter 6: Realisation of the Conceptual Model 
6.1 Introduction 
The work presented in this chapter builds on the theoretical foundation formed in Chapter 5, 
which comprises a blueprint of the conceptual model wherein the main objects and their 
relationships are identified. 
 
This chapter is concerned with the realisation of the conceptual model which, as Verdonck 
(2014) explained, is the final step in applying the conceptual modelling process.  The 
application of Verdonck’s (2014) conceptual modelling process in this chapter is detailed in 
section 5.3.2.  The goal is to develop the conceptual model through the investigation of the 
interdependencies that exist between the components from the three domains (Table 15), as 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
In addition to this chapter describing the realisation or development of the model, it will also 
verify the accuracy and completeness of the blueprint (Table 15) which identifies the domains 
and their respective components.  This is achieved by following the modelling strategy, as 
detailed in section 5.3.2.  This integrated approach was undertaken to build confidence and 
credibility in the blueprint (Thacker et al., 2004). 
 
Thacker et al. (2004) state that both verification and validation are processes that accumulate 
evidence of a model’s correctness or accuracy for a specific scenario; thus, the two processes 
cannot prove that a model is correct and accurate for all possible scenarios, but rather that the 
model is sufficiently accurate for its intended use. The verification of the model is presented in 
this chapter while the validation process is presented in Chapter 7. 
 
As per section 5.3.2, Step 2(a), the work presented in this chapter stems from an analysis of 
case law as presented in the South African courts, wherein electronic evidence formed a key 
part of evidence led during legal proceedings. This chapter presents the three cases and analyses 
them against critical components and domains, as discussed in the previous chapter (Table 15).  
The results of this analysis are used to identify the interdependencies between the three 
domains and their respective components, the results of which are then used to develop the 
conceptual model. 
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This chapter concludes with a discussion on how the proposed model can be used to enable 
organisations to reduce the potential dangers from the inadvertent destruction and negating of 
evidentiary data, and to so improve overall organisational digital forensic readiness.  In addition, 
this chapter presents a template against which a self-assessment can be conducted, when 
applying the model within an organisation. 
6.2 Model Development Protocol 
This section presents an analysis of case law to verify components of the proposed model.  After 
following the protocol pesented hereafter, findings started showing the same results after the third 
case that was analysed.  With theoretical saturation reached (Vogt et al., 2014; Beaudry et al., 
2016), detailed analysis was only limited to the 3 case law presented in the sections that follow.  
6.2.1 Scoping and Database Section 
The scope of our research was limited to material available on the Southern African Legal 
Information Institute (SAFLII, 2016) online database which publishes legal information for free 
public access. It mainly comprises case law and legislation from the South African High Court. 
 
A detailed search of relevant databases was conducted. The criteria for relevance was based on 
the following factors: 
i. Case law from South African courts only: This is particularly important as the legal 
context for this research is limited to South African law, as described in Chapters 2 and 
3, respectively.   
ii. Case law post 2002, after implementation of the ECT Act:  This is keeping in line with 
the legal context described in Chapter 2, section 2.3. 
iii. Case must be transcribed in English: This in keeping with the scoping criteria described 
in Chapter 2, section 2.3. 
iv. Electronic evidence must form part of key evidence led: The analysis phase can thus 
discover important aspects of the case which led to the admissibility, or inadmissibility, 
of electronic evidence presented. 
 
This analysis made use of the same keywords as presented in section 2.2, which were also used 
in the literature review. 
 
The last step was to analyse each case law to test if it matches the last criteria, which requires 
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that electronic evidence must form part of key evidence led.  From this exercise, three cases 
were selected for further detailed analysis using the Atlas.ti tool (Atlas.ti, 2012). This yielded 
a collective total of seven cases for review.  The research was limited to three cases as 
theoretical saturation of data was reached by the third case, and findings from the analysis of 
each case yielded similar results (Vogt et al., 2014; Beaudry et al., 2016). This negated the 
justification for sampling of additional cases. 
 
The next sections present the three cases and their respective synopsis. 
6.2.2 Selected Case Law 
The three cases selected refer to:  
i. Cellular Telephone Records (SAFLII, 2008), 
ii. Computer and Network data (SAFLII, 2014[a]) and  
iii. Customer Banking Records (SAFLII, 2014[b]). 
 
All the above cases are in the public domain and thus meet the University of South Africa’s 
policy on research ethics, as discussed in Chapter 1.  
 
The next section presents the merits of the court case in question. 
6.3 Findings 
This section provides a synopsis to the three cases analysed in this chapter as well as 
demonstrate the interdependencies that exist between the components from the three domains. 
6.3.1 Case Law Synopses 
The full case files, along with the coded and analysed Atlas.ti (Atlas.ti, 2012) relational 
diagrams (data maps) are attached as Appendices 5, 6 and 7, respectively. 
 
6.3.1.1 Cellular Telephone Records 
The first case took place in June 2003 and involved trucks carrying a large consignment of 
cigarettes belonging to The British American Tobacco Company of South Africa (BATSA), 
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which was hijacked by armed robbers. This happened three times. In all three incidents the 
contents of the truck was loaded onto another truck whilst the BATSA driver and his assistant 
were removed from the scene and later released, unharmed. 
 
In each case, the modus operandi used to stop the BATSA truck was a replica police vehicle 
equipped with a flashing blue light and driven by persons wearing police, or traffic officer, 
uniforms. After flagging down the BATSA truck and making some initial enquiry relating to 
the driver’s licence, or the cargo being carried, the criminals produced firearms and held up the 
driver and his assistant. 
 
The chief pillar of the State’s case was the evidence of the S204 accomplice witness, Vernon 
Aspeling. The second pillar consisted of the records of the cell phone activity of various cell 
phones allegedly used by, inter alia, accused 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8. Through this evidence the 
State sought to demonstrate that the accused were present at the scenes of one, or more, of the 
three robberies and were in contact with each other before, during and after such robberies 
(SAFLII, 2008). See Appendix 5 for the full case, coded data and Atlas.ti relational diagrams. 
6.3.1.2 Computer and Network Data 
The second case relates to defamatory and injurious allegations sent to customers concerning 
Bytes Managed Services (Bytes MS) by a disgruntled ex-employee of Bytes MS.  In these 
emails the defendant alleges that, while employed by Bytes MS, he was involved in an internal 
investigation sanctioned by himself and conducted with the assistance of 15 other employees 
to determine whether there were irregularities in the service delivery from Bytes MS to its 
customers.  He also informed the recipients that the matter had escalated to the level of enquiry 
by the National Prosecuting Authority and the Competition Commission. 
 
The defendant was employed by Bytes MS as a Business Development Executive from 2007 
to 2009.  Owing to the scope and type of confidential and sensitive documentation and 
information which the Defendant was privy to, he was required to sign various confidentiality 
undertakings.  The Defendant was dismissed in February 2009 due to insubordination and 
irretrievable breakdown of the trust relationship.  The Defendant’s dismissal resulted from his 
failure to follow frequently repeated and clear (written and oral) instructions in relation to a 
certain transaction which resulted in a bad debt provision of R3.2 million, one month prior to 
the financial year end of the First Plaintiff. 
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The case was based on an analysis of electronic copies of various emails in which the author 
used the alias “Sunita Paritala”. These emails contained defamatory and injurious allegations. 
The court required digital forensic experts to trace the emails and establish their origin, analyse 
all emails received from the Defendant, his legal representative and “Sunita Paritala” and to 
establish if the Defendant was involved in distributing these emails, either by supplying the 
information to, or posing as, “Sunita Paritala” (SAFLII, 2016[a]). 
 
See Appendix 6 for the full case, coded data and Atlas.ti relational diagrams. 
6.3.1.3 Customer Banking Records 
The last case involves the use of stolen login details of Postbank customers. The suspects were 
arrested after the discovery of a syndicate, the members of which allegedly stole R2 million 
from bank accounts, held by the public, at various Post Office outlets. 
 
The theft occurred in 2011 and the suspects were linked to another similar theft which had 
occurred in 2008. With the assistance of Post Office employees, the suspects had obtained 
details of Post Office banking accounts into which vast amounts of money had been deposited, 
and were being held. Identity documents, passports and other documents were falsified in order 
to access and divert the funds deposited in these bank accounts.  Thereafter, the funds held in 
said bank accounts were unlawfully depleted through the connivance of members of the 
syndicate, who had formerly been in the employ of the Post Office. 
 
Details of some of the targeted bank accounts (including references to the Post Office bank 
account numbers, balances, account holders’ names and contact details) were allegedly 
discovered stored on the suspects’ cell phones (SAFLII, 2014[c]). 
 
The State’s case was based on an analysis of computers, cellular phone data and other security 
logs, which were then used to reconstruct the scene and link the criminal activities to the 
suspected individuals. 
 
See Appendix 7 for the full case, coded data and Atlas.ti relational diagrams. 
6.3.2 Process for Data Coding 
The coding, mapping and analysis of case law data followed the same approach as discussed 
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in Chapter 4, which discusses the development of codes, families and networks.  Table 15, 
shows the common set of codes which was developed during the analysis of interview data and 
is used in this chapter as a foundation towards the validation of the three cases. 
 
Results from the analysis of the three cases, using the keywords in Table 15, show that all codes 
were found to exist in all three cases and that no new codes had emerged during the analysis 
process.  The study therefore accepts Table 15 as a final list of codes from which further 
analysis will take place. The consistency in findings between Chapters 2, 4 and 6 further acts 
as confirmation that the triangulation process was successful. 
 
Once codes were formed, they were further correlated into one to identify shared conceptual 
characteristics.  This was necessary in order to understand the relationship and 
interdependencies between the codes.  Where codes were found to relate to each other, memos 
were created to narrate the nature of their relationship.  Additionally, linkages were formed 
using either a black line (to represent a link which led to evidence being admitted in court) or 
a black line (to represent an action the court deemed detrimental to the case). 
 
Five types of linkage lines were used, each serving a specific purpose.  The linkage lines also 
had arrows to depict the flow of information. Both bi-directional and uni-directional arrows 
were used.  Table 18 summarises the meaning of each link type and its associated arrow. 
 
From the above analysis, groupings of codes sharing conceptual characteristics emerged.  The 
code groupings, or code families, were analysed further and given family names, based on their 
collective function. 
Link type 
Link type 
reference Arrow type 
Arrow 
type 
reference 
Synopsis 
Comply with Co Uni-directional arrow 
Uni-D Act in accordance 
with set law or policy. 
Cooperate with Coo Uni-directional arrow 
Uni-D Act jointly or assist 
with an action. 
Is a property of Pr Uni-directional arrow 
Uni-D Belongs to, or is a 
subset of. 
Must achieve Ac Uni-directional arrow 
Uni-D A required output or 
action. 
Is associated with As Bi-directional arrow 
Bi-D Sharing a common 
purpose. 
 
Table 18: Link and arrow types used to investigate relationships between components.	
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Finally, Atlas.ti was used to graphically represent the interdependencies between the codes, 
making use of different link and arrow types, as previously discussed.  This process is 
represented in Figure 6. 
 
The next section discusses the code families that were formed, and presents the function of 
each code family.  
6.3.3 Mapping of Code Families 
From the analysis of the code families, and component interdependency chart presented in 
Figure 6, findings show the following systems, or groupings of components based on a function 
they perform: 
i. Group 1: These are systems with two components from different domains; 
ii. Group 2: These components form systems with three components, and  
iii. Group 3: These components form systems with more than three components.  
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Figure 6: Summary charts of core network groupings from case law wherein electronic evidence 
was admitted in court. 
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6.3.3.1 Interdependencies between Group 1 components 
Findings show three groupings of components under Group 1.  These are: 
i. Collection (IE2) and Criminal Process (LE2); 
ii. Justice Personnel (LE5) and Interpretation (IE6) and 
iii. Law Enforcement Agents (LE4) and Presentation (IE8). 
 
The next section presents the interpretation of the interdependencies between each of the Group 
1 components.  
i. Collection (IE2) and Criminal Process (LE2): As depicted in Figure 7, the combination 
of LE2 and IE2 suggests that the nature of the interdependencies between the 
components speaks to the alignment that needs to exist between evidence collection 
procedures, as defined by industry (IE2), in order to processes, as stipulated by the law 
(LE2) of the country.  Findings suggest that the function performed by said code family 
is the collection of evidence.  Therefore, the function name was noted as Evidence 
Collection. 
 
 
Figure 6: Interdependencies between IE2 and LE2 
 
ii. Justice Personnel (LE5) and Interpretation (IE6): Figure 8 shows the interdependency 
between components LE5 and IE6.  These findings suggest that not only is the burden 
on industry to correctly interpret (IE6) results stemming from their digital forensic 
analysis, but that the justice system also has a duty to ensure that digital forensic 
findings are correctly interpreted, so as to ensure that the law is applied correctly.  
Findings suggest that the function performed by this code family is the implementation 
of the justice system.  Therefore, the function name was noted as Justice System 
Implementation. 
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Figure 7: Interdependencies between IE6 and LE5. 
 
iii. Law Enforcement Agents (LE4) and Presentation (IE8): The last of the Group 1 
components is the interdependency between LE4 and IE8.  As illustrated in Figure 9, 
findings suggest that those presenting testimony (IE8) to the courts must be willing, 
and able, to disclose all which is required by the court. In turn, Law Enforcement Agents 
(LE4) must be equally willing, and capable, of investigating such crimes. Findings 
suggest that the function performed by said code family is the prosecution of e-crimes. 
Therefore, the function name was noted as e-Crime Prosecution. 
 
 
Figure 8: Interdependencies between IE8 and LE4. 
 
The next section discusses the interdependencies between Group 2 components.  
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6.3.3.2 Interdependencies between Group 2 components  
Findings show six groupings of components under Group 2.  These are: 
i. Human Resources (CE4), Justice System (LE3) and Collection (IE2); 
ii. Presentation (IE8), Standards (CE1) and Electronic Laws (LE1); 
iii. Policies (CE2), Presentation (IE8) and Electronic Laws (LE1); 
iv. Human Resources (CE4), Presentation (IE8) and Criminal Process (LE2); 
v. Presentation (IE8), Procedures (CE3) and Criminal Process (LE2) and 
vi. DFR Technologies (CE5), Preservation (IE1) and Criminal Process (LE2). 
 
The next section presents the interpretation of the interdependencies between each of the Group 
2 components. 
i. Human Resources (CE4), Justice System (LE3) and Collection (IE2): As seen in Figure 
10, findings suggest that employees (CE4) must be sufficiently trained, educated and 
certified to operate the organisation’s forensic ready technology, provide witness 
services and cooperate with those in the justice system (LE3).  Additionally, those 
representing the justice system (LE3) should become fully acquainted with the digital 
forensic process.  Finally, that industry technical experts make use of the correct tools 
and follow due process in collecting (IE2) evidentiary data.  Findings suggest that the 
function performed by this code family is the handling of evidence.  Therefore, the 
function name was noted as Evidence Handling. 
 
 
Figure 9: Interdependencies between CE4, LE3 and IE2. 
	
 
ii. Presentation (IE8), Standards (CE1) and Electronic Laws (LE1): Findings suggest that 
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the nature of the interdependency within this group of components is such that 
organisational standards (CE1) need to be developed in line with legislative 
requirements (LE1).   Additionally, the presentation (IE8) of evidence should be in line 
with organisational standards (CE1).   This interdependency is illustrated in Figure 11. 
Findings suggest that the function performed by the said code family is the localisation 
of standards.  Therefore, the function name was noted as Standards Localisation. 
 
 
Figure 10: Interdependencies between IE8, CE1 and LE1. 
 
iii. Policies (CE2), Presentation (IE8) and Electronic Laws (LE1): Findings suggest the need 
for organisations to develop policies (CE2), in harmony with relevant legislation (LE1), 
and to ensure that the presentation (IE8) of evidence is in a manner that agrees with 
relevant legislation (LE1).  This interdependency is illustrated in Figure 12. Findings 
further show that the function performed by this code family is the alignment of policies.  
Therefore, the function name was noted as Policy Alignment. 
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Figure 11: Interdependencies between CE2, IE8 and LE1. 
 
iv. Human Resources (CE4), Presentation (IE8) and Criminal Process (LE2): As shown in 
Figure 13, findings suggest that employees (CE4) must be sufficiently trained, educated 
and certified to operate the organisation’s forensic ready technology, provide witness 
services (IE8) and cooperate with authorities.  Further, that these employees fully 
comply with the requirements of the criminal process (LE2) and so maintain the 
evidentiary value of all data processed. Findings suggest that the function performed 
by this code family is the preparation of witnesses.  Therefore, the function name was 
noted as Witness Preparation. 
 
 
Figure 12: Interdependencies between CE4, IE8 and LE2. 
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v. Presentation (IE8), Procedures (CE3) and Criminal Process (LE2): Findings suggest that 
evidence should be presented (IE8) in such a way that it fully complies with the 
requirements of the criminal process (LE2) and as stipulated by organisational 
procedures (CE3).  Further, that the latter (CE3) be in harmony with the requirements 
of the criminal process (LE2) (refer to Figure 14).  Findings suggest that the function 
performed by this code family is the implementation of procedures.  Therefore, the 
function name was noted as Procedural Implementation. 
 
 
Figure 13: Interdependencies between IE8, CE3 and LE2. 
 
vi. DFR Technologies (CE5), Preservation (IE1) and Criminal Process (LE2): As shown in 
Figure 15, findings suggest that the organisation needs to ensure the existence of 
forensic ready technology (CE5), which preserves (IE1) forensic attributes of all data 
stored, and maintains evidentiary value as required by the criminal process (LE2). 
Findings further suggest that the function performed by said code family is the 
preservation of evidence.  Therefore, the function name was noted as Evidence 
Preservation. 
 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR 
EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Chapter 6: Realisation of the Conceptual Model 112 
 
Figure 14: Interdependencies between CE5, IE1 and LE2. 
6.3.3.3 Interdependencies between Group 3 components 
Findings show one grouping of components under Group 3.  This entails interdependencies 
between LE3 and the industry environment, as represented by components IE1, IE2, IE3, IE4, 
IE5, IE6, IE7, LE8 and IE9. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 16, findings suggest that those in the justice system (LE3) must be 
adequately acquainted with all aspects of the digital forensic methodology (IE1 to IE9) when 
prosecuting cases of such a nature. The findings further suggest that the function performed by 
this code family is the evaluation of the implementation of the digital forensic methodology.  
Therefore, the function name was noted as Methodology Evaluation. 
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Figure 15: Interdependencies between LE3 and the industry environment as represented by 
components IE1 to IE9. 
 
The next section presents the final step in applying the conceptual modelling process, i.e. 
realisation of the conceptual model, and uses an analogy to explain the collective 
interdependencies which exists between the domains and components discussed.  
6.4 A Multidisciplinary Conceptual Digital Forensic Readiness Model  
In an effort to add clarity to the intricate workings of the proposed model, this section makes 
use of an analogy wherein the model is compared to the human body. The use of the human 
body for analogy purposes is deemed appropriate as the proposed model is intended to appeal 
to a broader audience. 
 
This discussion is followed by the presentation of Figure 17, which is the Multidisciplinary 
Digital Forensic Readiness Model (M-DiFoRe). 
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6.4.1 The Analogy 
Firstly, consider the impact that environmental factors have on the human body.  
Environmental factors can affect human health in many ways, both positively and negatively.  
 
Then consider the composition of the human body, which consists of three key interdependent 
parts: the head, torso and limbs. According to Camazine et al. (2001) the physiology of the 
head, torso and limbs focuses on individual organs which conduct the body's functions.  
Walhout et al. (2013) describe the human body as a group of organs or systems, that work 
together to perform a certain task.  
 
Finally, the systems found in the human body self-regulate through a process called 
homeostasis which maintains stability while adjusting to internal and external conditions 
(Camazine et al., 2001).  
6.4.2 Model Functionality 
To explain how the proposed model works, the study makes use of the above analogy on the 
workings of the human body. 
6.4.2.1 Explanation of Key Concepts  
Just as environmental factors influence a person’s decision to live in one city, rather than 
another; similarly, when deciding on which environment or locale to operate, an organisation 
needs to carefully consider the impact which factors such as weather, politics, legislation, crime, 
labour matters and other economic factors will have on its operations. Therefore, the top layer 
of the M-DiFoRe model is the Locale, which requires an organisation to consider factors 
associated with the environment within which it is established.  
 
The composition of the human body can be compared to the three domains of the M-DiFoRe 
model.  Just as adverse changes in weather conditions can negatively affect the human body; 
once the general locale conditions are understood, an organisation will have to investigate 
specific locale conditions (Domains) that affect the organisation (Corporate Environment), the 
industry in which the organisation operates (Industry Environment) and the laws (Legislative 
Environment) specific to the locale chosen by the organisation. These domains were discussed 
in chapter 4, section 4.5.  This understanding will aid the organisation in preparing for adverse 
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changes, such as changes in legislation which may impact on the organisation.  Therefore, the 
second layer of the M-DiFoRe model is the Domain layer.  
 
Just as the physiology of the head, torso and limbs focuses on individual organs which conduct 
the body's functions; each domain has individual components which are comparable to the 
organs in the human body. Therefore, the third layer of the M-DiFoRe model is the 
Components layer. These components were discussed in chapter 5, section 5.2.  
 
Finally, as Walhout et al. (2013) explained, the human body is a group of organs or systems, 
that work together to perform a certain task. Therefore, the fourth and final layer of the model 
is the Systems layer.  These systems were discussed in chapter 6, section 6.3.3.  Just as the 
human body requires all systems to function properly in order to achieve homeostasis, all 
systems of the proposed model are important in maintaining forensic readiness. 
 
The consolidation of the four layers discussed above culminate in the Multidisciplinary Digital 
Forensic Model (M-DiFoRe Model). 
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Figure 16:   The Multidisciplinary Digital Forensic Model (M-DiFoRe Model). 
The section above, together with the previous chapters, provide and explanation as to how the 
conceptual model was conceived.  The next section discusses the application of the conceptual 
model in order to verify the accuracy and completeness thereof. 
6.4.2.2 Applying the Conceptual Model  
If a model is to have any practical value, it needs to bridge the gap between the realm of the 
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conceptual and the applied (Cook, 2005 and Verdonck, 2014).  For any organisation to benefit 
from the M-DiFoRe model, a specific process should be followed in order to achieve the purpose, 
as set out in section 1.6, Chapter 1. 
        
This section begins with the presentation of a self-assessment tool through which organisations 
can evaluate their digital forensic readiness, using the M-DiFoRe model as a reference. The self-
assessment template (Table 19) lists all the systems (layer 4) of the M-DiFoRe model in addition 
to four essential steps which analyse the digital forensic readiness of an organisation: 
i. Step 1: Establish the existence of each component of the model. This is achieved by: 
I.  checking model requirements for each component (column 2) and then conducting 
a gap analysis to note the existence of each component of the system within the 
organisation. 
II.  recording the results, obtained from the above analysis, in the “Exist” column 
(column 3) of the self-assessment template (Table 19) with a “Y” indicating that 
the component exists and a “N” indicating that it does not exist.  
III.  completing the “Supporting Evidence Type and Source” column (column 4) by 
noting the type of evidence to support each finding.  The four types of evidence 
are: Documentary Evidence (D), Observed Processes (P), Verbal Statements (S) 
and Appendices (A).  The source of the evidence is also to be noted.  The types 
of supporting evidence and related abbreviations are explained at the end of this 
section.  
ii. Step 2:  Establish the existence of each system (column 1) which is achieved by: 
I.  completing the “Exist” column (column 5) found under step 2 (Table 19) and 
entering a “Y” where all the components of the system exist, as per the findings 
from step 1.  However, if step 1 reveals that one, or more, components were 
missing, then the system has to be marked as incomplete by entering a “N” in 
the “Exist” column.  
II.  completing the “Supporting Evidence Type and Source” column (column 6) by 
noting the type of evidence to support each finding, as well as its source.  
iii. Step 3: Establish the nature of the interdependencies which were found to exist between 
the existing systems.  In the case of systems that do not exist, skip to step 4.   This step 
is achieved by: 
I. completing the “Link type” column (column 7.2).  This is achieved by noting the 
component pair and entering the link type abbreviation in accordance with the 
guidelines provided in Table 18.  
II. completing the “Arrow type” column (column 7.3). This is achieved by entering 
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the type of arrow which represents the information flow between the component 
pair under analysis, as per the guidelines provided in Table 18.  
III. completing the “Model Compliance” column (column 8) by determining the degree 
to which the system under analysis complies with the requirements of the model. 
Results are noted under only one of three possible classifications, namely: 
a. None: where the system interdependencies within the organisation do 
not agree with those of the model.  
b. Partial: where there is a partial alignment between what has been found 
within the organisation and that which the model stipulates.    
c. Full: where the system found that within the organisation to be exactly 
as defined by the M-DiFoRe model. 
IV. completing the “Supporting Evidence Type and Source” column by noting the type 
of evidence which supports each finding, as well as its source.   
iv. Step 4:  Where findings from Model Compliance (column 8) reflect a “None” or “Partial” 
compliance, corrective steps are to be taken in accordance with the guidelines provided 
by the M-DiFoRe model (Chapter 6, section 6.3.3).  Step 4 concludes the self-
assessment process and requires that remedial action be undertaken to correct 
vulnerable systems.  Reference to the theory, which contains the requirements of the 
model, is noted under the “Model reference” column (column 11).  
 
Based on the previous assessment, a detailed action plan can be developed to guide those 
activities required towards increasing an organisation’s digital forensic readiness. 
 
With the execution of steps 1 to 3, as detailed above, it is imperative to collate sufficient and 
appropriate evidence to support and substantiate findings.  It is of the utmost importance to 
note that there can be more than one possible evidence type to support a finding.  Therefore, a 
description as to the nature of the source must be added for each type of evidence selected from 
the four options which follow.  Appropriate supporting evidence types are: 
i. Documentary evidence (D) such as documents created by the organisation in the normal 
course of business, policies and transactional data.  This is abbreviated as “D” in the 
“Supporting Evidence Type and Source” columns (columns 4, 6 and 10) of the self-
assessment template. Documentary evidence is classified as real evidence and carries 
material evidentiary weight in court. 
ii. Observed processes (P) and physical items, such as monitoring the operation of an 
intrusion detection system, or physically inspecting a collection of storage media 
containing archived firewall logs.  This is abbreviated as “P” in the “Supporting 
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evidence” column of the self-assessment template.  The observation is carried out by 
the person applying the self-assessment.  Observing a process may be necessary to 
confirm a finding which emanates from documentary evidence.  
iii. Verbal statements (S) include comments or references made by organisational 
representatives as to the existence of processes and procedures.  This is abbreviated as 
“S” in the “Supporting Evidence Type and Source” column of the self-assessment 
template.  To maintain evidentiary weight, it is necessary for the person applying the 
self-assessment to obtain verbal statements directly from the source. 
iv. Appendices (A) are documents external to the organisation and are created by the person 
applying the self-assessment during the M-DiFoRe model implementation process.  
Appendices should detail the thought process applied during analysis, evidence of 
research conducted and data analysis reports generated in the course of applying the 
self-assessment.   This is abbreviated as “A” in the “Supporting Evidence Type and 
Source” column of the self-assessment template. 
 
Table 19 illustrates the self-assessment template, with the model’s systems and components 
as pre-populated fields against which the assessment is based. 
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Table 19: Self-Assessment template for using the M-DiFoRe model to identify vulnerable systems. 
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In view of the results of the self-assessment process, the model provides a guideline according 
to which an organisation can ensure that the necessary components and systems are in place. 
Additionally, the model helps with an understanding of the respective functions of these 
components and systems.  This process is non-liner, thus allowing the organisation to 
implement the model starting at any layer as based on priorities identified in the self-assessment. 
 
The next section discusses the key differentiators from previous models presented. 
6.5 M-DiFoRe Model Key Differentiators  
In Chapter 2, section 2.2.5, an overview is provided of various digital forensic models that were 
developed since 2001.  The M-DiFoRe model differentiates itself from these models in the 
following ways:  
6.5.1 Systematic Classification of Critical Components 
The models reviewed as part of this study present varying components derived from a bottom-
up technical approach. As per Table 5, models 1-4,6,7,11 and 13 were developed using a 
bottom-up approach.  The M-DiFoRe model was developed with the end in mind (top-down), 
and made use of a case-law-driven approach to extrapolate critical components, as observed 
from the way in which the courts processed digital evidence.  This facilitated the identification 
of common factors which the courts considered important in determining the admissibility and 
weight of evidence led. Several examples of case law were analysed in chapter 6 and with the 
aid of Atlas.ti, the coded data was systematically classified to arrive at an inclusive list of 
critical components and the systems or families to which they belong.  
 
The practical value derived from this approach is that the risk of negating evidentiary data is 
reduced, through the holistic identification and prioritisation of critical components. This 
requirement is in line with the Purpose Statement as detailed in Chapter 1. 	
6.5.2 Strategic Codification of Component Interdependencies 
Pursuant to the identification and classification of critical components was the strategic 
codification of the same, in order to investigate component interdependencies.  The M-DiFoRe 
model identifies components with one-to-one, one-to-many and other types of dependencies, 
as discussed in Chapter 5. This sets the M-DiFoRe model apart from existing reviewed models 
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5-13 as shown in Table 5, as it provides deeper insight into the ripple effect which a change in 
the state of an attribute of a component has in relation to other associated components of the 
model.  
 
In line with the Problem Statement, this addresses the gap noted, by providing an enhanced 
multidisciplinary approach which seeks to  identify inter-disciplinary  interdependencies, 
thereby reducing the organisational risk of inadvertently destroying evidence.  
6.5.3 Cross-Functional Approach with Multiple Starting Points 
Unlike the process-based and integrated models 5, 7-13 discussed in Table 5,  the M-DiFoRe 
model does not have a single starting point for implementation.  Each system of the model is 
in itself a starting point and represents a complete module that can function independently 
without the need to implement the model in its entirety.  
 
This facilitates a phased implementation approach, based on the needs of the organisation, 
rather than simply applying a process from beginning to end before deriving value.  
Furthermore, the existence of multiple starting points in the M-DiFoRe model facilitates 
parallel implementation of systems for increased optimisation of organisational digital forensic 
readiness.   
 
Finally, in line with the Problem Statement, this modularity in design reduces the complexities 
associated with achieving digital forensic readiness by subdividing the implementation into 
smaller independent parts.  	
6.5.4 Non-Context Specific (Universal) Application 
The M-DiFoRe model deviates from the trend noted in models 8, 10 and13 as discussed in 
Table 5, which tend to be context and use case specific.   
 
The practical value derived is that M-DiFoRe model assumes a macro integrated approach 
which focuses on digital forensics as a discipline, thereby applying a principle-based design to 
enhance its applicability across different disciplines.  
 
In line with the Problem Statement, this provides a more universal way of addressing the 
multidisciplinary nature of digital crimes as it can be applied to any type of organisation using 
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any type of technology.	
6.6 Conclusion 
The primary goal of this chapter is the realisation of the conceptual model as the final step in 
applying the conceptual modelling process. The secondary goal is to verify the accuracy and 
completeness of the blueprint (Table 15, Chapter 4, page 75) which identifies the domains and 
their respective components, as presented in Chapter 5.  This verification process was done 
through a review of three legal cases which were heard in the South African courts (section 
6.3).  
 
The interpretive paradigm as discussed in chapter 2 was used to analyse secondary research 
data (Case Law) that was utilised for purposes of verifying prior primary research findings.  
The results of this process confirmed that the identified 18 components, 10 systems, and their 
respective domains, were present in all cases analysed and that no new components or domains 
emerged.  
 
Additionally, this chapter identified the interdependencies between the components, the 
systems and their respective domains in order to develop the multidisciplinary conceptual 
model. Findings show ten systems, which are made up of more than two components from 
different domains, which self-regulate to maintain digital forensic homeostasis within an 
organisation.  
 
The chapter also verifies the accuracy and completeness of the blueprint presented in Table 15 
by triangulating findings from chapter 2, using a different research method and arriving at the 
same results.  
 
This chapter concludes with the presentation of the M-DiFoRe model. It uses the analogy of 
the human body to explain how the proposed model can be applied in order to enable 
organisations to reduce likely dangers from the unintended destruction and negating of 
evidentiary data as per the purpose statement in Chapter 1, section 1.6.  In addition, the study 
provides a process on how an organisation can use the proposed model to conduct a self-
assessment.  
 
The next chapter is concerned with the validation of the proposed model, and tests the proposed 
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model against a different case that met the same selection criteria as those presented in this 
chapter, but where the court found the electronic evidence presented inadmissible.  The purpose 
of this to determine whether the proposed model could have prevented this from happening as 
per the purpose statement in Chapter 1, section 1.6.  
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7. Chapter 7: Model Validation Approach 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented and explained the realisation of the conceptual model and 
verified the accuracy and completeness of the proposed model, as derived from an analysis of 
case law in Chapter 6 wherein the courts found electronic evidence admissible. The aim of this 
chapter is to validate the proposed model, using a different case where the courts found 
electronic evidence presented inadmissible. The said validation process uses the 
implementation tool as discussed in section 6.4.2.2.  The application of the proposed model to 
a case such as this demonstrates the difference the model can make in the admissibility of 
evidence.   
 
This chapter presents evidence which suggests that the proposed model is sufficiently accurate 
for its intended use of enabling organisations to reduce the potential dangers from the 
inadvertent destruction and negating of evidentiary data, and improving overall organisational 
digital forensic readiness. 
 
The evidence stems from an analysis of case law, as presented in the South African courts, 
wherein electronic evidence formed a key part of evidence led during legal proceedings. Unlike 
the three cases in Chapter 6, the case used for validating the model contained digital evidence 
that the court deemed inadmissible.  If applying the model to this case results in the 
identification of the components and inherent relationships that caused the evidence to be 
inadmissible, the model van be considered valid and sufficiently accurate.    
 
The chapter starts by presenting a synopsis of the legal case used. This discussion is followed 
by a post-analysis of the case using the proposed model, to thereby determine the validity of 
the model in preventing the organisation from inadvertently destroying or negating evidence. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the results of the validation process and identifies 
critical points of failure in the case which, if the model had been applied before the events, 
could have mitigated the risk of the organisation inadvertently negating evidentiary data, thus 
losing the case. 
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7.2 Validation Protocol 
As Debbabi et al. (2010) and Verdonck (2014) explained, model validation is undertaken to 
build confidence and credibility, and is the final step in the applied modelling process, as 
discussed in section 5.3.2, step 6.   
 
This is achieved in this section, by applying the model (retrospectively), to a case that was 
presented in court, wherein electronic evidence was found inadmissible.  The validation is done 
based on a two-pronged approach to achieve the same goal.  The first methods uses the self-
assessment template presented in chapter 6. The second method is based on a qualitative 
analysis of the case using ATLAS.ti. If a comparing of the results obtained from the two 
methods show a high degree of similarity, the model can be considered as sufficiently valid.  
Discrepancies in the results would invalidate the model.   
 
Key activities undertaken in the validation process are: 
i. Activity 1- Present case law synopsis where electronic evidence was found inadmissible; 
ii. Activity 2 - Apply steps 1 to 3 of the self-assessment template to the said case law;  
iii. Activity 3 - Perform a qualitative analysis on the said case law; 
iv. Activity 4 - Compare results from activity ii and iii above and 
v. Activity 5 - Apply step 4 of the self-assessment template to the said case law. 
7.3 Validation of model 
This section presents the analysis of the court case in question.  (Refer to Appendix 8 for the 
full court case). 
7.3.1 Activity 1 - Case Law Synopsis: Defamation and Unlawful Competition 
In this case, the applicants alleged that the respondent had sent an email to its customers, 
competitors and staff which was defamatory and which interfered with its contractual 
relationships (Juta Law, 2016).  The case is in the public domain and therefore complies with 
the ethics requirements as discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.7. 
 
The respondent was employed by the applicant from 2010 as a software developer and later 
became its Chief Information Officer. The respondent resigned with effect 31 January 2014. 
On termination of his employment, the respondent was subject to a restraint of trade agreement, 
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precluding him from doing business with certain of the applicant’s customers. The applicant 
alleged that subsequent to the termination of his employment, the respondent had motive to 
harm the applicant’s business as he resigned before being eligible to receive a bonus of R11 
million ($900k).   
 
Based on the above, the applicants obtained a court order allowing for a search of the 
respondent's premises, the seizure of relevant documents (and their preservation) pending an 
action which it intended to initiate against the respondent for defamation and unlawful 
competition. 
 
An issue on the return day of the hearing was the degree of proof that the applicants were 
required to show in respect of the requirements for the order, namely: 
i. Possession by the respondent of vital evidence;  
ii. A real apprehension that it might have been hidden or destroyed and  
iii. A cause of action to which the evidence related.  
 
The court ruled that the applicants had failed to establish a strong prima facie case that the 
respondent was the author of the defamatory emails in question, or that he had, what the 
applicant deemed intellectual property. The preservation order was accordingly discharged 
(Juta Law, 2016). 
7.3.2 Activity 2 - Self Assessment 
This section presents an application of the steps as detailed in section 6.4.2.2.   
7.3.2.1 Step 1: Component Existence 
The application of the M-DiFoRe model begins with conducting a gap analysis into the 
existence of the relevant components within the organisation.  In this instance, the process 
entailed a review of case law, as per section 7.3.1, with the objective of extrapolating 
supporting evidence (section 6.4.2.2) which indicates the presence of each of the components 
of the M-DiFoRe Model.   
 
Table 20 shows partial results (5 systems only) of the completed self-assessment (step 1).  The 
results suggest that all components of the model were found to exist in the case analysed. The 
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complete self-assessment results can be viewed in Appendix 9. 	
	
Table 20: Step 1: Self-Assessment Results 
 
Results in column 3 (Exist) indicates a “Y” which denote that all the components were found 
to exist, as per the model guidelines. Furthermore, the Supporting Evidence Type and Source 
(column 4) is listed as documentary evidence (D) presented to the court, verbal statements (S) 
and appendices (A), which include evidence found by law enforcement during the course of 
the investigation.  The number/s in column 4 indicate the section in the case law where evidence 
of the existence of a component was found (see Appendix 9, column 4). 
 
The application of identifying “System Existence” (step 2) is discussed next.  
7.3.2.2 Step 2: System Existence  
The next activity is to establish the existence of each system, as shown in Table 21. 
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The execution of step 2 requires that the “Exist” column (column 5) be completed to indicate 
the presence or absence of a system, followed by “Supporting Evidence Type and Source” 
(column 6).  In this case, Table 21 (step 2, column 5) shows that all the systems of the model 
were found to exist, and that supporting evidence (column 6) is documentary evidence (D), 
verbal statements (S) and appendices (A), as previously discussed in step 1.  
 
Since the self-assessment process was applied retrospectively to case law, it was necessary to 
analyse the case using an approach detailed enough so that the nuances of the case could stand 
out.  For this reason, techniques from immersion/crystallisation and constant comparison, as 
discussed in Chapter 4 and applied to the interview transcripts, were applied to aid in the 
identification of the systems of the model, and the type of evidence that was presented to the 
courts.  The iterative reading process made it possible for focus/immersion to be applied to 
each paragraph of case law and for the emergence/crystallisation of findings to take place.  
 
Since the fully completed self-assessment document is lengthy, only the results of the first 5 
systems are shown in Table 21. Appendix 9 contains the complete self-assessment.  
 
Step 2 is an important step as it lays the foundation for comparison with the qualitative analysis, 
which ultimately determines the validity of the manual analysis process (Table 19).  Similarity 
in results between the latter and Figure 17, would not only validate the M-DiFoRe model, but 
also the process of applying the model, as discussed in section 6.4.2.2. 	
Table 21 is presented next, followed by the application of step 3 of the self-assessment. 
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	Table 21: Step 2: Self-Assessment Results 
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7.3.2.3 Step 3: System Interdependencies 
The aim of this step is to establish the nature of the interdependencies which exist between the 
systems which were found to exist. Following guidelines, as per section 6.4.2.2, Table 22 
shows the “Link type” (column 7.2) and associated “Arrow type” (column 7.3) for each of the 
systems analysed.  
 
Findings relating to the degree in which the systems under analysis comply with the 
requirements of the model are shown in column 8 (Model Compliance) and note that supporting 
evidence (column 9) is documentary evidence (D), verbal statements (S) and appendices (A).  
The theory which elucidates the differences in these evidence types is presented in section 
6.4.2.2.  The number/s in column 9, indicate the paragraph in the case law where evidence of 
the existence of a system was found.  Appendix 9, column 9 contains the complete list of 
supporting evidence. 
 
The process identified system interdependency issues relating to the evidence preservation 
system.  This suggests that the nature of the interdependency between components CE5 and 
IE1 is not in accordance to what the M-DiFoRe model proposes. This is the only system which 
was found to be noncompliant with the M-DiFoRe model.   
 
Further findings show six systems with instances of partial compliance and nine instances of 
full compliance with the M-DiFoRe model.  The model proposes that noncompliant and 
partially compliant systems be remediated during step 4, with the objective making them fully 
compliant.   
 
As with the previous steps, only the results of the first 5 systems are shown in Table 22. See 
Appendix 9 for the complete self-assessment. 
 
 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Chapter 7: Model Validation Approach 133 
 
Table 22: Step 3: Self-Assessment Results
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7.3.3 Activity 3 - Qualitative Analysis 
In addition to manually applying the self-assessment for purposes of demonstrating the M-
DiFoRe model’s basic application within an organisation, it was necessary to qualitatively 
analyse the case law, as summarised in section 7.3.1.  This qualitive data analysis used the 
Atlas.ti tool which enables a comparison of the results of the two different methods applied.  
The qualitative analysis uses the data analysis method, as discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.  
 
Figure 18 illustrates that the validation process identified system vulnerabilities. Green solid 
information flow lines indicate full compliance to the requirements of the model.  On the other 
hand, red solid information flow lines indicate partial compliance to the requirements of the 
model and red dotted lines indicate a gap, or complete noncompliance.  
 
Since the purpose of this chapter is to validate the proposed model, the same codes tabulated 
in Table 15 (Chapter 4, section 4.5.4.4) were used. Findings from Figure 18 show that:  
i. Twelve component pairs were found to be fully compliant with the requirements of the 
model and only.  From these, only 3 systems were found to be fully compliant.  
ii. A further 12 component pairs have a red solid information flow line which, as discussed, 
indicates partial compliance to the requirements of the model.  From this, only 6 
systems were found to be partially compliant. 
iii. Only 1 system was found to have a noncompliant component pair, as indicated by a red 
dotted line.  
 
The following sub sections present the findings of the detailed analysis in order to arrive at the 
results illustrated in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18: Summary chart of core network groupings on case law that where 
electronic evidence was found inadmissible by the court 
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7.3.3.1 Evidence Collection System (IE2 to LE2) 
An evaluation of this system shows that correct methods and tools were used to maintain 
evidence integrity, and that this was executed in accordance with the requirements of the 
Criminal Process (see Figure 19). 
 
Findings show that the investigators met the requirements set out by components (IE2) and 
(LE2), as required by the model, resulting in the court accepting that the integrity of the 
evidence presented had been maintained.  
 
	
Figure 17: Analysis of the Evidence Collection system.	
 
Therefore, the result of the self-assessment is that all components of the model exist, as defined 
by the M-DiFoRe model, and thus a full compliance rating was noted against this system. 
7.3.3.2 Justice System Implementation System (LE5 and LE6) 
Findings which stem from the evaluation of this system show that Justice Personnel could 
correctly interpret findings presented and, in addition, interrogate the way the digital forensic 
methodology was applied.  Similarly, those representing the industry environment were able 
to present their interpretation of findings in a way that allowed the Justice Personnel to 
understand and interrogate the process followed (see Figure 20). 
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Figure 18: Analysis of the Justice System Implementation system. 	
The above finding demonstrates the shared common purpose of components LE5 and IE6.  The 
self-assessment results show that the requirements of this system were fully met.  Therefore, a 
full compliance rating was noted against this system. 
7.3.3.3 e-Crime Prosecution System (LE4 to IE8) 
Findings from an analysis of this system show that Law Enforcement Agents (LE4) met the 
requirements set out by the component (IE8), as required by the model, by demonstrating 
knowledge and willingness to investigate during the execution of the Anton Piller order.  
Further, they acted in accordance with industry requirements by providing written testimony 
on the process followed, and detailing their findings (see Figure 21). 
 
	
Figure 19: Analysis of the e-Crime Prosecution system.	
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Therefore, the results of the self-assessment show that all components were found to exist, as 
per the model, and thus a full compliance rating was allocated.  
7.3.3.4 Evidence Handling System (CE4, LE3 and IE2) 
Findings show that correct interdependencies existed between CE4 and LE3, in that 
representatives of the company could cooperate with the justice system by presenting sufficient 
evidence to support their claim that an ex-employee could be responsible for the defamatory 
email which was sent to the company’s staff, competitors and customer database.  It is this 
cooperation which led to the court granting the Anton Piller order.  As a result, a full 
compliance rating was allocated against the implementation of CE4 and LE3. 
 
Additionally, those representing the Justice System (LE3) were able to detail limitations of 
scope in the Anton Piller order, thereby restricting the collection of evidence (IE2) to only those 
items that were specific to proving that the ex-employee was the author of the disputed email.  
See Figure 22.  As a result, a full compliance rating was allocated against the implementation 
of LE3 and IE2. 
 
	
Figure 20:	Analysis of the Evidence Handling system.	
 
The self-assessment identified partial compliance in the nature of the dependency between 
Human Resources (CE4) and Collection (IE2).  This partial compliance refers to the finding 
that while correct methods and tools were used to collect evidence, some of the evidence 
collected was out of scope and not in agreement with what the court order had stipulated.  
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7.3.3.5 Standards Localisation System (IE8, CE1 and LE1) 
A full compliance rating was allocated against the implementation of components CE1 and 
LE1, and components IE8 and CE1, respectively.  This is because the organisation was able to 
convince (IE8) the courts that it is one of a handful of companies in the logistics industry, with 
specific standards (CE1) of operation, including the use of sophisticated software to facilitate 
warehousing and distribution. Further that all the above were compliant with electronic laws 
(LE1) (see Figure 23). 
 
	
Figure 21: Analysis of the Standards Localisation system.	
 
However, findings show that the vulnerability was that the evidence led in testimony (IE8) was 
incomplete. This evidence did not meet the requirements of the law (LE1) in that some evidence 
led was out of scope, and those giving testimony did not fully disclose all relevant case facts 
to the court. Therefore, the nature of the relationship between IE8 and LE1 is noted in the self-
assessment as being partially compliant.  
7.3.3.6 Policy Alignment System (CE2, IE8 and LE1) 
As with the Standards Localisation system, the organisation was able to demonstrate to the 
courts that it operates in a niche industry. As such it has written policies (CE2), which govern 
the behaviour of those interacting with the organisation, to protect itself from incidents 
stemming from within, or outside, the organisation.  Included in these policies are those that 
protect the organisation against the use of its own intellectual property for malicious purposes.  
Further, that said policies are in accordance with the law (LE1). Thus, a full compliance rating 
was allocated for the interdependency between CE2 and LE1, and a further full compliance 
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granted for the interdependency between components CE2 and IE8 (see Figure 24). 
 
	
Figure 22:	Analysis of the Policy Alignment system.	
 
While the self-assessment identified correct interdependencies to exist between components, 
as discussed previously, the nature of the relationship between Presentation (IE8) and 
Electronic Laws (LE1) was found to be vulnerable. This vulnerability was found to be a result 
of partial compliance of evidence led in testimony (IE8) as it did not meet the requirements of 
the law (LE1) in that some of the evidence was out of scope and those giving testimony did not 
fully disclose all relevant case facts to the court.  
7.3.3.7 Witness Preparation System (CE4, IE8 and LE2) 
In this case, the self-assessment identified partial compliance in the nature of the dependency 
between all components of the system.  This partial compliance refers to the finding that the 
organisation’s representatives (CE4) failed to present the court with all the facts relating to the 
case, that the witness testimony (IE8) was partly based on evidence which fell outside the scope 
of the court order (LE2), thereby causing the court to rule that the Anton Piller order was not 
executed in accordance with the law (see Figure 25). 
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Figure 23: Analysis of the Witness Preparation system.	
7.3.3.8 Procedural Implementation System (CE3, LE2 and IE8) 
Findings show that all components of the system were found to exist and that the 
interdependencies between components CE3 and LE2 were as defined by the model.  The 
organisation was able to follow correct internal procedures in preparing a compelling case for 
the court to grant an Anton Piller order, in accordance with the Criminal Process (LE2).  For 
this reason, a full compliance rating was allocated during self-assessment (see Figure 26). 
 
	
Figure 24:	Analysis of the Procedural Implementation system.	
 
However, while the model identified correct interdependencies between components CE3 and 
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LE2, vulnerabilities were found in how IE8 interacts with LE2 and CE3, respectively.  These 
vulnerabilities relate to the partial compliance noted during the self-assessment stage. The 
partial compliance was the result of findings which show that evidence led in testimony (IE8) 
failed to comply with the requirements of the law (LE2) and organisational procedures (CE3) 
in that it was incomplete and partly based on incorrect evidence. 
7.3.3.9 Evidence Preservation System (CE5, IE1 and LE2) 
An analysis of this system shows that the organisation could demonstrate to the court that they 
make use of sophisticated and legal industry specific software which facilitates operations in 
this niche logistics environment. This convinced the courts that the author of the email in 
question was someone from within the industry, and most likely the organisation itself.  As a 
result, an Anton Piller order was granted by the court.  Therefore, a fully compliant rating was 
granted in the self-assessment for the interdependencies between CE5 and LE2 (see Figure 27). 
 
	
Figure 25: Analysis of the Evidence Preservation system.	
 
In addition, the organisation could demonstrate to the court that they applied correct industry 
processes in preserving evidence and that the integrity of such evidence was maintained, as per 
the criminal process. As a result, the court accepted the validity of the evidence preservation 
process.  For this reason, a full compliance rating was granted on the interdependency between 
LE2 and IE1. 
 
Finally, findings show a vulnerability between CE5 and IE1 which, in the self-assessment, is 
noted as a total noncompliance to the requirements of the model.  Findings show that DFR 
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Technologies failed to prevent and identify if and how company intellectual property could 
have been taken by the then Chief Information Officer, or any other disgruntled employee, and 
end up in the hands of customers in the form of the disputed email.  While preliminary evidence 
was sufficient for the court to grant an Anton Piller order, the organisation failed to gather 
sufficient evidence to support their claims, resulting in the court dismissing the case.  
7.3.3.10 Methodology Evaluation 
An analysis of the Methodology Evaluation system shows that those representing the justice 
system were able to interpret findings from the application of the digital forensic methodology 
used in the execution of the Anton Piller order. A full compliance rating was granted for the 
interdependencies between components LE3 and IE2.  This was due to LE3’s ability to identify 
that correct methods and tools had been used to collect evidence, that the integrity of said 
evidence was maintained and that it could be tested in a court of law (see Figure 28). 
 
Additionally, a full compliance rating was granted for the interactions between components 
LE3 and IE9.  The latter is because the court stipulated the conditions under which evidence 
was to be retained during the execution of the Anton Piller order and, upon dismissing the case, 
ordered for such evidence to be returned to its rightful owners. 
 
The self-assessment identified a further seven cases of partial compliance relating to 
components IE1 and IE3 to IE8.  This was as a result of the court ascertaining that some of the 
evidence presented fell outside the scope of the court order.  This resulted in the preservation, 
validation, identification, analysis, interpretation documentation and presentation of evidence 
outside the scope of the Anton Piller order.  Additionally, the court found gross inefficiencies 
in the submitted documentation which was intended to itemise evidence inventory.  This 
documentation was found to lack the necessary detail to validate the contents of the evidence 
bags. This suggests that those representing the justice system were sufficiently able to interpret 
and prosecute the case in question (see Figure 28). 
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Figure 26:	Analysis of the Methodology Evaluation system.		
The process identified system interdependency issues relating to the evidence preservation 
system.  This suggests that the nature of the interdependency between components CE5 and 
IE1 is not in accordance to what the M-DiFoRe model proposes. This is the only system which 
was found to be noncompliant with the M-DiFoRe model.  Further findings show six systems 
with instances of partial compliance, and a further three systems that have full compliance with 
the M-DiFoRe model.    The final step to implementing the gap analysis deals with the process 
to follow in order to remediate noncompliant and partially compliant systems, with the 
objective of advancing them to a fully compliant state.  This is discussed later in this chapter.  
 
The next section compares results from having applied steps 1 to 3 of the self-assessment, and 
those from the qualitative analysis. 
7.3.4 Activity 4 - Results Comparison 
When comparing the results of the self-assessment in section 7.3.2 (Appendix 9) with the 
results from the qualitative analysis in section 7.3.3 (Figure 18) it is clear that the degree of 
similarity is total.  With both methods (Appendix 9 and Figure 18), it was possible to identify 
the one system that was noncompliant, the six partially compliant systems and the three fully 
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compliant systems. Table 23 provides a brief observation on the specific component pairs 
which were found to be noncompliant and partial compliant, respectively. 
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System 
Activity 2 – 
Self 
Assessment 
(section 
7.3.2.3) 
Activity 3 – 
Qualitative 
Analysis  
(section 
7.3.3) 
Observation 
Noncompliance 
  
  
  
Evidence 
Preservation 
(IE8, CE3, LE2) 
CE5, IE1 CE5, IE1 
DFR technology failed to preserve 
the required evidence thereby 
failing to identify if and how 
intellectual property could have 
been taken by the then Chief 
Information Officer. 
Partial 
Compliance 
  
  
  
Evidence 
Handling  
(CE4, LE3, IE2) 
CE4, IE2 CE4, IE2 
Improper collection of evidence 
due to some of the evidence being 
collected being out of scope and 
not in agreement with what the 
court order had stipulated, 
Standards 
Localisation  
(IE8, CE1, LE1) 
IE8, LE1 IE8, LE1 
Failure to disclose all facts relating 
to office operations as they relate to 
the then Chief Information 
Officer’s true role. 
 Policy 
Alignment  
(CE2, IE8, LE1) 
IE8, LE1 IE8, LE1 
Failure to disclose all facts relating 
to office operations as they relate to 
the then Chief Information 
Officer’s true role. 
Witness 
Preparation  
(CE4, IE8, LE2) 
CE4, LE2 CE4, LE2 
Insufficient evidence during 
criminal proceedings.  Role of the 
then Chief Information Officer in 
relation to the alleged Christmas 
list could not be clearly proven. 
CE4, IE8 CE4, IE8 Employees led evidence outside scope of court order. 
IE8, LE2 IE8, LE2 
Failure to comply with criminal 
process in that the Anton Piller 
order was not executed as 
prescribed by the court. 
    
Procedural 
Implementation  
(IE8, CE3, LE2) 
IE8, CE3 IE8, CE3 
Testimony led by employees was 
found to be inconsistent with 
organisational procedures. Staff 
alleged that the then Chief 
Information Officer was party to 
certain procedures, which the court 
found untrue. 
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IE8, LE2 IE8, LE2 
Failure to comply with criminal 
process in that the Anton Piller 
order was not executed as 
prescribed by the court. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Methodology 
Evaluation  
(LE3, IE1-IE9) 
LE3, IE1 LE3, IE1 
Inefficiencies in evidence 
preservation, as some evidence was 
found to be out of scope. 
LE3, IE3 LE3, IE3 
Inefficiencies in evidence 
validation, as some evidence was 
found to be out of scope. 
LE3, IE4 LE3, IE4 
Inefficiencies in evidence 
identification, as some evidence 
was found to be out of scope. 
LE3, IE5 LE3, IE5 
Inefficiencies in evidence analysis, 
as some evidence was found to be 
out of scope. 
LE3, IE6 LE3, IE6 
Inefficiencies in interpretation of 
evidence, as some evidence was 
found to be out of scope. 
LE3, IE7 LE3, IE7 
Inefficiencies in evidence 
documentation, as the inventory 
lists prepared were incomplete. 
LE3, IE8 LE3, IE8 
Inefficiencies in evidence 
presentation, as some evidence was 
found to be out of scope. 
 
Table 23: Comparison of self-assessment results to qualitative analysis. 
 
This confirms the validity of the model as it identified the same vulnerabilities. 
 
With the vulnerabilities now determined, the next step in applying the M-DiFoRe model is to 
undertake remedial action on vulnerable systems, to bring the affected systems into full 
compliance with the requirements of the model.  This is discussed next.   
 
 
7.3.5 Activity 5 – (Step 4) Remedial Action  
The final step in applying the model is to take corrective measures to bring vulnerable systems 
into a fully compliant state.  This process is non-linear and thus allows the organisation to 
implement the model starting at any layer, based on priorities identified in the self-assessment. 
 
As discussed in section 6.4.2.2, the M-DiFoRe model provides guidelines as to the ideal nature 
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of system interdependencies.  Applying remedial action to vulnerable systems requires that an 
organisation base their corrective measures on model guidelines, as referenced under step 4 in 
Appendix 9.  The numbers in the Reference column refer to the paragraph numbers in Chapter 
6 which relate to the specific system.  Table 24 provides a summary of the recommended 
remedial action to be taken on vulnerable systems. 
 
 System 
Activity 2 – Self 
Assessment 
 (section 7.3.2.3) 
Remedial Action description Reference  
Noncompliance 
  
  
  
 Evidence 
Preservation 
(IE8, CE3, LE2) 
CE5, IE1 
Correct implementation and 
configuration of DFR 
technologies, including event 
logging. 
6.3.3.2(vi) 
Partial 
Compliance 
  
  
  
Evidence 
Handling  
(CE4, LE3, IE2) 
CE4, IE2 Strict adherence to court order on evidence to be collected. 6.3.3.2(i) 
Standards 
Localisation  
(IE8, CE1, LE1) 
IE8, LE1 
Present evidence that is within 
scope of court order.  Full 
disclosure of facts. 
6.3.3.2(ii) 
Policy 
Alignment  
(CE2, IE8, LE1) 
IE8, LE1 
Present evidence that is within 
scope of court order.  Full 
disclosure of facts. 
6.3.3.2(ii) 
  
Witness 
Preparation  
(CE4, IE8, LE2) 
  
CE4, LE2 Employees to present all facts to the court. 6.3.3.2(iv) 
CE4, IE8 
Testimony given to court to be 
based on evidence within scope 
of court order. 
6.3.3.2(iv) 
IE8, LE2 
Testimony to demonstrate 
compliance with the criminal 
process. 
6.3.3.2(v) 
Procedural 
Implementation  
(IE8, CE3, LE2) 
IE8, CE3 
Testimony to demonstrate 
compliance with organisational 
procedures. 
6.3.3.2(v) 
IE8, LE2 
Testimony to demonstrate 
compliance with the criminal 
process. 
6.3.3.2(v) 
  
  LE3, IE1 
Preservation of correct evidence 
using correct process. 6.3.3.3 
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Methodology 
Evaluation  
(LE3, IE1-IE9) 
  
  
  
LE3, IE3 Adherence to rules of evidence validation. 6.3.3.3 
LE3, IE4 Adherence to rules of evidence identification. 6.3.3.3 
LE3, IE5 Analysis of data that falls within scope of court order 6.3.3.3 
LE3, IE6 Correct interpretation of evidence. 6.3.3.3 
LE3, IE7 Maintaining proper chain of evidence. 6.3.3.3 
LE3, IE8 Presentation of evidence that falls within scope of the court order. 6.3.3.3 
 
Table 24: Recommended remedial action on vulnerable systems 	
The following section provides a detailed discussion of the individual remedial actions that 
should have been taken to avoid the evidentiary data being negated. 	
7.3.5.1 Recommended remedial action on noncompliant systems 
Further findings show that the self-assessment process identified one system, namely Evidence 
Preservation, that had a noncompliant rating.  
 
As discussed earlier, noncompliant ratings present the highest risk to the organisation and 
should be treated as a priority when implementing the model.  In the case law discussed, 
findings show that the noncompliant system ultimately led to the dismissal of the case by the 
court.  As per references provided to support the noncompliant finding, the organisation 
failed to identify if and how intellectual property could have been taken by the then Chief 
Information Officer (CIO), or any other disgruntled employee. This intellectual property then 
ultimately ended up in the hands of customers, in the form of the disputed email.  
 
The recommendation, as per section 6.3.3.2(vi), is thus for the organisation to ensure correct 
implementation and configuration of DFR technologies, including event logging.  In this 
case, the organisation should have implemented DFR technology to log user activities and 
manage access control to critical files and applications.  In doing this the organisation would 
have been able to present accurate information to the court in respect to whether, or not, the 
then Chief Information Officer had any access to the alleged intellectual property, referred to 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR 
EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Chapter 7: Model Validation Approach 150 
as the “Christmas list” in the case, and his role in the distribution thereof, including his 
participation in the defamatory email. 
7.3.5.2 Recommended remedial action on partially compliant systems 
According to the results of the self-assessment, six of the systems evaluated had vulnerabilities 
that were rated as partially compliant. These systems, as identified by their partially compliant 
status (column 8 of Appendix 9) and the recommended action (column 10 of Appendix 9) are: 
i. Evidence Collection: remedial action is to ensure strict adherence to court order regarding 
evidence to be collected. Adherence to the court order would have ensured that only 
evidence which fell within the ambit of the order was collected. The supervising 
attorneys should have monitored the process closely to ensure that evidence collected 
was as defined in the court order.  
ii. Standards Localisation: remedial action is for employees to present all facts during 
testimony.  Employees were to ensure full disclosure of facts to the court, so as to 
enhance the credibility of their testimony.  The organisation should have ensured that 
employees leading evidence received adequate training regarding organisational 
standards to thus provide factual disclosure of facts relating to the operations of the 
organisation in relation to roles and responsibilities.  
iii. Policy Alignment: remedial action is for employees to present all facts during testimony.  
Employees were to ensure full disclosure of facts to the court, so as to enhance the 
credibility of their testimony.  The organisation should have ensured that employees 
leading evidence received adequate training concerning organisational policy to thus 
provide factual disclosure of facts relating to the operations of the organisation. 
iv. Witness Preparation: remedial action is for employees to be prepared and encouraged to 
present all facts to the court (full disclosure), and to provide testimony based on 
evidence that is within the scope of the court order. The latter, together with ensuring 
full compliance with the criminal process, would have placed employees in a position 
where they could have demonstrated competence and credibility to the court.  
v. Procedural Implementation: remedial action is for employees giving testimony to be 
prepared to demonstrate compliance with organisational procedures and the criminal 
process. Offering the required preparatory training to employees would have eliminated 
inefficiencies relating to evidence collection and would have enhanced their credibility. 
vi. Methodology Evaluation: remedial action is to ensure proper application of the digital 
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forensic methodology.  The supervising attorney should have communicated the court’s 
expectations to the technical team so that their activities could have been aligned with 
all the requirements of the court order. This would have given the court comfort in the 
credibility of the process followed.  
 
Further findings show that the partial compliance found in the case analysed, refers to human 
error which would have been impossible to identify had the self-assessment been conducted 
pre the court case.  This suggests that in evaluating systems vulnerable to human error, the 
questions asked need to include those that seek to establish what has been done to ensure strict 
compliance to those aspects of the system which are susceptible to human error.  
7.4 Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to validate the interdependencies between the proposed model’s 
systems using a case which the court had judged inadmissible.  The validation process was 
conducted through the analysis of the case law, as presented in the South African courts.  
 
As per the synopses presented, the case law refers to an incident that took place in 2010, 
wherein the applicants alleged that the respondent had sent a defamatory email to its customers, 
competitors and staff.  The email also severed contractual relationships. 
 
This chapter continued with the exploration of evidence to suggest that the proposed model is 
sufficiently accurate for its intended use of enabling organisations to reduce the potential 
dangers from the inadvertent destruction and negating of evidentiary data and to improve their 
overall organisational digital forensic readiness.  This was achieved through the following five 
key activities:  
i. Activity 1 - Present case law synopsis where electronic evidence was found 
inadmissible; 
ii. Activity 2 - Apply steps 1 to 3 of the self-assessment template to said case law; 
iii. Activity 3 - Perform a qualitative analysis on said case law; 
iv. Activity 4 - Compare results from activities ii and iii above and  
v. Activity 5 - Apply step 4 of the self-assessment template to said case law. 
 
Findings show that: 
i. The self-assessment (as presented in Appendix 9) served as an effective tool to identify 
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(Activity 2) and provide remedial action (Activity 5) on vulnerabilities in the case 
analysed. Had the model been applied, it could have mitigated the risk of inadvertently 
destroying and negating evidentiary data. 
ii. The comparison of results obtained through the self-assessment process in section 7.3.2 
(Appendix 9) with those from the qualitative analysis in section 7.3.3 (Figure 18) show 
a complete degree of similarity, which validates the M-DiFoRe model.  
 
Based on these finding, the M-DiFoRe model can be considered sufficiently accurate for its 
intended use of enabling organisations to reduce the potential dangers from the inadvertent 
destruction and negating of evidentiary data and improving overall organisational digital 
forensic readiness. 
 
The M-DiFoRe model, as illustrated in Figure 18, is therefore presented as the final model 
without any changes. 
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8. Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the introductory section of Chapter 1, most countries recognise the importance 
of the criminalisation of malicious computer related acts to promote a secure business 
environment. However, literature review findings in section 1.2 suggest that few countries 
possess the legal and technical resources necessary to address the complexities of adapting 
criminal statutes to cyberspace.  The proposed solution, per the literature review, is a 
coordinated, public-private partnership to produce a model approach which can help eliminate 
the challenges faced by developing countries.  
 
It is against this backdrop that the study explored the development of a multidisciplinary digital 
forensic model for use in developing economies, utilising the South African legal context as a 
reference point. 
 
As presented in the problem statement (Chapter 1, section 1.3), this study undertook to develop 
and assess a digital forensic readiness model using a coordinated, multidisciplinary approach 
involving both the public and private sectors, with the aim of enabling organisations to reduce 
the potential dangers from the inadvertent destruction and negating of evidentiary data.  To 
achieve this, a set of 10 hypotheses were created (See Chapter 1, section 1.5). Each of these 
was linked to five research objectives which emerged during the preliminary literature survey 
as challenges faced by corporations, and countries at large, when dealing with digital crimes. 
Table 1 presents a summary linking each of the literature themes to the 10 hypotheses (as 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 4). 
 
This study comprised 8 chapters, each with a specific goal contributing towards the purpose 
statement (section 1.6). The purpose statement sought to develop, and explain, how a model 
based, multidisciplinary approach to digital forensic readiness can aid in preserving the 
integrity of evidentiary data within an organisation. 
 
The next section summarises the content of the chapters of this study. 
 
8.2 Chapter Summary  
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Below is a synopsis of each chapter’s goal, the research process adopted and overall findings.  
8.2.1 Chapter 1: Introduction  
The goal of this introductory chapter was to contextualise the research which detailed the 
problem statement, the paradigm and methodological choices made for this research (see 
section 1.7). 
 
To explore the problem statement, the study used 10 hypotheses, each linked to a research 
objective. Table 1 lists the hypotheses and their corresponding research objectives.  This 
chapter also employed a literature survey to motivate the study and to demonstrate that the 
problem statement presents a real problem to be solved.  
8.2.2 Chapter 2: Systematic Literature Review 
The goal of this chapter was to present a systematic literature review, applied with the purpose 
of investigating the five hypotheses presented in the chapter. 
 
The said research question was answered by means of five hypotheses which, as per Table 1, 
relate to each of the five research objectives of this study. See section 2.4 for detailed findings. 
i. Hypothesis 1 states that: electronic evidence gathered during a digital forensic 
investigation does not provide sufficient assurance of non-manipulation to the courts. 
Findings show that existing digital investigation methodologies (Live and Dead 
forensic acquisition processes) do not provide sufficient assurance of non-manipulation 
of evidence. The study found that this is due to the rapid changes/advances in storage 
technologies. 
ii. Hypothesis 2 states that: there is a lack of standardisation in the criteria against which 
electronic evidence is validated as no consistent digital forensic methodology exists. 
Findings show that the digital forensic industry lacks standardisation in the criteria used 
for collecting evidence. This has led to a lack of synergy in innovation, as well as 
limited regulation and misalignment of education and certification relating to digital 
forensics.  This is as a result of various legal systems, which have varying requirements. 
iii. Hypothesis 3 states that: forensic technology for gathering digital evidence is 
increasingly lagging behind the advances made in anti-forensic tools and the rapid 
changes in storage technology. Findings show that a trade-off in the functionality of 
information security and digital forensic tools exists. Additionally, that forensic 
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technology for gathering evidence is increasingly lagging behind due to the rapid 
advances in anti-forensics and changes in technology.  
iv. Hypothesis 4 states that: individuals involved in the digital forensic investigation and 
prosecution process are not sufficiently trained and/or educated. Findings show that 
those involved in the digital forensic process are not adequately trained and educated, 
thereby contributing to the inadvertent destruction of evidentiary data.  
v. Hypothesis 5 states that: an organisation responding to a digital crime, without an 
incident response plan, may take actions that compromise the admissibility of evidence 
to a court of law. Findings show that a mature technical environment is not the only 
factor impacting on the organisation’s digital forensic readiness, and that without an 
incident response plan, an organisation will take actions that compromise the 
admissibility of evidence.  In addition, the study found that existing literature does not 
sufficiently define the concept of digital forensic readiness for it to be implemented, 
and that suggestions as to a framework to guide its implementation, are also absent.  
 
With all the hypotheses proven true, this chapter concludes that a need to revisit the underlying 
principles of digital forensics exists.  This provides further evidence of the need for a 
multidisciplinary digital forensic model, geared particularly towards addressing challenges 
faced by law enforcement and corporations in developing economies. 
8.2.3 Chapter 3: Research Design   
The goal of this chapter was to present the design, methodology, and methods adopted in this 
research.    
8.2.4 Chapter 4: Data Gathering And Analysis  
The goal of this chapter was to collect interview data from industry experts, to validate findings 
from the literature survey (Chapter 2) and to investigate the five related hypotheses. 
 
In preparing the research instrument, three questions were formulated to test each of the five 
hypotheses. The hypotheses were also linked to each of the core literature themes, as discussed 
earlier.  Therefore, the interview process was based on a total of 15 key questions. 
 
Below are the five hypotheses that were investigated in this chapter, and their respective 
findings (see section 4.4):  
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i. Hypothesis 6 states that: as a result of the presence of the electronic laws in South Africa, 
the prosecution of digital crimes faces no limitations. Findings suggest that the 
hypothesis is not true, as a lack of processes, procedures, education, training and 
certification can serve as limitations during the prosecution of digital crimes.  
ii. Hypothesis 7 states that: South Africa has a standardised digital forensic model and 
process that is used by authorities to investigate and prosecute digital crimes.  Findings 
suggest that this hypothesis is not true, as no single common model or process is in 
place for the South African legal context.  
iii. Hypothesis 8 states that: The Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act of 
South Africa adequately positions the acceptable use of, and extent to which, electronic 
evidence can be used in a civil or criminal proceeding. Findings suggest that this 
hypothesis is true, as the ECT Act makes it possible to present electronic evidence in a 
court of law. 
iv. Hypothesis 9 states that: those individuals involved in the prosecution of digital crimes 
are knowledgeable, adequately trained and professionally certified. Findings suggest 
that this hypothesis is not true, as credentials were noted as being a common limitation 
amongst prosecutors and investigators alike. 
v. Hypothesis 10 states that: South African organisations do not need to concern themselves 
with digital forensic readiness, as digital crimes are not commonplace.  This hypothesis 
was proven untrue as findings point to a prevalence of various types of digital crimes.  
 
With the exception of Hypothesis 8, all other hypotheses were proven untrue.  These findings 
helped to establish that the key stakeholders in a digital forensic investigation originate from 
three different domains namely: the corporate environment, the industry environment and the 
legislative environment.  Additionally, this chapter presented a set of critical components under 
each domain, which point to components needed to satisfy the requirements of that domain. 
See Table 15 for these domains and their respective components.  
8.2.5 Chapter 5: Foundational Principles Towards Model Development 
The goal of this chapter was to investigate the significance of the three key domains and each 
of their respective components (output from Chapter 4). This data was then used as a 
foundation towards the development of the proposed model. 
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The literature reviewed is based on each of the components, as shown in Table 15. 
 
Findings confirm that the three identified domains are sufficiently representative of the 
environments from which key stakeholders in the digital forensic process originate. 
Additionally, that each of the components, as depicted in Table 15, is correctly allocated under 
each of the three domains.  
 
The identified domains, and their respective components, serve as a basis for further 
investigation towards the development of the M-DiFoRe model. 
8.2.6 Chapter 6: Realisation of the Conceptual Model 
The goal of this chapter was to develop the conceptual model through the investigation of the 
interdependencies which exist between the components of the three domains (Table 15), as 
discussed previously.  
 
Findings confirmed that the identified domains, and their respective domains (as per Table 15), 
were sufficiently comprehensive for their intended use.  Additionally, the interdependencies 
between the components were investigated and findings presented in this chapter.  
 
Finally, Chapter 6 presented the M-DiFoRe model (Figure 16). The development of this model 
using real life case law, ensured that a coordinated and multidisciplinary approach was 
achieved, as the involvement of all stakeholders in the case law was carefully assessed.  
The chapter also discusses in detail the key differentiators of the M-DiFoRe model that sets it 
apart from previously developed models as discussed in chapter 6, section 6.5.  
8.2.7 Chapter 7: Model Validation Approach 
The goal of this chapter was to validate the M-DiFoRe model (Figure 16), using a case that the 
court found the evidentiary data to be inadmissible. This was done to establish if the model 
was comprehensive enough for its intended use.  
 
Findings show that the self-assessment (Appendix 9) proved useful in identifying systems 
whose component interdependencies did not comply with those the M-DiFoRe model proposed. 
More importantly, the results of the self-assessment (Appendix 9) and those from the 
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qualitative analysis (Figure 17) were found to be congruent, thereby validating the M-DiFoRe 
model. The said findings let to the adoption of the M-DiFoRe model (Figure 16) as the final 
version, without any changes. 
 
This chapter also showed how the results obtained from applying the M-DiFoRe model could 
be used to make recommendations regarding remedial actions to address identified 
vulnerabilities. 
8.3 Revisiting the Problem Statement  
The study set out to address the following five research objectives:  
i. Research Objective 1 (RO1): To identify common factors associated with both the 
technical and legal challenges faced in the prosecution of digital crimes.  This was 
achieved in Chapter 2, section 2.4.1, by presenting traditional and modern approaches 
to digital forensics, including the evolution of computer forensics. Additionally, the 
findings were triangulated in Chapter 4, section 4.4.3, with data obtained from 
interviews with industry experts.  
ii. Research Objective 2 (RO2): To establish whether organisations in the same legal 
jurisdiction have, and make use of, a standard digital forensics methodology. This was 
achieved in Chapter 2, section 2.4.2, by presenting literature relating to standardisation 
in the digital forensic profession. Additionally, the findings were triangulated in 
Chapter 4, section 4.4.4, with data obtained from interviews with industry experts. 
iii. Research Objective 3 (RO3): To determine the extent to which advances in digital 
forensics are meeting the demands of the changing legal and technical landscape.  This 
was achieved in Chapter 2, section 2.4.3, by presenting a discussion regarding the 
impact of recent advances in storage technologies on existing digital forensic processes. 
Additionally, the findings were triangulated in Chapter 4, section 4.4.5, with data 
obtained from interviews with industry experts. 
iv. Research Objective 4 (RO4): To investigate critical factors preventing human resources, 
directly involved in the investigation and prosecution of digital crimes, from 
functioning effectively. This was achieved in Chapter 2, section 2.4.4, by presenting a 
discussion on education, training and certification as three distinct concepts. 
Additionally, the findings were triangulated in Chapter 4, section 4.4.6, with data 
obtained from interviews with industry experts. 
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v. Research Objective 5 (RO5): To determine whether organisations are taking the 
necessary steps to proactively manage the rising scourge of digital crimes.  This was 
achieved in Chapter 2, section 2.4.5, by exploring the concept of forensic readiness and 
the factors that have an impact on it. Additionally, the findings were triangulated in 
Chapter 4, section 4.4.7, with data obtained from interviews with industry experts. 
 
The problem statement, as per section 1.3, states: 
 
The organisational risk of inadvertently destroying and negating evidentiary data, due to the 
complexity and multidisciplinary nature of digital crimes, necessitates the development of a 
digital forensic readiness model using a coordinated, multidisciplinary approach involving 
both public and private sectors. Current models are context, technology and/or business 
process specific, and lack the multidisciplinary approach which seeks to investigate inter-
discipline interactions. 
 
The output of this study is the M-DiFoRe model (Figure 16). This model was developed using 
a coordinated approach which involved a systematic review of existing literature (Chapter 2) 
and case law (Chapters 6 and 7), and the participation of industry experts from both the public 
and private sectors (Chapter 4). The M-DiFoRe model (Figure 16) is a practical model which 
was verified (Chapter 6) and validated (Chapter 7) using case law. The model was found to be 
sufficiently accurate for its intended use namely enabling organisations to reduce the potential 
dangers from the inadvertent destruction and negating of evidentiary data as well as improving 
overall organisational digital forensic readiness.   
 
The M-DiFoRe model differs (Chapter 6, section 6.5) from existing models as it offers a less 
complicated and streamlined process for achieving digital forensic readiness, through the use 
of the accompanying self-assessment tool (Table 19).  The self-assessment tool was thoroughly 
tested using case law (Chapter 7, section 7.3.2) and a qualitative analysis process (Chapter 7, 
section 7.3.3) and was consequently found to be an effective tool to identify vulnerabilities and 
provide appropriate remedial action based on the M-DiFoRe model guidelines (Chapter 6, 
section 6.3.3). 
 
  It is with the above in mind, that this study considers the said problem statement solved.  
8.4 Revisiting the Purpose Statement  
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The purpose of this study was to develop and explain how a model based, multidisciplinary 
approach to digital forensic readiness can aid in preserving the integrity of evidentiary data 
within an organisation. 
 
In line with the purpose statement, this study presented the M-DiFoRe model (see paragraph 
6.4) and explained how a model based, multidisciplinary approach to digital forensic readiness 
can aid in preserving the integrity of evidentiary data within an organisation. Additionally, 
Chapter 7 tested the validity of the proposed model through a rigorous process of analysis 
against case law.  
8.5 Research Contribution to Body of Knowledge  
This research is considered a meaningful contribution to the digital forensic body of knowledge 
and to the general research community for the following reasons: 
i. From the evaluation of existing models as per section 2.2.5.1, this study identified 
challenges with existing models (section 2.2.5.2), and presents ways in which the 
proposed model overcomes them (section 6.5). 
ii. As detailed in section 2.3, this study identified gaps in current definitions of Digital 
Forensics, and adopted a definition that speaks to the digital forensic methodology and 
process.  
iii. As per Table 15, this study presented three domains and their respective components 
critical to achieving digital forensic readiness. Additionally, this study expounded on 
the domains and their respective components by detailing the nature of their 
interdependencies (systems), as discussed in Chapter 6, and presenting the function of 
each system, thereby simplifying the concept of digital forensic readiness. The domains 
and components in Table 15 attest to the multidisciplinary nature of the digital forensic 
investigation value chain.  
iv. Finally, this study presents the M-DiFoRe model, which was validated (Chapter 6) and 
verified (Chapter 7) to assess its usefulness in achieving digital forensic readiness. It 
further provides a mechanism, the self-assessment template (Table 15), for the 
identification of vulnerabilities.   
8.6 Research Limitations  
The following have been identified as limitations relating to this study: 
i. Limitation 1: This study sets the legal context as South Africa.  When applied in other 
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countries, one may find variations in legal provisions relating to electronic evidence.  
While the above is an inherent limitation of this study, it does not negate the findings 
as the model does not discuss specific provisions of the law, but points to the 
requirement that relevant legislation be considered when implementing the applicable 
systems of the M-DiFoRe model. 
ii. Limitation 2: While the model has been verified and validated and found to be 
sufficiently accurate for its intended use, findings show that an element of human error 
exists.  This finding proposes that people are prone to making errors when performing 
functions, as they relate to digital forensic readiness. 
While this finding does not fall within the scope of the model, it does not negate it as 
The M-DiFoRe model addresses that which must be placed in order to achieve digital 
forensic readiness.  
iii. Limitation 3: The M-DiFoRe model helps organisations identify vulnerabilities through 
the use of the self-assessment template.  However, the model does not provide a means 
to fix these vulnerabilities.   
This limitation falls outside the scope of this research.  However, findings show that 
this does not negate the model, or the self-assessment template provided. 
iv. Limitation 4: The study identifies three main domains to which stakeholders in the digital 
forensic process could belong.  These three domains were selected as the most dominant 
and this does not suggest that other, less dominant domains, do not exist.   
This does not negate the findings of the study as the domains were found to be 
multidisciplinary in nature and accommodating of the key stakeholders. 
v. Limitation 5: This study investigates the use of the proposed model within the typical 
corporate environment, and does not focus on a specific industry, or sector. 
The above does not negate the model. Findings show that the multidisciplinary nature 
of the model allows for it to be applied within various environments. 
vi. Limitation 6: Finally, this study acknowledges that the National Integrated Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICT) Policy White Paper, which was approved by 
Cabinet on 28 September 2016, intended to set out the framework of how government 
will provide access to modern communications infrastructure and services to facilitate 
the entry of new players and meaningful participation of all citizens, including those in 
rural areas (Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services, 2016). 
This document was not included in this study as it was released at the end of this 
research. 
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8.7 Future Research Opportunities 
Each limitation, as discussed previously, presents an opportunity for further research. These 
opportunities are: 
i. Opportunity 1: Since this study is based on the South African legal system which, as seen 
from the case law analysed, is a hybrid of civil, common and customary law (the latter 
is not covered in this study), a research opportunity would be to apply the study to 
another legal context and observe how this affects interdependencies in the model’s 
components and systems.  
ii. Opportunity 2: Since the study only provides components, and does not link these to any 
best practice or international standards as a way of facilitating the development of said 
components, and fix vulnerabilities identified from using the self-assessment template, 
further research can be undertaken into establishing the linkages between components 
and international best practice, and investigating how vulnerabilities identified by the 
M-DiFoRe model can be resolved.  
 
iii. Opportunity 3: Limit the scope of the new study to a specific business type, industry or 
sector, to thus gain a deeper understanding of the usefulness of the M-DiFoRe model 
in the specific chosen context. 
 
iv. Opportunity 4: The application of the M-DiFoRe model could be done programmatically.  
Technologies such as Artificial Intelligence and eDiscovery applications could be used 
to automate the implementation of the M-DiFoRe model.  
8.8 The Research Value 
The inherent value of applying the M-DiFoRe model, as presented in this study, is: 
i. The reduction of technical complexity: the study serves to reduce the complexity of 
achieving digital forensic readiness by identifying areas of concern (components), their 
dependencies (systems) and detailing the function or purpose served by each 
dependency (system).  The resulting value is that more organisations will be able to 
become digitally forensic ready, thereby addressing the challenge of cybercrime.   
ii. The multidisciplinary focus: while the M-DiFoRe model addresses a technical challenge, 
it was developed using a multidisciplinary approach, thereby rendering it useful in other 
disciplines. Most of the current models are based on a uni-disciplinary approach, 
thereby decreasing the practical applicability thereof.  
iii. The use of the mixed data gathering methods: this study provides evidence of the benefits 
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of utilising various data gathering methods in a single research towards achieving 
theoretical grounding and triangulating findings.  This process strengthens the validity 
of findings and recommendations.  
iv. Manage insured liability: As discussed in Chapter 1, the rising scourge of digital crimes 
affects organisations and countries at large.  While this study provides a model that can 
assist organisations in achieving digital forensic readiness, it can also serve as a 
proactive tool to aid in the reduction of insurance premiums, and/or assist organisations 
in meeting minimum requirements to be insured against cyber and other digital related 
crimes. 
v. Stakeholder due care: in a world of increasing legal and compliance requirements, this 
study provides tools which senior management, directors and executives can use to 
demonstrate effort towards managing the risk of digital crimes and preventing harm to 
the organisation. The model’s self-assessment template provides a dashboard that 
leadership can use to gain insight into the organisation’s forensic readiness.  This has 
become increasingly important as is evident in Corporate Governance standards. 
 
The next section presents the researcher’s reflections on the research undertaken, and discusses 
lessons learned. 
8.9 Self-Reflection 
As I reflect on my research journey, the following are lessons learned from the analysis of 
literature and other content generated as part of this study: 
i. Digital forensics is more about people than it is about technology. The education, training, 
certification and/or awareness of relevant stakeholders is a key determining factor to 
the successful prevention, detection and prosecution of digital crimes. This highlights 
the need for more integrated and multidisciplinary research approaches.   
ii. Public-private partnerships and cooperation are necessary ingredients to overcoming 
technical, legal and other limitations faced by governments and corporations in the fight 
against technology related crimes. This highlights the need to institutionalise digital 
forensic readiness so that it becomes a focused, dedicated and strategic role performed 
at enterprise level. 
iii. I find the abovementioned lessons to be congruent with the view of Benbasat and Zmud 
(2003), which states “the complex and imposing challenges associated with IT 
management, development, and use demand interdisciplinary approaches to their 
resolution”. To this end, the integrated and multidisciplinary research approaches 
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adopted in this study add meaningful contribution to this discipline.   
 
Specific to the scientific research process, the following points have made a profound 
impression on me: 
i. When conducting research, the researcher needs to guard against the propensity to rely 
on assumption, but should rather allow the scientific exploratory nature of the process 
to naturally unfold. 
ii. When founded upon principles of trust, mutual respect and professionalism, the 
relationship between the student and supervisor can be such that it enables the student 
to develop as an independent academic identity.  
iii. Whetten (1989) argues that a meaningful theoretical contribution requires an extensions 
of existing theory that fundamentally change prior understanding of mechanisms by 
which relationships operate, which might involve developing new concepts or 
redefining old ones.  By following a sound scientific research process, I was able to 
produce the M-DiFoRe Model, which satisfies the requirements for a meaningful 
theoretical contribution as per Whetten (1989). 
 
Finally, the process of undertaking this study has benefited me more than merely attaining a 
doctoral degree and elevating my comprehension of the digital forensic discipline.  Additional 
skills learned include: 
i. An ability to set and manage long-term goals and the discipline to maintain a work-study-
life balance; 
ii. The ability to conduct a rigorous and systematic literature review and to critically analyse 
and formulate substantiated points of view; 
iii. The ability to apply thinking at a strategic, tactical and operational level; 
iv. The ability to scientifically articulate thoughts and  
v. The ability to create new knowledge, and to critically challenge my own ideas.  
 
I am thankful for the opportunity afforded to me to have embarked on this research journey.   
 
Finally, I consider this research to have been a success, as the M-DiFoRe model was validated, 
verified and found to adequately address the problem statement presented in Chapter 1. 
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Abstract—The ever-growing threats of fraud and security 
incidents present many challenges to law enforcement and 
organisations across the globe.  This has given rise to the 
need for organisations to build effective incident 
management strategies, which will enhance the company’s 
reactive capability to security incidents.  
The aim of this paper is to propose proactive activities 
an organisation can undertake in order to increase its ability 
to respond to security incidents and create a digitally 
forensic ready workplace environment.  
The study constitutes exploratory research, with the use of 
a systematic literature review as a basis to identify activities 
relating to a digitally forensic ready environment. 
While much has been written about how organisations 
can prepare to respond to security incidents, findings show 
an absence of a digital forensic readiness model.  This paper 
concludes by presenting such a conceptual model.  
This study contributes to the greater body of knowledge 
on the design and implementation of a digital forensic 
readiness programme, aimed at maximising the use of 
digital evidence in an organisation.  
Keywords - digital forensic readiness; computer forensics; 
data integrity; digital evidence; incident handling; empirical 
research 
1. Introduction 
White-collar crime is a term that has had common 
occurrence in the news.  To explain it, consider the following 
cases. Towards the end of 1999, the South African government 
signed contracts totalling R30 billion to modernise its defence 
equipment.  The project, “which promised billions of Rands in 
export and local sales, has not happened” [1].  On another 
matter, it was reported that Randgold & Exploration was subject 
to “massive fraud” equal to R1.5bn by its former CEO Brett 
Kebble, who misappropriated funds, forged documents and was 
involved in imprudent deal making, according to a forensic 
investigation [2].  While these types of cases do not form part 
of a typical law enforcement agent’s daily work, they do depict 
the gradually decaying ethical fibre of modern-day society.  
Speculations were that these elaborate crimes would end with 
Enron, and that the business community would use the lessons 
learned and better manage this great risk [3].  However, this has 
not been the case.  Many other organisations such as 
WorldCom, Health South, Adelphia and Tyco suffered the same 
tragedy [4]. In trying to understand and measure the impact of 
fraud on organisations, the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners released findings of a study that a typical 
organisation loses 5% of its annual revenue to fraud [5]. In other 
studies, South Africa was found to have the second-worst white-
collar crime rate in the world [6]. 
The inherent risk of increased technical sophistication in 
modern crimes makes these security incidents harder to detect, 
thereby potentially creating more damage [7]. Additionally, 
technology now plays a central role in facilitating and 
enhancing the sophistication of modern security incidents [8]- 
[9]. Over the past decade, well-understood procedures and 
methodologies have evolved within computer forensics digital 
evidence collection [10]-[11].  Kenneally and Brown [10] 
further note: “Computer forensic autopsies are no longer 
performed on single machines with small data storage 
capacities. Rather, the scope for potential evidence has 
expanded to networks of interconnected computers, each with 
vast storage capacities containing potential artefacts of legal 
relevance”.  Available literature relating to digital forensic 
readiness (DFR) addresses various technical components of this 
concept, but none brings all the components into one framework 
[12]-[15]. The need for a consolidation of research efforts in 
creating frameworks and models that help to address recent 
threats was recently identified by Garfinkel [9], who states that 
“without a clear strategy for enabling research efforts that build 
upon one another, forensic research will fall behind the market, 
tools will become increasingly obsolete, and law enforcement, 
military and other users of computer forensics products will be 
unable to rely on the results of forensic analysis”. 
This paper investigates recent challenges that technology 
presents with regard to the reliance and admissibility of 
electronic evidence in a court of law.  A systematic literature 
review was used to gather relevant information and this data is 
critically analysed in order to identify gaps and to improve upon 
them. 
A section dedicated to explaining the scientific research 
method adopted in this paper is presented next.  This is followed 
by a section on the application of the said research method, in 
reviewing existing literature relating to digital forensics.  
Preceding the conclusion is a section that presents the 
conceptual model for DFR. 
 
2. Research Method 
A systematic literature review was used.  Unlike 
conventional literature review, a systematic review follows a 
predefined protocol.  It is defined as a way to “identify, evaluate 
and interpret the available research that is relevant to an issue 
or discipline, or phenomenon of interest of a specific research 
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domain” [16]. Systematic reviews require the researcher to 
systematically collect all the search on a given topic, select 
studies according to pre-determined quality criteria, abstract the 
same information from each included study, display the results 
in evidence tables and interpret the results in view of the totality 
of the evidence [17]. 
A. Scoping 
The scope of our research was limited to material available 
on the University of South Africa Online Library [18].  This 
library is said to be one of the largest libraries in Africa, best 
endowed with information sources in access of 1,5 million. The 
library also subscribes to an increasing number of electronic 
journals, which are available at all times to Unisa students [18]-
[19]. 
A detailed search of relevant databases was conducted.  The 
relevance was determined by using the library’s A-Z list of 
electronic resources [18]. From this, only seven databases 
containing the most relevant material were selected and 
analysed further for articles and other publications.  The 
databases were selected on the basis of being classified under 
the following categories: 
• Multidisciplinary; 
•  Computing; 
•  Law; 
• Information Science; and  
• Engineering.  
Furthermore, the databases that were used were the ones 
containing the majority of the search hit results.  The search 
term used was “digital forensic”.  This keyword was used as the 
basis of the search as it relates directly to the topic under 
investigation. 
Only English written material published in the last nine 
years (2002-2011) was considered. The reasons for this were 
that, firstly, Unisa’s online library is available in English and 
secondly, English is one of South Africa’s most commonly 
spoken language in business, politics and the media [20]-[21].  
As there was no law on digital crimes in South Africa prior to 
the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act in 2002 
[22], only articles written after promulgation of this law were 
taken into consideration. 
The decision for reviewing only articles was based on the 
logic that articles usually precede books, dissertations and 
theses. Therefore, by looking at articles, content from the latter 
is also covered.  The next section deals with the methodology 
for screening articles for inclusion. 
B. Screening of articles for inclusion 
Since the application of a systematic literature review was 
intended not only for publication purposes but also for 
instrumental utilisation, an additional task to increase the 
reliability of the screening process was undertaken.  Both the 
authors conducted the screening process on a subset of articles 
independently of each other and then met together to compare 
results. 
In order to ensure that this process was scientific, the 
Cohen’s Kappa (K) interrater was used in measuring reliability 
of this process.   Interrater reliability is the degree of agreement 
between two observers who have independently observed and 
recorded behaviours at the same time [23]-[24]. The basic 
formula for Cohen’s Kappa (K) used is as computed below: 
Cohen’s Kappa =  PA (0.77) – PC (0.50) 
          1 – PC (0.50) 
     = 0.54 
Where PA is the observed percentage agreement and PC is 
the percentage agreement expected [24]. 
The goal in this study was to produce a PA value above 75% 
from the total reviewed articles.  This was done to ensure that 
all relevant articles were included for detailed review and to 
archive a kappa value above 0.50.   The said kappa goal is 
generally considered to be satisfactory  [23]-[24]. 
Both authors met to calculate the interrater reliability by 
calculating a percentage agreement.  This process was repeated 
until the percentage agreement exceeded 75%. Abstracts of 459 
articles were reviewed, resulting in the identification of 130 
relevant articles for possible inclusion.  The review process was 
refined further and the result was an agreement on the final 100 
articles for inclusion.    
The next section provides a literature overview of DFR.  
3. Digital Forensic Readiness Overview 
Rapid changes and advances in technology and related 
crimes have given rise to the need to review and improve on 
digital forensic models and processes.  Gravetter and Forzano 
[25] also make the observation that “unlike other forensic 
sciences, digital forensics subject matter continues to evolve, as 
do the techniques”. 
Given recent advances in technology, Bell and Boddington 
[26] argue that it would be imprudent and potentially reckless 
to rely on existing evidence collection processes and 
procedures.  They add “conventional assumptions about the 
behaviour of storage media are no longer valid”.   Unlike 
traditional storage media, modern storage devices can operate 
under their own volition in the absence of computer instructions 
[10], [27]. Such operations can be highly destructive of 
traditionally recoverable data.  This process has the potential to 
contaminate evidence and can obfuscate and make validation of 
digital evidence difficult [10].  
For purposes of this study, the use of the term “traditional 
approaches” denotes forensic procedures undertaken from the 
dawn of the computer forensic practice to 2005 [10].  First, the 
basic concept of a traditional approach called dead forensics is 
explained. 
A. Dead Forensics 
To meet the desired goal of preserving original evidence, 
one of the ﬁrst steps in traditional evidence collection 
procedures includes taking the evidence-containing computer 
system ofﬂine and creating a bit-stream image of the entire 
original evidence disk [10]. 
The process begins with the preservation of digital evidence 
by pulling the power cord, in preparation for the physical 
removal of the storage device for imaging purposes.  Security 
becomes an important consideration to ensure the logical and 
physical safety of the evidence.  At the conclusion of the 
imaging process, a hashing tool is used to authenticate the 
forensic image.  This is then followed by the analysis and 
reporting phases.   
Recent studies show that the well-understood digital 
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forensic procedures and methodologies are evolving [9], [11]. 
The scope for potential evidence has expanded from standalone 
computers to networks of interconnected computers, each with 
vast storage capacities containing potential artefacts of legal 
relevance, making the dead forensic process increasingly 
obsolete. 
B. Live Forensics 
Also known as fast forensics, this concept is deﬁned by 
Reyes and Brittson [25] as “those investigative processes that 
are conducted within the ﬁrst few hours of an investigation, that 
provide information used during the suspect interview phase”. 
Due to the need for information to be obtained in a relatively 
short time frame, fast forensics usually involves an on-site/ﬁeld 
analysis of the computer system in question. 
 Live analysis techniques use software that existed on the 
system during the time frame being investigated. On the other 
hand, dead analysis techniques don not use software that existed 
on the system during that time frame [28]. 
Avoiding contamination during the recovery process is 
paramount and depends on effective, error-free data recovery 
from digital devices.  Traditionally, write-blocking hardware 
combined with bit-stream image copying processes served this 
purpose. 
Some fast forensics techniques utilise Linux or other 
forensic boot disks to perform on-scene/site searches and data 
extraction. The boot disks run in memory only and mount the 
hard drives as read only so as not to corrupt the evidence [25]. 
Sutherland et al. [29] ague that “there is no way to avoid 
making changes, since in order to conduct a live examination it 
is necessary to deploy tools on the live system to capture data, 
and such tools will make changes to the running system”. 
This argument was later supported by Chan et al. [30], who 
found that current forensic tools are limited by their inability to 
preserve the hardware and software state of a system during 
investigation.  Existing tools can overwrite evidence present in 
memory or alter the contents of the disk causing forensic taint, 
which lowers the integrity of the evidence.  
On the other hand, taking a snapshot of the system can result 
in a phenomenon known as forensic blurriness, where an 
inconsistent snapshot is captured because the system is running 
while it is being observed.  Forensic blurriness affects the 
ﬁdelity and quantity of evidence acquired and can cast doubt on 
the validity of the analysis, making the courts more reluctant to 
accept such evidence [30]. 
From the above, the conclusion is made that neither dead 
nor live forensics provide sufficient assurance of non-
manipulation. Therefore, if existing computer forensic 
procedures ultimately render evidence inadmissible, then the 
need for a redefinition of the methodology is paramount. 
C. Digital Forensic Technical Challenges 
According to Bell and Boddington [26], “these long-
established, internationally accepted procedures even cover 
situations such as the automated recovery of court-submissible 
evidence which a defendant has previously attempted to delete. 
Indeed, the peculiarity of 'deleted, but not forgotten' data which 
so often comes back to haunt defendants in court is in many 
ways a bizarre artefact of hard drive technology”.  
This comes from the reality that traditional hard disks have 
slow access speeds relative to their capacity for storage (the 
latter makes complete erasure very inconvenient), and from the 
fact that there is no performance penalty is incurred for writing 
over existing data (which makes complete erasure 
unnecessary). 
This situation is in the process of changing [9].  Newer 
technologies such as solid-state drives (SSDs) are much faster 
and more complex.  However, these complexities are not 
limited only to SSDs, but extend to other storage forms, such as 
raid arrays, storage area network (SAN) and network attached 
storage (NAS) devices.  
Commensurate changes that need to be made by the digital 
forensic tool manufacturers to accommodate/address the new 
file systems, operating systems and connectivity demands also 
contribute to shorter lifespan of forensic tools [31]. The issue of 
tools and other technical resources becomes even more 
pertinent as anti-forensic efforts continue to increase.  Anti-
forensics can be defined as “the movement to exploit 
weaknesses in the forensic process or tools” [25]. 
This rising surge of anti-forensic tools and their ease of 
access on the internet directly impacts on any organisation’s 
ability, or lack thereof, to respond effectively to digital crimes 
[32].  
There is a need to find a balance between the functionality 
that security applications provide (eg. secure deletion) and the 
reverse engineering capability required from digital forensic 
tools.  Findings show that security applications have advanced 
far beyond digital forensic tools, rendering some forensic tools 
obsolete against (anti-forensic) actions undertaken using 
security tools. 
D. Digital Forensic Readiness 
The previous section provides evidence suggesting that a 
mature technical environment alone is not the only factor 
impacting on the organisation’s DFR.  In this section, we 
explore the concept of DFR and other factors that have an 
impact on it.   
Rowlingson [13] defined forensic readiness “as the ability 
of an organisation to maximise its potential to use digital 
evidence whilst minimising the costs of an investigation”. 
Garcia [33] later modified this definition to describe forensic 
readiness as the “art of maximizing the environment's ability to 
collect credible evidence”. 
From the perspective of law enforcement agencies, the 
forensic process begins when the crime has been committed or 
when a crime has been discovered and reported. The concept of 
forensic readiness, according to Hoolachan and Glisson [34], is 
that an organisation can pre-empt the occurrence of a crime by 
preparing the environment in advance and in doing this, 
organisations will benefit not only in instances where 
prosecution becomes an issue, but also in limiting their own 
business risks. 
a) Policies & Procedures 
The business requirement to gather and use digital evidence 
has been recognised in a number of studies. Rowlingson [13] 
notes that enterprise policies can enhance computer and 
network forensics. While policies are important, they alone will 
not guarantee an organisation’s overall forensic readiness. An 
implementation plan (incident response) must be developed and 
tested. 
According to Jaatun et al. [35], incident response is the 
process of responding to and handling security-related incidents 
involving information and communications technology 
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infrastructure and data. Incident response has traditionally been 
rather reactive in nature, focusing mainly on technical issues 
[35]-[36]. An incident can be anything from an attack that 
crashes all the servers and cuts off all network communications 
to an intrusion that causes no actual damage but demonstrates 
the vulnerability of the organisation's systems [36]-[37]. In the 
introduction of this article, reference to examples of high-
profile fraud cases relating to the South African government’s 
arms deal, Brett Kebble’s affairs while at Randgold and those 
of international companies such as Tyco, Adelphia and 
WorldCom indicate the damage a poorly managed incident can 
cause. 
Taylor et al. [32] add that “although all security incidents 
should be taken seriously, they may not all have the same 
severity”.  An incident response plan should therefore deﬁne 
how incident severities will be determined and what this means 
in terms of incident handling.   
b) Incident Management 
David [38] suggests that before dealing with “the incidents 
that have been deemed worthy of treatment, there are three 
important steps that should be taken. First, all events should be 
logged, and the logging should be in as much detail as possible”. 
This makes allowance for things such as later treatment of the 
non-priority items, detecting patterns leading up to incidents, 
and a ready source of information regarding events that are 
action items.  
The second important step is that there should be an 
escalating set of responses when appropriate. The benefits 
derived from this step are what can be called ‘quick and dirty’ 
initial reactions to certain incidents, and provide follow-up 
actions if the earlier ones fail to accomplish their goals.  
David [38] further suggests that “all events, even those not 
designated as incidents to be treated in the incident response 
plans, should be treated with reasonable promptness, although 
certainly not with the urgency associated with the more serious 
events”. 
If the above steps are not taken to stop the events of lesser 
importance, those initiating these events can continue doing 
them without fear of reprisal, and might even try more severe 
attacks [37]-[38]. 
c) Response Team 
In an attempt to be proactive, many organisations form 
incident response teams—called computer incident response 
teams (CIRTs).  These teams are made up of trained individuals 
whose goal is to be able to react speedily to occurrences of 
incidents [39].  
Each team member covers a pre-assigned area of 
responsibility, thus decreasing the amount of damage and 
increasing the likelihood of apprehending the perpetrator of the 
incident [35]-[36].  An incident response manager, whose 
responsibility includes coordinating notiﬁcations, escalations 
and ensuring that the incident response team is properly 
assembled, usually leads this team [32]. 
Lamis [39] adds that “communication between team 
members, internal departments, and external networks is critical 
to creating a resourceful environment to effectively combat and 
handle incident responses. An organisation’s incident response 
team may require outside assistance, which costs crucial time 
and money to select during the incident”. 
 
While no evidence of a forensic readiness model could be 
found, critical components making up such a model can be 
extrapolated from the literature reviewed. There is a need for a 
consolidation of research efforts in creating frameworks and 
models that help to address recent threats and incidents [9].   The 
next section covers how reviewed literature on research efforts 
relating to DFR was consolidated in the development of a 
conceptual model for digital forensic readiness. 
E. Digital Forensic Readiness Conceptual Model 
From the literature analysis, the critical components of a 
DFR model are summarised in Figure 1.  At a macro level, core 
activities relating to DFR fall under four categories, namely 
People, Process, Policy and Technology.  Within each category 
are sub-activities which can further be classified into proactive 
and reactive classes.  
Figure 1. Digital forensic readiness conceptual model 
 
From the above discussion, forensic readiness as explained 
by Rowlingson [13] was found to have two main objectives:  
• Maximising an environment’s ability to collect 
credible digital evidence; and 
• Minimising the cost of forensics during an incident 
response.  
a) People 
Under the People category are many sub-activities such as 
the hiring of experienced CIRT members, segregation of duties 
and security training and awareness campaigns.  Establishing a 
capability for securely gathering legally admissible evidence is 
a key component of DFR [13]. 
The objective is to ensure that the human resources of an 
organisation all contribute towards the prevention and detection 
of security incidents [14].   
Research suggests that building a response team should 
involve many different organisational departments such as legal 
and public relations [32], [39]. These additional parties 
sometimes include external parties who provide support and 
have skills that may not be present in the organisation.  
External parties should also be readily available to provide 
assistance to internal teams in the event of an incident [36]-[37]. 
Although the variety of staff involved generally varies 
depending on the magnitude of the investigation, Hoolachan 
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and Glisson [34] argue that “there are a multitude of people who 
need to understand the correct protocol within a digital 
investigation”.   Failure to organise and equip human resources 
with the necessary tools and knowledge can ultimately 
negatively impact the organisation’s forensic readiness.   
Developing and documenting processes that affect all 
parties involved is key in ensuring that the integrity of evidence 
and the reputation of the organisation remain intact, even after 
the incident.  
b) Process 
The Process category is concerned with activities that ensure 
the integrity of evidence.  This includes ensuring that 
operational documents such as an incident response plan and a 
forensic methodology are in place [34]. This is critical as it 
provides the organisation with an implementation guide to 
meeting the requirements set by regulatory framework and 
organisational policies. 
Von Solms et al. [14] summarise the four key activities of 
the digital forensic process:  
5 Securing the evidence without contaminating it,  
6 Acquiring the evidence without altering or damaging the 
original,  
7 Authenticating that the recovered evidence is the same as 
the original seized data, and  
8 Analysing the data without modifying it.  
The procedures for evidence acquisition and preservation 
can be simple, rapid and effective, saving time and money [40]. 
The complexities of modern network environments, however, 
demand that organisations define the details well ahead of time. 
Failing to preserve the integrity of data on a victim or attacking 
systems in a timely manner will negatively affect the outcome 
of the investigation.  
It is therefore important to have defined processes that guide 
the organisation in achieving a digitally forensic ready 
environment.  Furthermore, these processes should be governed 
by certain policies and guiding principles to chart the course of 
action in the event of an incident. 
 
c) Policy 
Rowlingson [13] notes that enterprise policies can enhance 
computer and network forensics. In addition, he proposes six 
categories of policies to facilitate digital forensic investigations. 
These categories are designed to help enterprises deter 
computer crime and position themselves to respond to 
successful attacks by improving their ability to conduct 
investigations. The six categories of policies that facilitate 
digital forensic investigations are:  
• Retaining information – Policies that relate to the 
storage of information by an organisation;  
• Planning the response – Policies that guide the 
organisation’s plans to respond to various incidents 
and situations;  
• Training – Policies that address the training of staff 
members and those affiliated with the organisation;  
• Accelerating the investigation – Policies that address 
operational aspects of investigations;  
• Preventing anonymous activities – Policies that 
address the organisation’s proactive efforts against the 
risk of fraud; and 
• Protecting the evidence – Policies that address the 
handling and protection of evidence and other vital 
data. 
Grobler and Louwrens [15] argue that digital forensics 
policies may augment some information security policies, 
suggesting that interdependencies between policies will exist.  
As such, these policies must not be developed in silos, but 
should inform one another. 
While policies are important, they alone will not guarantee 
an organisation’s overall forensic readiness. Technology is the 
ultimate enabler, ensuring that People have proactive and 
reactive tools to implement as guided by Policy and defined 
Processes.  
d) Technology 
An organisation needs to ensure that appropriate technology 
is used not only to enable business operations, but to also 
prevent and detect computer incidents.    
To provide more clarity on the role of technology or system 
forensic readiness, Tan et al. [40] present the idea of system 
forensic readiness as one part of overall enterprise forensic 
readiness.  It is critical for organisations to know their sources 
of potential evidence and to determine what currently happens 
to the potential evidence data [13]. 
Evidence preservation is not only affected by technical 
factors.  Tan [12] argues that non-technical factors for 
consideration also include: 
• How logging is done; 
• What is logged; 
• Intrusion detection systems (IDSs); 
• Forensic acquisition; and 
• Evidence handling. 
According to Doherty and Liebesfeld [31], more private 
investigators are declining various digital forensic work 
because the needed and required tools are very expensive and 
have a short lifespan, due to the increasing and changing variety 
of digital devices available on the market each year.  
The issue of tools and other technical resources becomes 
even more pertinent as the anti-forensic efforts continue to 
increase.  Anti-forensics, as explained above, can be defined as 
“the movement to exploit weaknesses in the forensic process or 
tools” [25]. It can also involve the various acts of hiding data 
from the forensic exam. Older techniques were as simple as 
running a simple script to perform a touch command on every 
ﬁle to alter file attributes (date and time stamps), or deleting log 
and temporary ﬁles [41].   
It is therefore important to incorporate digital forensic 
toolsets into the overall organisational technology 
infrastructure.   By including some aspects of DFR into the 
information security architecture of the organisation, it will be 
possible to link the source of the attack to the incident and the 
perpetrator [15]. This integration of digital forensics in the 
architecture design will help to bridge the gap between 
advances in security applications and challenges that digital 
forensic tools face.  
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As can be extrapolated from the definition of DFR, efforts 
to ensure availability and integrity of data are central to 
maximising the organisation’s ability to collect credible 
evidence to facilitate an investigation [33]-[34].  Studies have 
also shown that DFR activities relating to data benefit 
organisations not only in instances where prosecution becomes 
an issue, but also in limiting an organisation’s own business 
risks [13], [34]. 
4. Value Proposition 
As discussed, the increasing sophistication of incidents can 
cause great harm to an organisation.  While numerous 
organisations have policies, human resources and technical 
tools, many of these efforts are modelled in a way that supports 
business functions and not necessarily DFR.   
The proposed conceptual DFR model provides a platform 
for proactive activities to be consolidated and concentrated to 
ensure collaboration within the organisation in building 
capacity to prevent, detect and manage incidents.  
Additionally, the model can be used to provide a dashboard of 
all related organisational activities, classified under each of the 
four components of People, Process, Policy and Technology.  
Once complete, this classification can be used to measure the 
maturity of how ready the organisation is to deal with security 
incidents.  This will further aid in reducing duplication of 
activities geared towards achieving DFR. 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to propose proactive activities an 
organisation can undertake in order to increase its ability to 
respond to security incidents and create a digitally forensic 
ready workplace environment. This was done by investigating 
recent challenges that technology presents with regard to the 
reliance and admissibility of electronic evidence in a court of 
law.  A systematic literature review was used to gather relevant 
information and this data was critically analysed in order to 
identify gaps and to fill them. 
Findings show that available literature relating to DFR 
addresses various technical components of this concept, but 
none brings all the components into one framework.  The need 
for a consolidation of research efforts in creating frameworks 
and models that help to address recent threats was also 
discussed and the outcome is a proposed conceptual DFR 
model, which can be used as a tool to consolidate and integrate 
segregated business activities which form part of DFR.  The 
model also identifies four critical components that are necessary 
to achieve DFR. In the absence of such a model, an organisation 
will not be able to maximise the environment's ability to collect 
credible evidence. 
Literature reviewed shows that fraud and security incidents 
affect organisations across the public and private sector.  This 
research adds value by highlighting the impact of technological 
advances on traditional digital forensic processes. Included is 
the emphasis on the sophistication of recent security incidents 
and the importance of a DFR model to aid organisations in 
aligning efforts that ensure that credible evidence can be 
retained during normal business operations.   
A limitation of this research is that it presents only a 
conceptual model, which is generic in nature. Further research 
opportunities are in building on the proposed conceptual model 
by identifying the different stakeholders in an investigation 
process, and personalising the model to their varying 
environments.  Additionally, sub-activities within each of the 
identified components of the model can be investigated in 
greater detail, to include testing of recent forensic and security 
tools that can be used to address technological advances 
discussed earlier in this paper.  
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COGNITIVE APPROACHES FOR HOLISTIC DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS 
PLANNING 
 
Antonio Pooe and Les Labuschagne 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on the use of cognitive approaches for digital forensic readiness planning. 
Research has revealed that a well-thought-out and legally contextualized digital forensic 
readiness strategy can provide organisations with an increased ability to respond to security 
incidents while maintaining the integrity of the evidence gathered and keeping investigative 
costs low. This paper contributes to the body of knowledge in digital forensics related to the 
design and implementation of digital forensic readiness plans aimed at maximizing the use of 
digital evidence in organisations. The study uses interviews as part of a mixed-methods 
approach. In particular, it employs a mix of informal conversational and standardized open-
ended interview styles conducted with industry experts over a variety of communication media. 
 
Keywords: digital forensic readiness; digital evidence; cognitive approaches 
 
1. Introduction 
 From the perspective of law enforcement agencies, the forensic process begins when a 
crime has been committed or when a crime has been discovered and reported [6]. Forensic 
readiness enables organisations to preempt the occurrence of crimes by gathering evidence in 
advance and, in doing so, derive benefits in instances where prosecution becomes an issue and 
also limit their risks [5]. 
 The organisational requirement to gather and use digital evidence has been recognized in 
a number of studies (see, e.g., [2, 5]). These studies stress the importance of a structure to 
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maintain the integrity of forensic evidence. In particular, Yasinsac and Manzano [7] note that 
organisational policies play a critical role in providing the needed structure. Yasinsac and 
Manzano also propose six categories of policies to facilitate digital forensic investigations. The 
categories are designed to help organisations deter digital crime and position themselves to 
respond to attacks by improving their ability to conduct investigations. The six categories of 
policies that facilitate digital forensic investigations are: 
• Retaining Information: Policies that relate to the storage of information by an 
organisation. 
• Planning the Response: Policies that guide an organisation's plans for responding to 
incidents and situations. 
• Training: Policies that address the training of staff members and others affiliated with 
an organisation. 
• Accelerating the Investigation: Policies that address the operational aspects of 
investigations. 
• Preventing Anonymous Activities: Policies that address an organisation's proactive 
efforts against fraud. 
• Protecting the Evidence: Policies that address the handling and protection of evidence 
and other vital data. 
 From the above discussion, the concept of digital forensic readiness has two main 
objectives: (i) maximizing the ability to collect credible digital evidence (Categories 1, 2, 5 and 
6 above); and (ii) minimizing the cost of digital forensics during incident response (Categories 
3 and 4). While this reinforces the importance of cohesive policies in organisations, the 
problem with the categorisation is that it suggests that organisations must have all six policies 
in place, which may result in possible duplication and/or conflicting policy statements. 
Furthermore, it may lead to confusion in identifying the authority/governing policy for 
facilitating digital investigations. While the policies are important, they alone do not guarantee 
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a holistic digital forensic readiness plan.  
 Because of the potential policy conflicts, this study used mixed methods interviews [4] 
as a means to develop a holistic digital forensic readiness plan. The interviews were employed 
as an exploratory research tool to gather information from subject matter experts and to capture 
real-world experiences with the goal of identifying key components for consideration. 
 
2. Research Design 
 
 Mixed method research is a design with philosophical assumptions and various methods 
of inquiry [4]. The philosophical assumptions guide the direction of the collection and analysis 
of data while the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods of inquiry in a single or 
series of studies offers a better understanding of research problems than each approach on its 
own [12]. 
 The intent of the two-phase exploratory design is that the results of the first method 
(qualitative) can help develop or inform the second method (quantitative) [4]. This is based on 
the premise that an exploration may be needed for one or more reasons, which takes into 
account the possibility that measures or instruments are not available, variables are unknown 
and no guiding framework or theory exists. 
 This design is used because it enables the exploration of a phenomenon in detail and the 
development and testing of the resulting conceptual model [4, 12]. The use of the design in this 
study helps validate qualitative data with quantitative results.  
 Interviews were used in this study as the data collection method. In mixed methods 
research, open-ended qualitative interviews (INTQUAL) are featured more frequently than 
closed-ended quantitative interviews (INT-QUAN). Qualitative interviews are usually non-
directive and general (“tell me about your school"). On the other hand, quantitative interviews 
are structured and closed-ended (“which of the following describes the food in your school 
cafeteria - very good, good, bad, very bad") [12]. 
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2.1 Types of Interviews 
 
 Patton [8] defined four types of open-ended interviews, ranging from the least structured 
(informal conversational interviews) to more structured (general interview-guided approaches) 
to the most structured (standardized open-ended interviews). He also described closed fixed-
response interviews but does not advocate their use. The four types of open-ended interviews 
are:  
• Type 1: Informal Conversational Interview: Questions emerge from the immediate 
context and are asked in the natural course of the interview. The question topics and 
wording are not predetermined. 
• Type 2: General Interview Guide Approaches: Topics and issues are specified in 
advance in outline form. The interviewer decides the sequence and working of questions 
in the course of the interview. 
• Type 3: Standardized Open-Ended Interviews: The exact wording and sequence of 
questions are determined in advance. All interviewees are asked the same basic 
questions in the same order.  Questions are worded in a completely open-ended format. 
• Type 4: Closed Fixed-Response Interviews: Questions and response categories are 
determined in advance. The responses are fixed. The respondent chooses from among 
the fixed responses. 
 
 For purposes of this study, a mixture of Type 1 and Type 3 open-ended interviews was 
used. Teddie and Tashakkori [12] state that researchers who select the INT-QUAL strategy 
may use any of the open-ended interview approaches and potentially combine the interview 
types. They suggest the following sequence of interview techniques: 
Figure 1.  Start with the unstructured informal conversational interview approach to build 
 rapport and elicit spontaneous responses.  
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Figure 2.  Move to the interview guide approach that provides a more comprehensive 
 outline of topics, but yet maintains a conversational tone.  
Figure 3.  Finish with the highly structured, standardized open-ended interview approach, 
 which greatly increases response comparability. 
 Our study began with an unstructured informal conversational interview approach, 
followed by a highly structured, standardized open-ended interview approach. The questions 
were formulated based on a literature survey conducted in 2011 [9]. 
 
2.2 The Interviews 
 
 This section discusses the criteria used to select the interviewees, the communication 
channels used to conduct the interviews and the ethical considerations related to the interview 
process. 
 The interviewees were selected based on three criteria: 
• Individuals from the private sector and law enforcement were selected in order 
to emphasize the multidisciplinary aspects of the domain and to capture a broad 
range of views from subject matter experts involved in different aspects of the 
digital forensic process. 
• Individuals with experience in digital law and/or digital forensics were selected 
to ensure that the input gathered was not biased and addressed the technical and 
legal dimensions of digital forensics. 
• Individuals who had been practicing digital forensics in South Africa for a 
period of no less than three years were selected. Since the context of the study 
was South Africa, it was important to identify subject matter experts with 
experience in the geographical context. 
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Table 1 – Interviewee profiles Interviewee	 Experience	>	3	Years	 Law	Enforcement	 Private	Sector	Experience	 Management	Position	INT1	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 Yes	INT2	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	INT3	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 Yes	INT4	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	INT5	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 Yes	INT6	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 Yes	INT7	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
 
 These criteria ensured that the interviewees would provide a mixture of opinions based 
on their experiences in their different working environments. Studies have shown that while 
open-ended interviews are typically conducted in a face-to-face manner, they may also be 
conducted over the telephone and via the Internet [11, 12]. 
 A total of seven interviews were conducted using three channels: four interviews were 
face-to-face, one was conducted over the phone and two over the Internet. Due to the volume 
of data collected, the ATLAS.ti tool [1] was used to process and analyse the data collected 
during the interviews. 
 
3. Interview Results 
 
 This section describes the results of the seven interviews. All the interviewees met the 
selection criteria. Table 1 summarizes the interviewee profiles.  
 We now provide a summary of some of the questions, the responses received and the 
interviewees that were in agreement. Based on the responses, cognitive approaches to digital 
forensic readiness planning were used to develop a conceptual model. 
 
i. Question 1: Should South African organisations be concerned about digital crimes? 
 Responses to this question show the following opinions:  
j. Digital crimes were on the increase (All). 
k. The intangible nature of data in electronic format causes people to lower their 
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defences (INT1, INT4 and INT7). 
l. Modern criminals are technologically literate and have access to good legal 
representation (INT1, INT2 and INT3). 
m. Immaturity of the digital forensic profession allows criminals to go free (INT5). 
n. Following correct investigative processes to preserve evidence is important (INT6). 
 
ii. Question 2: Which three types of digital crimes do you find to be the most prevalent? 
 The following crimes were found to be prevalent:  
o. Financial crimes (All). 
p. Child pornography (INT4, INT5, INT6, INT7). 
q. 419 scams (INT4, INT6). 
r. Malware-related crimes (INT1, INT2). 
s. Intellectual property theft (INT1, INT5). 
t. Hacking and illegal access (INT3, INT2). 
u. Internet misuse (INT5). 
 
iii. Question 3: Which sector do you find to be the most targeted? 
 The following sectors were found to be targeted:  
v. Banks/financial Sector (All). 
w. Large corporates (INT2, INT4 and INT7). 
x. Individuals (INT2 and INT3). 
y. Mining (INT4). 
z. Businesses (INT5). 
 
iv. Question 4: Have you noted any challenges regarding the prosecution of digital 
crimes? 
 The following challenges were noted: 
aa. Knowledge of digital forensic principles lacking among the stakeholders (All). 
bb. Lack of understanding of legal requirements (INT1; INT3; INT4, INT5, INT6). 
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cc. Lack of resources [INT2, INT7]. 
 
v. Question 5: Do you or your organisation have a digital forensic model that has been 
adopted? 
All the respondents indicated that they use their own entity-specific model, which may 
differ from those used by other organisations. 
 
vi. Question 6: Does electronic evidence provide sufficient assurance of non-
manipulation? 
Provided that the correct processes were followed, all the respondents were of the opinion 
that electronic evidence can be relied upon. 
 
vii. Question 7: Is there a standard process for electronic evidence gathering? 
All the respondents indicated that, while processes adopted in their individual 
organisations were similar, no process standards specific to South Africa exist. 
 
viii. Question 8: Does the law adequately position the acceptable use of/or extent to which 
electronic evidence can be used in a civil or criminal proceedings? 
All respondents referred to the Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act of 
2002 as legislation that makes it possible to present electronic evidence in a South African 
court of law. However, the following contradictions were noted: 
dd. Existing laws support the ECT Act (INT4, INT5 and INT7). 
ee. Discrepancies exist between ECT Act and existing laws (INT2). 
 
ix. Question 9: Does the law cater to the complexities of modern IT devices? 
All the respondents indicated that the law lagged behind technology. While the ECT Act 
was found to be strong legislation, the respondents indicated that it needed periodic review. 
 
x. Question 10: What are the factors that contribute to electronic evidence being rendered 
inadmissible? 
All the respondents pointed to digital forensic processes and procedures as a good 
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foundation for ensuring the admissibility of evidence. 
 
xi. Question 11: Have you noted any challenges that prevent digital crime investigators 
from correctly applying the digital forensic model or framework? 
All respondents indicated that a single point of reference was needed. Other points noted 
were: 
ff. South Africa needs a specific model (INT5 and INT7). 
gg. The model must enable and support legal processes (INT7). 
hh. The model must be flexible (INT5). 
 
xii. Question 12: Do you think digital forensic investigators are sufficiently trained to do 
their work? 
All the respondents identified a need for more training for local digital forensic 
investigators. 
 
xiii. Question 13: Have you noted any challenges that prevent prosecutors from successfully 
prosecuting digital crimes? 
 Responses identified the following challenges: 
ii. A lack of interest in digital crimes (INT1, INT3, INT4, INT5, INT 6, INT 7). 
jj. High caseloads (INT1, INT2, INT4, INT5 and INT7). 
kk. Lack of digital forensic training and/or awareness (INT2, INT5 and INT7). 
ll. Lack of cooperation (INT5). 
 
xiv. Question 14: Do you think state prosecutors are sufficiently trained to do their work? 
 All respondents opined that a training need  exists for state prosecutors. 
 
xv. Question 15: What do you think should be done to increase the prosecution rate of 
digital crimes in South Africa? 
 The responses included:  
mm. Special digital forensic courts (INT1, INT3, INT4, INT5 and INT7). 
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nn. Education, training and awareness (INT1, INT2, INT6 and INT7). 
oo. More research focused on digital forensics (INT1 and INT6). 
pp. Compulsory reporting requirements (INT1 and INT5). 
qq. A new law of evidence for electronic crimes (INT2). 
rr. Define processes and a model (INT4). 
 
4. Data Analysis and Interpretation 
 
 This section discusses the application of the data analysis method and presents the results 
of the analysis. 
 The data analysis was conducted by transcribing each interview and reading each 
transcript repeatedly to identify the codes for each question answered by the interviewees. 
Techniques from immersion/crystallisation and constant comparison (grounded theory) were 
applied to assist with the development of the initial and final codes [3]. The iterative reading 
process made it possible for focus/immersion to be applied to each question and for the 
emergence/crystallisation of themes to take place. Differences in findings (codes and themes) 
were also resolved using the iterative process. The above process resulted in three 
environments: corporate, industry and legislative. 
 
4.1 Corporate Environment 
 
 Key findings from the correlation of results from each interview revealed the following: 
• Organisational Culture: A large proportion of organisations were found to 
have a habit/culture of ignoring/overlooking small crimes. Additionally, 
organisations were found to invest the least amount of resources to address the 
risk of digital crimes. Finally,  a lack of awareness about digital crime 
prevention and detection was found to exist.  
These findings suggest that, by creating a culture of no tolerance to crime and 
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taking action on reported crimes, an organisation can significantly reduce its 
risk exposure to digital crimes. 
• Policies: Interviewees noted that a general lack of governance, policies and 
procedures relating to fraud risk management existed in many of the 
organisations with which they had been in contact. These findings support 
existing literature (as discussed earlier in this study) on the importance of 
policies as they relate to achieving digital forensic readiness. 
• Communication Channels: The reporting of digital crimes was found to be 
low. The causes mentioned included a culture of “sweeping things under the 
carpet” along with ignorance, and the lack of education and law enforcement 
effectiveness.  
These findings suggest that encouraging and supporting open dialog, coupled 
with crime reporting mechanisms can positively impact organisational culture. 
• Emerging Risks: The following areas of risk were identified: 
• The intangible aspect of technology causes people to lower their defences. 
This is evident in the various types of white-collar crimes committed 
using technology. 
• Modern IT criminals are technologically literate and have access to 
financial and other resources, including good legal representation. 
• Criminals are quick to exploit innovations in mobile technology. 
• The digital forensic industry is not sufficiently mature, enabling criminals 
to take advantage of ambiguities in global legal structures. 
• Digital forensic investigators often do not follow due process, which 
contributes to the low prosecution rate of digital crimes. 
 The findings suggest the importance of being cognizant about emerging risks 
because they affect the nature of controls and mitigation strategies that organisations 
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employ. 
• Crime Trends: Respondents were of the opinion that digital crimes are on the 
increase and will affect all current and future users of technology. The high 
prevalence of crime is attributed to legal gaps. These findings suggest that 
increased awareness of crime trends can aid organisations in focusing their 
attention and resources on high risk areas. 
 
4.2 Industry Environment 
 
 The correlation of results from each interview revealed the following findings: 
• Standards: The absence of standards for digital forensics was identified as an 
inhibiting factor to the prosecution of digital crimes. An open culture of 
information sharing was noted as necessary to promote the maturity of the 
digital forensic profession. Specific to a digital forensic model, this should not 
be legislation but, instead, recommended guidelines that enable and support the 
legal process while being sufficiently flexible to accommodate advances and 
changes in legislation and technology. 
These findings suggest that establishing governance structures is an important 
step to building quality digital forensic case law and professionalizing the digital 
forensic industry. 
• Methodology: While digital forensic investigation methodologies exist, there 
is a need for a single point of reference. This extends to the need for consistency 
in country-specific standards, processes and methodology. Awareness of 
research-based methodologies and their alignment to legislation was also found 
to be necessary.  
These findings suggest that standardisation can encourage consistency, 
conformity, compliance and increase competitiveness in the digital forensic 
profession. 
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• Education: A lack of cohesion between academics and practitioners was found 
to exist. While interviewees noted that no single qualification is a prerequisite 
to qualify as a digital forensic practitioner, specialized training and a balance of 
education and experience were found to be necessary. A digital forensic model 
was also found to be essential to guide training efforts.  
These findings suggest that the ideal qualification requirements for digital 
forensic practitioners are formal education coupled with advanced training in a 
field of specialisation. 
• Training: Training of all stakeholders was noted as essential. In particular, 
emphasis was placed on legal requirements as superseding technical processes. 
Some practitioners lack an understanding of the legal requirements and/or 
incorrectly apply technical knowledge. These findings suggest the need to 
expose digital forensic investigators to a balanced training curriculum that 
covers all related disciplines. 
• Development: There was a lack of continued professional development for 
individuals in the investigation value chain, including prosecutors, judges and 
digital forensics practitioners across all sectors. These findings suggest the need 
for organisations to employ qualified digital forensic investigators and provide 
continuous education and career development in order to ensure that the 
investigators are equipped with the skills necessary to handle modern digital 
crimes. 
 
4.3 Legislative Environment 
 
 The correlation of results from the interviews yielded the following findings: 
• Legal Culture: A lack of consideration of digital crimes exists among some 
judges and prosecutors; this was attributed to high caseloads and limited 
resources. The creation of special interest groups and special courts could 
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introduce positive changes. These findings suggest the need for a culture of 
cooperation between organisations, law enforcement and prosecuting 
authorities. 
• eLaw Development: Specific to South African legislation on electronic 
evidence [10], the findings indicate that the key strengths of the law are robust 
legislation and good baselines. On the other hand, the findings also suggest that 
the law imposes low penalties, there is limited awareness and understanding of 
the law, and considerable complexity in its use of technical terminology. Lastly, 
the South African legislation on electronic evidence was perceived as being 
adequate to cover technological advances over the next ten to twenty years. 
These findings suggest the need for continuous review and development of 
legislation relating to digital crimes in order to close the gap (of relevance) 
between technology and the law. 
• Awareness: The findings suggest that the judiciary is presented with challenges 
that result in a reluctance to prioritize digital evidence. High caseloads and a 
lack of awareness of digital forensic processes and methodologies exist. 
Interviewees pointed to a need for a change in culture. Training and awareness 
were suggested as effective drivers to implement this change. These findings 
point to the importance of digital forensic awareness initiatives as a means to 
reduce the reluctance to prioritize digital crimes and increase confidence levels 
when prosecuting crimes. 
 
5. Cognitive Approaches 
 
 From the breadth of responses and the associated analysis, it is clear that the development 
of a digital forensic readiness plan extends beyond the realm of an organisation. The corporate, 
industry and legislative environments each have properties that must be considered when 
developing a digital forensic readiness plan. These properties are presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Cognitive Approaches for digital forensic readiness planning 
 
 The corporate environment has properties that are within an organisation's control that 
must be aligned with and support an organisation's digital forensic readiness plan. The 
corporate environment operates within the limitations of the industry environment, which, in 
turn, is influenced by the limitations of the legislative environment. A critical component of a 
digital forensic readiness plan is to establish a cooperation strategy that ensures that digital 
forensic cases can progress seamlessly from their inception in a corporate environment to 
conclusion in a court of law (legislative environment), following relevant guidelines in the 
industry environment to ensure that the integrity of evidence is maintained. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 This study has sought to investigate cognitive approaches that aid in developing digital 
forensic readiness plans. The study reveals that developing a digital forensic readiness plan is 
a task that involves many factors beyond the realm of a single organisation. The factors are 
presented in the form of a conceptual model for organisations to use in process planning to 
achieve digital forensic readiness. By focusing on the lessons learned from experience, the 
study provides cognitive approaches to digital forensic readiness that can be used by 
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individuals who wish to explore this topic further as well as by organisations that desire to 
enhance their ability to respond to security incidents while maintaining the integrity of evidence 
and keeping investigative costs low.  
 Our future research will examine digital forensic readiness as it relates to specific 
contexts such as mobile devices, wireless networks, public key infrastructures and cloud 
computing. 
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Appendix 3: Interview Instrument 
 
    
 Current Position:     
 Experience in digital forensics (years):     
 Company name & contact details:      
        
  Introduce reason for research. 
        
2 BUILD RAPPORT   
   OBJECTIVE  CRITERIA 
  
Over the years, what has been your 
involvement in digital crimes in South 
Africa? 
Validate if 
interviewee meets 
minimum criteria  
1. Digital Forensics/Law  
2. Period > 3 years     
3. Practiced in RSA 
4.Private/Public/Academic 
Sector 
        
3 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS OBJECTIVE KEYWORD 
Q1 Should South African organisations be concerned about digital crimes? 
Establish general 
attitude towards the 
effects of digital 
crimes. 
1.  Material/Immaterial 
2.  Damages 
3.  Losses  
4.  Impact 
5.  Limitations 
6.  Resources 
7.  Major/Minor 
  Yes/No: State reason:     
Q2 Which three types of digital crimes do you find to be the most prevalent? 
Establish the most 
prevalent types of 
DF crimes. Limit to 
top 3.  
1.  Computer Based 
2.  Online Based 
3.  Cell Phone and other 
devices 
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Q3 Which sector do you find to be the most targeted? 
Establish which 
sector and sub-
sector is targeted 
the most. Using the 
standard industrial 
council subsector 
classification 
1.  Private, Public or 
Parastatal 
2.  Mining  
3.  Manufacturing 
4.  Electricity, Gas and 
Water 
5. Construction 
6.  Retail, Motor Trade 
and Repair Services 
7. Wholesale Trade, 
Commercial Agents and 
Allied Services  
8.  Catering, 
Accommodation and other 
Trade 
9. Transport, Storage and 
Communications 
10.  Finance and Business 
Services 
11.  Community, Social 
and Personal Services 
12.  Agriculture 
Q4 Have you noted any challenges regarding the prosecution of digital crimes? 
Establish prior 
challenges in 
respect of the 
specific sectors.  
Sector specific 
challenges/strengths 
1.  Presence/Lack of 
2.  Standard process 
3.  Methodology 
4.  Guidelines 
5. Best Practice 
6.  Data Integrity 
7.  Non-manipulation 
8.  Repudiation 
9.  Reliability 
10.  Availability 
11.  Accessibility 
12.  People 
(Judge/Investigator) 
13.  Training 
14.  Reporting 
15.  lack of 
knowledge/skill 
Q5 
Do you or your organisation have a 
digital forensic model that has been 
adopted? 
Establish if a 
formal digital 
model is used and 
how it's applied. 
1.  DF model name 
2.  Strengths/Weaknesses 
Q6 Does  electronic evidence provide sufficient assurance of non-manipulation?   
Establish if DF 
process maintains 
data integrity 
1.  Data Integrity 
2.  Non-manipulation 
3.  Repudiation 
4.  Reliability 
5.  Availability 
6.  Accessibility 
Q7 Is there a standard process for electronic evidence gathering? 
Establish if 
common standard 
exists 
1. Yes, motivate 
2. No, motivate 
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Q8 
Does the law adequately position the 
acceptable use of/or extent to which 
electronic evidence can be used in a civil 
or criminal proceedings? 
Are there guidelines 
on what the courts 
will accept 
regarding e-
evidence 
1. Yes, motivate 
2. No, motivate 
Q9 Does the law cater to the complexities of modern IT devices?   
Identify challenges 
with the law 
1. Yes, motivate 
2. No, motivate 
Q10 
What are the factors that contribute to 
electronic evidence being rendered 
inadmissible? 
Identify challenges 
with the process 
1. Yes, motivate 
2. No, motivate 
Q11 
Have you noted any challenges that 
prevent digital crime investigators from 
correctly applying the digital forensic 
model or framework? 
Identify challenges 
with the model 
1. Yes, motivate 
2. No, motivate 
Q12 Do you think digital forensic investigators are sufficiently trained to do their work? 
Identify challenges 
with the people 
1.  Diploma 
2. Degree 
3. Certificate 
4.  Special Course 
5. Internal/External 
Course 
6.  Informal/Formal 
training 
7.  Regular/Once-off 
Q13 
Have you noted any challenges that 
prevent prosecutors from successfully 
prosecuting digital crimes? 
Identify challenges 
with the people 
1.  Practicality of Model 
2.  Process challenges 
3.  Internal/External 
4.  Technical  
5. Legal 
6.  Awareness/Knowledge 
7.  Resources 
8.  Pressures 
Q14 Do you think state prosecutors are sufficiently trained to do their work? 
Identify challenges 
with the people 
1. Yes, motivate 
2. No, motivate 
Q15 
What do you think should be done to 
increase the prosecution rate of digital 
crimes in South Africa? 
Establish general 
perceptions on what 
can be done as part 
of the solution. 
1.  People 
2.  Process 
3.  Technology (HW/SW) 
4.  Law 
5.  Report cases 
6.  Evidence 
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Appendix 5: Case Study 1: Atlas.ti Coding Summary Report  
 
List of all objects 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
HU 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Case Law - Verification Chapter 
 
Primary Documents 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
P 1: Case Law - Verification.rtf {424} 
 
Quotations 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
1:1 British American Tobacco Compa.. (35:35) 
1:2 Rawsonville in the Western Cap.. (35:35) 
1:3 West Coast road near Darling (35:35) 
1:4 Kinkelbos, outside Port Elizab.. (35:35) 
1:5 common law offences of theft, .. (39:39) 
1:6 Rawsonville, Darling and Kinke.. (39:39) 
1:7 Lenasia South, Vereeniging (39:39) 
1:8 Kinkelbos (39:39) 
1:9 Firearms Control Act, 60 of 20.. (41:41) 
1:10 Prevention of Organised Crime .. (41:41) 
1:11 trial lasting more than 160 co.. (55:55) 
1:12 State alone led the evidence (55:55) 
1:13 90 witnesses (55:55) 
1:14 testified on their own behalf (55:55) 
1:15 evidence of the s 204 (59:59) 
1:16 records of the cell phone acti.. (59:59) 
1:17 State sought to demonstrate (59:59) 
1:18 cell phone records (59:59) 
1:19 corroborate his evidence and s.. (59:59) 
1:20 cell phone evidence (59:59) 
1:21 introduce the cell phone recor.. (59:59) 
1:22 cell phone evidence (59:59) 
1:23 trials-within-a-trial (59:59) 
1:24 trials-within-a-trial (59:59) 
1:25 admissibility of exhibits seiz.. (59:59) 
1:26 police (59:59) 
1:27 police search and seizure oper.. (59:59) 
1:28 one or more cell phones were s.. (59:59) 
1:29 link (59:59) 
1:30 records of cell phone activity.. (59:59) 
1:31 linking (59:59) 
1:32 State sought, furthermore, to .. (59:59) 
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1:33 linkages (59:59) 
1:34 information downloaded from th.. (59:59) 
1:35 seized (59:59) 
1:36 seized certain other articles (59:59) 
1:37 State led the evidence (59:59) 
1:38 one or more drivers or assista.. (59:59) 
1:39 cell phone evidence (61:61) 
1:40 jurisdiction of this Court in .. (64:64) 
1:41 last two robberies in the East.. (64:64) 
1:42 Seven accused hail from Ennerd.. (64:64) 
1:43 Firearms Control Act, counts 2.. (64:64) 
1:44 Soweto (64:64) 
1:45 s 2(4) of POCA (64:64) 
1:46 National Director of Public Pr.. (64:64) 
1:47 POCA (64:64) 
1:48 s 111 of Act 51 of 1977 (66:66) 
1:49 proceedings against the accuse.. (66:66) 
1:50 Mr. Vernon Aspeling was called.. (69:69) 
1:51 at the request of the prosecut.. (69:69) 
1:52 answer all questions fully and.. (69:69) 
1:53 he has been in a witness prote.. (71:71) 
1:54 Vernie’s Transport (71:71) 
1:55 Rawsonville (73:73) 
1:56 Cape Town (73:73) 
1:57 Waterfront Suites in Green Poi.. (73:73) 
1:58 mid-Ennerdale (77:77) 
1:59 Cape Town (77:77) 
1:60 Waterfront Suites (77:77) 
1:61 Johannesburg (83:83) 
1:62 Cape Town (83:83) 
1:63 Cape Town (83:83) 
1:64 Cape Town (83:83) 
1:65 other countries in Africa (83:83) 
1:66 sketched his knowledge (85:85) 
1:67 taxi rank in Ennerdale (88:88) 
1:68 Ultra City in Bloemfontein (92:92) 
1:69 Cape Town (92:92) 
1:70 Three Sisters (92:92) 
1:71 Waterfront Suites in Green Poi.. (92:92) 
1:72 cigarette company (94:94) 
1:73 Cape Town (94:94) 
1:74 Montague Gardens (96:96) 
1:75 BATSA’s (96:96) 
1:76 Green Point (96:96) 
1:77 BATSA (98:98) 
1:78 BATSA (98:98) 
1:79 BATSA (98:98) 
1:80 BATSA (98:98) 
1:81 Worcester (98:98) 
1:82 Robertson (100:100) 
1:83 BATSA (100:100) 
1:84 BATSA (100:100) 
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1:85 BATSA (100:100) 
1:86 Waterfront Suites in Green Poi.. (100:100) 
1:87 Ennerdale (100:100) 
1:88 Lenasia (102:102) 
1:89 Bera’s Transport (102:102) 
1:90 Cape Town (104:104) 
1:91 Cape Town (104:104) 
1:92 Cape Town (108:108) 
1:93 Cape Town (108:108) 
1:94 Engen truck stop en route to M.. (110:110) 
1:95 Waterfront Suites (112:112) 
1:96 Cape Town (112:112) 
1:97 Johannesburg (114:114) 
1:98 Cape (114:114) 
1:99 Montague Gardens (118:118) 
1:100 Waterfront Suites (118:118) 
1:101 Montague Gardens (118:118) 
1:102 Malmesbury road (118:118) 
1:103 BATSA (118:118) 
1:104 BATSA (118:118) 
1:105 BATSA (118:118) 
1:106 Gauteng (120:120) 
1:107 Bera’s Transport (122:122) 
1:108 Ennerdale (122:122) 
1:109 Port Elizabeth (125:125) 
1:110 Gauteng (125:125) 
1:111 Port Elizabeth (125:125) 
1:112 East London. (125:125) 
1:113 Port Elizabeth (125:125) 
1:114 Port Elizabeth (125:125) 
1:115 Port Elizabeth (125:125) 
1:116 Grahamstown (125:125) 
1:117 Port Elizabeth (125:125) 
1:118 Cape Town (127:127) 
1:119 Bera’s Transport (127:127) 
1:120 Bera’s Transport (127:127) 
1:121 Kroonvaal Toll Plaza (127:127) 
1:122 Colesberg (127:127) 
1:123 Ennerdale (127:127) 
1:124 Port Elizabeth (129:129) 
1:125 Cape Town (129:129) 
1:126 Port Elizabeth (129:129) 
1:127 Formula 1 hotel in Alberton (137:137) 
1:128 Lenasia (143:143) 
1:129 Ennerdale (143:143) 
1:130 affidavits (165:165) 
1:131 Aspeling’s three affidavit (165:165) 
1:132 minor discrepancies in his/her.. (165:165) 
1:133 searched (173:173) 
1:134 s 208 of the Criminal Procedur.. (232:232) 
1:135 two s 205 subpoenas (264:264) 
1:136 Vodacom (264:264) 
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1:137 prosecutor or investigating of.. (264:264) 
1:138 Detailed billing records (265:265) 
1:139 Ms Petro Heynecke (264:264) 
1:140 Ms Hilda du Plessis (274:274) 
1:141 MTN (274:274) 
1:142 Detailed billing records (275:275) 
1:143 “It is requested that it be es.. (281:281) 
1:144 Ms Hilda du Plessi (286:286) 
1:145 MTN (286:286) 
1:146 testified (286:286) 
1:147 forensic data analyst (286:286) 
1:148 access (286:286) 
1:149 MTN’s database (286:286) 
1:150 only person (286:286) 
1:151 forensic requests for access t.. (286:286) 
1:152 witness testified (286:286) 
1:153 MTN (286:286) 
1:154 South African Police Services (286:286) 
1:155 cell phone data in terms s 205.. (286:286) 
1:156 electronic format and cannot b.. (286:286) 
1:157 no such manipulation takes pla.. (286:286) 
1:158 MTN (286:286) 
1:159 kept in a back-up system in th.. (286:286) 
1:160 subpoena (288:288) 
1:161 MTN (288:288) 
1:162 MTN’s computerized database (288:288) 
1:163 State seeks to link (288:288) 
1:164 State (288:288) 
1:165 Telematrix (288:288) 
1:166 link (288:288) 
1:167 link (288:288) 
1:168 link (288:288) 
1:169 cross-examination (290:290) 
1:170 authenticity (290:290) 
1:171 Mr. Cornelius Basson (290:290) 
1:172 MTN (290:290) 
1:173 responsible (290:290) 
1:174 operation of the systems which.. (290:290) 
1:175 operating systems are pre-test.. (290:290) 
1:176 properly maintained (290:290) 
1:177 very high level of reliability.. (290:290) 
1:178 Ms Petro Heyneke (292:292) 
1:179 Vodacom (292:292) 
1:180 testify (292:292) 
1:181 forensic liaison manager at Vo.. (292:292) 
1:182 Vodacom systems (292:292) 
1:183 The Vodacom systems hold the h.. (292:292) 
1:184 The witness’s attention was di.. (294:294) 
1:185 The witness’s main responsibil.. (296:296) 
1:186 released in the encrypted port.. (296:296) 
1:187 tampered (296:296) 
1:188 police (296:296) 
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1:189 link (298:298) 
1:190 testified (298:298) 
1:191 link (298:298) 
1:192 link (300:300) 
1:193 link (302:302) 
1:194 cell phone documentation (302:302) 
1:195 Vodacom documentation (302:302) 
1:196 link (302:302) 
1:197 Vodacom documentation (302:302) 
1:198 identified (302:302) 
1:199 witness testified (304:304) 
1:200 The data was never tampered wi.. (304:304) 
1:201 designed in accordance with a .. (304:304) 
1:202 data was received from the arc.. (304:304) 
1:203 Mr. Jasper Smi (306:306) 
1:204 Vodacom (306:306) 
1:205 testified (306:306) 
1:206 responsible (306:306) 
1:207 integrity of Vodacom’s systems.. (306:306) 
1:208 had experienced no problems in.. (306:306) 
1:209 kept in the system for a perio.. (306:306) 
1:210 retained (306:306) 
1:211 number of years in Vodacom’s a.. (306:306) 
1:212 Mr. Spangenberg (308:308) 
1:213 criminal proceeding (308:308) 
1:214 s 15(4) of the Electronic Comm.. (308:308) 
1:215 cell phone documentation had n.. (315:315) 
1:216 Uniform Rule 54(5) (315:315) 
1:217 Registrar of the High Court. (315:315) 
1:218 s 205 of Act 51 of 1977 (315:315) 
1:219 The subpoenas are counter-sign.. (315:315) 
1:220 s 59 of The Regulation of Inte.. (319:319) 
1:221 carries significant evidentiar.. (323:323) 
1:222 Further, in my view, subject t.. (323:323) 
1:223 Further, in my view, subject t.. (323:323) 
1:224 police (343:343) 
1:225 testified (343:343) 
1:226 cell phones seized (343:343) 
1:227 evidence was that the cellular.. (343:343) 
1:228 sealed forensic bag (343:343) 
1:229 sealed (343:343) 
1:230 arresting officers (343:343) 
1:231 recorded (343:343) 
1:232 match (343:343) 
1:233 link (343:343) 
1:234 reliability and accuracy of th.. (345:345) 
1:235 lack of technical competency o.. (345:345) 
1:236 cross-examination (347:347) 
1:237 police (347:347) 
1:238 witnesses (347:347) 
1:239 testified (347:347) 
1:240 volume and complexity of the c.. (347:347) 
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1:241 cell phone evidence (349:349) 
1:242 linkages (349:349) 
1:243 State led the evidence (349:349) 
1:244 expert (349:349) 
1:245 combining the data (349:349) 
1:246 He linked calls and linked the.. (349:349) 
1:247 modus operandi (37:37) 
1:248 In each case the modus operand.. (37:37) 
1:249 On 24 June 2003 a truck carryi.. (35:35) 
1:250 Whilst the bulk of the charges.. (39:39) 
1:251 After flagging down the BATSA .. (37:37) 
1:252 As far as statutory offences a.. (41:41) 
1:253 Count 1 alleged that several o.. (43:43) 
1:254 Ultimately accused number 1 an.. (53:53) 
1:255 In a trial lasting more than 1.. (55:55) 
1:256 called witnesses (55:55) 
1:257 Accused 2, 3, 6, 7, 10 and 11 .. (55:55) 
1:258 The chief pillar of the State’.. (59:59) 
1:259 corroborate his evidence and s.. (59:59) 
1:260 police search and seizure oper.. (59:59) 
1:261 strengthen such linkages by in.. (59:59) 
1:262 I propose to deal with the two.. (61:61) 
1:263 The State thus commenced its p.. (64:64) 
1:264 A further document handed up a.. (66:66) 
1:265 State’s principal witness (69:69) 
1:266 Ever since that time he has be.. (71:71) 
1:267 By 2003 it appears that he had.. (71:71) 
1:268 Accused 2 was the younger brot.. (73:73) 
1:269 The witness had known accused .. (79:79) 
1:270 As the evidence revealed the e.. (83:83) 
1:271 About a month before the first.. (88:88) 
1:272 The following day Zallie calle.. (90:90) 
1:273 [25] On Monday, 23 June 2003 a.. (95:96) 
1:274 [52] On or about 7 November 20.. (152:153) 
1:275 The State tendered in evidence.. (175:175) 
1:276 Van Rooyen’s evidence was not .. (177:177) 
1:277 The admissibility of that evid.. (185:185) 
1:278 Aspeling’s evidence was extens.. (187:187) 
1:279 He was, as was put to him on s.. (195:195) 
1:280 Notwithstanding these criticis.. (197:197) 
1:281 He continued to answer all oth.. (199:199) 
1:282 It is trite law, however, that.. (207:223) 
1:283 The Court will bear in mind th.. (237:237) 
1:284 That evidence was contested at.. (239:239) 
1:285 phones allegedly used by, inte.. (59:59) 
1:286 records (59:59) 
1:287 The cell phone evidence was co.. (59:59) 
1:288 were seized from each accused’.. (59:59) 
1:289 witness protection programme (71:71) 
1:290 witness (73:73) 
1:291 witness (75:75) 
1:292 witness (77:77) 
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1:293 Aspeling identified accused (81:81) 
1:294 . Aspeling also testified that.. (85:85) 
1:295 Returning to Aspeling’s eviden.. (116:116) 
1:296 ] Nonetheless Aspeling believe.. (131:131) 
1:297 Accused 3 called him, saying: .. (133:133) 
1:298 The route which Aspeling follo.. (135:135) 
1:299 [46] The witness drove into Fr.. (140:141) 
1:300 Aspeling, accused 7 and Grant .. (145:145) 
1:301 Accused 7 urged Aspeling and o.. (147:149) 
1:302 ] On the Saturday evening they.. (151:151) 
1:303 After his appearance in the Ma.. (155:155) 
1:304 ide range of exhibits by the p.. (155:155) 
1:305 exhibits (155:155) 
1:306 photographs (155:155) 
1:307 photographs (155:155) 
1:308 extract from a docket (155:155) 
1:309 cell phone numbers and names d.. (155:155) 
1:310 his cell phone record (155:155) 
1:311 extracts from the documents pu.. (155:155) 
1:312 evidence in chief given by Asp.. (157:157) 
1:313 These included that Aspeling w.. (157:157) 
1:314 ] Instead, it was put to him, .. (159:159) 
1:315 He was probed, time and again,.. (161:161) 
1:316 [57] Another area which attrac.. (162:163) 
1:317 . Secondly, Aspeling’s own exp.. (165:165) 
1:318 s 204 witness (165:165) 
1:319 It was not the purpose of such.. (165:165) 
1:320 evidence were confirmed or cor.. (167:167) 
1:321 testified (167:167) 
1:322 During this trip accused 2 had.. (169:169) 
1:323 He confirmed too that after fo.. (171:171) 
1:324 testified (171:171) 
1:325 Aspeling testified hearing tha.. (173:173) 
1:326 State led the evidence (173:173) 
1:327 (exhibit “W” (173:173) 
1:328 exhibit “X (173:173) 
1:329 testifying that he had no know.. (173:173) 
1:330 State tendered in evidence cop.. (175:175) 
1:331 Aspeling explained that the in.. (175:175) 
1:332 Aspeling testified that shortl.. (177:177) 
1:333 cross-examination (177:177) 
1:334 Hall testified that this perso.. (179:179) 
1:335 A warning statement made by ac.. (179:179) 
1:336 The proliferation of exhibits .. (179:179) 
1:337 the officer in overall charge .. (181:181) 
1:338 In the vehicle’s cubby-hole he.. (181:181) 
1:339 There a telephone number attri.. (181:181) 
1:340 On 14 October 2003 Inspector H.. (183:183) 
1:341 Mr. Vincent Matthysen, as well.. (183:183) 
1:342 an orange and yellow reflectiv.. (183:183) 
1:343 bullet proof jacket but with n.. (183:183) 
1:344 d (183:183) 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR 
EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Appendix 5: Case Study 1: Atlas.ti Coding Summary Report 223 
1:345 reflective jacket was also ide.. (183:183) 
1:346 evidence lies in the voluminou.. (185:185) 
1:347 own cell phone data, and that .. (185:185) 
1:348 evidence was extensively criti.. (187:187) 
1:349 he repeatedly contradicted his.. (187:187) 
1:350 Aspeling’s evidence was also c.. (189:189) 
1:351 As far as another major area o.. (191:191) 
1:352 Aspeling testified over an ext.. (193:193) 
1:353 Aspeling testified in extraord.. (193:193) 
1:354 his evidence in chief was deli.. (193:193) 
1:355 He was, as was put to him on s.. (195:195) 
1:356 Notwithstanding these criticis.. (197:197) 
1:357 Aspeling appeared to enjoy the.. (197:197) 
1:358 his tendency to sometimes beco.. (197:197) 
1:359 to ask the cross-examiner ques.. (197:197) 
1:360 Aspeling’s failure to answer a.. (197:197) 
1:361 The cross-examination in quest.. (197:197) 
1:362 Its tone was evidenced by Stat.. (197:197) 
1:363 Aspeling declined to answer fu.. (199:199) 
1:364 Aspeling immediately declared .. (199:199) 
1:365 Notwithstanding the extremely .. (201:201) 
1:366 This explanation cannot be rej.. (201:201) 
1:367 Aspeling impressed as someone .. (203:203) 
1:368 He revealed himself as someone.. (203:203) 
1:369 although not flawless, contain.. (205:205) 
1:370 State relied heavily on docume.. (239:239) 
1:371 What I will refer to generally.. (241:241) 
1:372 admissibility of articles seiz.. (241:241) 
1:373 two cell phones as well as doc.. (253:253) 
1:374 two cell phones (254:254) 
1:375 black plastic bag containing v.. (254:254) 
1:376 a cell phone (255:255) 
1:377 white Volkswagen Golf ; (255:255) 
1:378 a white Volkswagen Polo, a whi.. (257:257) 
1:379 two cell phones and documentat.. (257:257) 
1:380 Those records were similarly o.. (259:259) 
1:381 Detailed billing records (265:265) 
1:382 including calls made and recei.. (265:265) 
1:383 Detailed billing records perta.. (275:275) 
1:384 including calls made and recei.. (275:275) 
1:385 MTN personnel worked after hou.. (288:288) 
1:386 . Du Plessis identified exhibi.. (288:288) 
1:387 The witness then identified ex.. (288:288) 
1:388 In cross-examination it was pu.. (290:290) 
1:389 authenticity of the documentat.. (290:290) 
1:390 He added that the systems invo.. (290:290) 
1:391 He stated that the operating s.. (290:290) 
1:392 received internal training in .. (292:292) 
1:393 The Vodacom systems hold the h.. (292:292) 
1:394 The data contains all cell pho.. (292:292) 
1:395 It contains both successful an.. (292:292) 
1:396 The witness’s attention was di.. (294:294) 
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1:397 The first column contains the .. (294:294) 
1:398 Only once the data is moved fr.. (296:296) 
1:399 Only once the data is moved fr.. (296:296) 
1:400 The data is processed in masse.. (296:296) 
1:401 Since Vodacom receives many su.. (296:296) 
1:402 Vodacom cannot change one set .. (296:296) 
1:403 The witness then had her atten.. (298:298) 
1:404 Ms Heyneke identified exhibit .. (300:300) 
1:405 State sought to link to accuse.. (302:302) 
1:406 State sought to link to accuse.. (302:302) 
1:407 State sought to link to accuse.. (302:302) 
1:408 applicable to the cell phone d.. (313:313) 
1:409 having to call a witness to pr.. (313:313) 
1:410 In my view the evidence of Mes.. (313:313) 
1:411 The reference by counsel to un.. (317:317) 
1:412 Cell phone numbers connected t.. (331:331) 
1:413 Henry Cottle, a security offic.. (331:331) 
1:414 entoor explained that he had a.. (331:332) 
1:415 Speed was also involved in exe.. (333:333) 
1:416 he downloaded the following re.. (333:333) 
1:417 Aspeling testified that the ce.. (336:336) 
1:418 Analysis of the Vodacom data i.. (338:338) 
1:419 An analysis of the MTN cell ph.. (340:340) 
1:420 One example was an instance wh.. (345:345) 
1:421 police witnesses (347:347) 
1:422 exhibits seized by the police (59:59) 
1:423 police officers testified (343:343) 
1:424 police requested the data to b.. (296:296) 
 
Codes 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
\ {0-0} 
Analysis (IE5) {16-1}~ 
Comment: 
Analysis of evidence and its attributes. 
Case Law {1-0}~ 
Comment: 
Consider case law in preparation 
CE {28-0}~ 
Comment: 
establish domain 
Collection (IE2) {24-3}~ 
Comment: 
Correct method/tools to collect evidence without compromising forensic integrity. 
Criminal Process (LE2) {16-6}~ 
Comment: 
Correct application of the Criminal Process in ensuring evidence discovery, maintaining 
integrity of evidence seized, and adherence to due process.  
DFR Technologies (CE5) {20-2}~ 
Comment: 
Digital Forensic Ready technology to maintain forensic attributes in all data stored.  
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Documentation (IE7) {4-1}~ 
Comment: 
Thorough documentation and chain of custody relating to the case. 
Electronic Laws (LE1) {21-3}~ 
Comment: 
Comprehensive legislation detailing compliance specifications  
Evidence: Corroborative / Nature {4-0}~ 
Comment: 
Consider nature of evidence and supportive/corroborative evidence. 
Documentary vs Real evidence  
Evidence: Testing {1-0} 
Evidentiary: Value {2-0}~ 
Comment: 
Careful scrutiny of evidence and correct interpretation of findings. 
Consider the weight of the evidence obtained. 
Human Resources (CE4) {27-4}~ 
Comment: 
Ability to operate forensic ready technology, and provide expert witness. 
Identification (IE4) {6-1}~ 
Comment: 
Identification of key evidence attributes for analysis. 
Interpretation (IE6) {19-2}~ 
Comment: 
Correct interpretation of findings during investigation and analysis stage. 
Investigation: Methodology {2-0}~ 
Comment: 
Determine investigative approach and methodology 
Stick to the plan.  
Investigation: Scope {1-0}~ 
Comment: 
after modus operandi, establish limitations and set investigation scope 
Jurisdiction {67-0}~ 
Comment: 
establish legal jurisdiction (geographic location and relevant laws) 
consider laws as per country, state, province, city, town  etc. 
Justice Personnel (LE5) {11-1}~ 
Comment: 
Correct interpretation of digital forensic results during prosecution stage. 
Justice System (LE3) {7-10}~ 
Comment: 
Ability to interpret and prosecute cases involving electronic evidence. 
Law Enforcement Agents (LE4) {10-1}~ 
Comment: 
Knowledge and willingness to investigate e-crimes. 
Legal Charges {1-0}~ 
Comment: 
Consider charges as per contravened laws (federal or state law) 
Legislative Scope {1-0}~ 
Comment: 
Define legal contraventions. 
Limitations:  Legal {2-0} 
Maturity of the legal system {1-0}~ 
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Comment: 
Principle of fairness  
modus operandi {1-0}~ 
Comment: 
Establish the what/how/who/when/why etc. of the incident. 
nature of crimes {1-0}~ 
Comment: 
determine the nature of offenses as per laws in that jurisdiction 
Policies (CE2) {8-2}~ 
Comment: 
Organisation to develop policies that govern forensic readiness. 
Presentation (IE8) {56-8}~ 
Comment: 
Demonstration/Application of education, training and certification  of CIRT/Witnesses on 
presentation of evidence. 
Preservation (IE1) {19-3}~ 
Comment: 
Evidence preserved in accordance with industry standards and aligned to legislative 
requirements. 
Procedures (CE3) {11-2}~ 
Comment: 
Organisation to develop procedures that govern forensic readiness. 
Resources: Law Enforcement {1-0}~ 
Comment: 
Availability and competence of police. 
Resources: Legal Representation {1-0}~ 
Comment: 
Consider availability of competent legal representation. 
Resources: Suspects {1-0} 
Resources: Timeline {1-0} 
Resources: Witnesses {10-0}~ 
Comment: 
Consider key/principal witness/es 
Consider value of witnesses. 
Protection of witness. 
Integrity. 
Credibility. 
Expertise & Experience.  
Relationship between witnesses/accused. 
Preparation of witness for court.  
Retention (IE9) {2-1}~ 
Comment: 
Retention of evidence as required by law. 
Standards (CE1) {3-2}~ 
Comment: 
Organisational standards developed in harmony with legislative requirements. 
 
Synopsis {17-0}~ 
Comment: 
what transpired? 
obtain all facts? 
sequence of events? timeline.  
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Validation (IE3) {8-1}~ 
Comment: 
Validating evidence for relevance and corroboration. 
 
Code Families 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Corporate Environment (6) 
Industry Environment (9) 
Legislative Environment (5) 
 
Network Views 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
E-Crime Prosecution  LE4 | IE8 (2)  
Evidence Collection  IE2 | LE2 (2)  
Evidence Handling CE4 | LE3 | IE2 (3)  
Evidence Preservation - CE5 | IE1 | LE2 (3)  
Justice System Implementation LE5 | IE6 (2)  
M-DiFoRe Network Links (19)  
Methodology Evaluation LE3 - IE1 to IE9 (10)  
Policy Alignement CE2 | IE8 | LE1 (3)  
Procedural Implementation IE8 | CE3 | LE2 (3)  
Standards Localisation IE8 | CE1 | LE1 (3)  
Witness Preparation CE4 | IE8 | LE2 (3)  
 
 
 
Code-Links 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Collection (IE2) <comply with> Criminal Process (LE2) 
Criminal Process (LE2) <is associated with> Preservation (IE1) 
DFR Technologies (CE5) <comply with> Criminal Process (LE2) 
DFR Technologies (CE5) <must achieve> Preservation (IE1) 
Human Resources (CE4) <comply with> Collection (IE2) 
Human Resources (CE4) <comply with> Criminal Process (LE2) 
Human Resources (CE4) <Cooperate with> Justice System (LE3) 
Human Resources (CE4) <must achieve> Presentation (IE8) 
Justice Personnel (LE5) <is associated with> Interpretation (IE6) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Analysis (IE5) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Collection (IE2) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Documentation (IE7) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Identification (IE4) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Interpretation (IE6) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Presentation (IE8) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Preservation (IE1) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Retention (IE9) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Validation (IE3) 
Law Enforcement Agents (LE4) <comply with> Presentation (IE8) 
Policies (CE2) <comply with> Electronic Laws (LE1) 
Policies (CE2) <comply with> Presentation (IE8) 
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Presentation (IE8) <comply with> Criminal Process (LE2) 
Presentation (IE8) <comply with> Electronic Laws (LE1) 
Presentation (IE8) <comply with> Procedures (CE3) 
Presentation (IE8) <comply with> Standards (CE1) 
Procedures (CE3) <is property of> Criminal Process (LE2) 
Standards (CE1) <is property of> Electronic Laws (LE1) 
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Appendix 6: Case Study 2: Atlas.ti Coding Summary Report 
 
List of all objects 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
HU 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Case Verification  - Accepted Evidence 2 
 
Primary Doc 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
P 1: 926.rtf {168} 
 
Quotations 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
1:1 I heard evidence for some thre.. (83:83) 
1:2 Various lengthy affidavits wer.. (83:83) 
1:3 during the course of the proce.. (83:83) 
1:4 but having been given the nece.. (83:83) 
1:5 was able to conduct his defenc.. (83:83) 
1:6 I am completely satisfied that.. (83:83) 
1:7 He was told that he need not p.. (83:83) 
1:8 emanate to a large extent from.. (87:87) 
1:9 The First Plaintiff has a divi.. (87:87) 
1:10 Second Plaintiff is the Managi.. (87:87) 
1:11 This industry is a notoriously.. (87:87) 
1:12 It enters into Service Level A.. (90:90) 
1:13 it guarantees to meet minimum .. (90:90) 
1:14 It has about 500 skilled techn.. (90:90) 
1:15 The information derived from t.. (90:90) 
1:16 such service level standards r.. (90:90) 
1:17 If Bytes MS drops below the ag.. (91:91) 
1:18 it is typically given a month .. (91:91) 
1:19 it may also face effective fin.. (91:91) 
1:20 Second Plaintiff and the facts.. (97:97) 
1:21 Bytes MS’ clients, rely on a g.. (97:97) 
1:22 effective and efficient runnin.. (97:97) 
1:23 is entrusted to the support an.. (97:97) 
1:24 it is a business imperative fo.. (97:97) 
1:25 its reputation for integrity, .. (97:97) 
1:26 The Second Plaintiff testified.. (97:97) 
1:27 He was employed in Bytes MS as.. (101:101) 
1:28 He had to attend weekly execut.. (101:101) 
1:29 5.1 Executive and other commit.. (102:110) 
1:30 Because the scope and type of .. (113:113) 
1:31 13.2 of the Defendant’s standa.. (113:116) 
1:32 Confidential information, whic.. (122:122) 
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1:33 To that end, Defendant who was.. (124:124) 
1:34 Not to reveal confidential inf.. (126:126) 
1:35 Not to interfere with or endea.. (128:128) 
1:36 Not to “persuade, induce, soli.. (132:132) 
1:37 Not to use any confidential in.. (134:134) 
1:38 To surrender all confidential .. (136:137) 
1:39 evidence was that Defendant’s .. (140:140) 
1:40 16 March 2009 Defendant referr.. (140:140) 
1:41 Defendant was grossly negligen.. (140:140) 
1:42 He denied any wrong doing and .. (140:140) 
1:43 This application was dismissed.. (140:140) 
1:44 9. I will deal with certain fa.. (142:143) 
1:45 “As stated in my previous e-ma.. (143:143) 
1:46 Bytes MS had allegedly been de.. (148:148) 
1:47 The Defendant allegedly attemp.. (150:151) 
1:48 The identity of Bytes MS clien.. (151:151) 
1:49 On 16 October 2009 Defendant’s.. (154:154) 
1:50 Second Plaintiff had testified.. (154:154) 
1:51 Second Plaintiff also testifie.. (154:154) 
1:52 These e-mails are almost ident.. (158:158) 
1:53 He also told the recipients th.. (158:158) 
1:54 Also, on 25 November 2009 Defe.. (159:159) 
1:55 This e-mail to Kagiso was forw.. (162:162) 
1:56 As a result Plaintiffs’ Attorn.. (165:165) 
1:57 I may add that Defendant did n.. (166:166) 
1:58 On this day Defendant sent an .. (170:170) 
1:59 I will quote a part of this em.. (171:173) 
1:60 the Plaintiffs launched an urg.. (175:175) 
1:61 “The SCCU investigating office.. (173:173) 
1:62 Pending the outcome of an acti.. (175:175) 
1:63 On 23 December 2009 Sapire AJ .. (178:203) 
1:64 2. indicate to the applicants’.. (204:215) 
1:65 I must add in this context tha.. (219:219) 
1:66 Client was satisfied by Bytes .. (219:219) 
1:67 seized during the Anton Piller.. (222:222) 
1:68 Mr K. Yeo gave evidence in thi.. (222:222) 
1:69 Mr Yeo said “of late this cust.. (222:222) 
1:70 Defendant said in his affidavi.. (222:222) 
1:71 I may add at this stage, Defen.. (222:222) 
1:72 During cross-examination on th.. (222:222) 
1:73 It was First Plaintiff’s case .. (225:225) 
1:74 THE PARITALA E-MAILS: In this .. (228:229) 
1:75 He was provided with electroni.. (236:236) 
1:76 trace the e-mails and establis.. (237:237) 
1:77 I have already mentioned that .. (237:237) 
1:78 analysed the e-mails, extracte.. (238:238) 
1:79 The analysis involved expertis.. (238:238) 
1:80 which is fully reflected in th.. (238:238) 
1:81 From the e-mail which was rece.. (240:240) 
1:82 The same information was refle.. (242:242) 
1:83 The e-mail sent 4:28 on 3 Febr.. (245:245) 
1:84 All these documents reflect th.. (247:247) 
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1:85 On 3 February 2010 at 4:33 ano.. (249:249) 
1:86 The e-mails were originally se.. (254:254) 
1:87 These annexures were not print.. (256:256) 
1:88 They were also not forwarded t.. (258:258) 
1:89 These annexures were printed t.. (260:260) 
1:90 From the files’ Meta-data it w.. (264:264) 
1:91 Whether Defendant gave the doc.. (266:266) 
1:92 The Applicants were also grant.. (269:269) 
1:93 two computer hard drives and t.. (269:269) 
1:94 Centurion Sheriff two computer.. (269:269) 
1:95 forensically analyse the elect.. (269:269) 
1:96 gave evidence as to what he di.. (269:269) 
1:97 He had utilised keywords to lo.. (271:271) 
1:98 Defendant’s user name on his c.. (273:273) 
1:99 He located references to all t.. (275:275) 
1:100 He located the original e-mail.. (277:277) 
1:101 He also stated that it was bey.. (279:279) 
1:102 When searching for other commu.. (282:282) 
1:103 Defendant was still in possess.. (287:287) 
1:104 in the context of the data col.. (296:296) 
1:105 The integrity of the data coll.. (296:296) 
1:106 During March/April 2008 she wa.. (300:300) 
1:107 He had worked for Bytes since .. (304:309) 
1:108 On 23 April he sent an e-mail .. (310:314) 
1:109 The new policy that he had sug.. (315:315) 
1:110 as to fall in line the best pr.. (315:315) 
1:111 After Defendant had made publi.. (318:318) 
1:112 They found that no fraud had b.. (318:318) 
1:113 Cross-examination of Mr Yeo: D.. (320:321) 
1:114 Third Defendant testified that.. (324:324) 
1:115 Second Plaintiff also testifie.. (324:324) 
1:116 Ms Grune gave evidence about t.. (330:330) 
1:117 For that purpose her mandate w.. (330:330) 
1:118 The review was performed also .. (330:330) 
1:119 Data records of incidents logg.. (337:337) 
1:120 Policy documents and procedure.. (339:339) 
1:121 They performed data analysis o.. (341:341) 
1:122 KPMG’s calculations were compa.. (343:343) 
1:123 They documented findings and c.. (345:345) 
1:124 They performed tests to verify.. (347:347) 
1:125 KPMG recommends that a System .. (358:358) 
1:126 Corrections should not be allo.. (358:358) 
1:127 34. During cross-examination b.. (369:370) 
1:128 According to the KPMG Report, .. (373:373) 
1:129 I may just say at this stage t.. (376:376) 
1:130 I may also mention briefly at .. (376:376) 
1:131 Ms. le Hanie, the Second Plain.. (380:380) 
1:132 She has deposed to five affida.. (380:381) 
1:133 She mentioned that during June.. (384:384) 
1:134 Ms le Hanie was in my view a l.. (387:387) 
1:135 40. She remembers that probabl.. (389:390) 
1:136 Ms le Hanie then gave evidence.. (393:393) 
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1:137 Since the false allegations we.. (396:396) 
1:138 The business of First Plaintif.. (399:399) 
1:139 DEFENDANT’S CROSS-EXAMINATION .. (402:402) 
1:140 MR I VAN DER MERWE: (412:412) 
1:141 DEFENDANT’S CROSS-EXAMINATION:.. (428:428) 
1:142 Every client had a different S.. (429:429) 
1:143 DEFAMATION: APPLICABLE LEGAL P.. (441:441) 
1:144 Khumalo and Others vs Holomisa.. (443:443) 
1:145 Crawford vs Albu 1917 AD 102 a.. (455:455) 
1:146 LAWSA, Volume 17 page 237. (457:457) 
1:147 SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v.. (459:459) 
1:148 Neethling vs Du Preez, Neethli.. (464:464) 
1:149 Le Roux vs Dey 2010 (4) SA 210.. (466:466) 
1:150 National Media Ltd vs Bogoshi .. (470:470) 
1:151 : Delta Motor Corporation (Pty.. (472:472) 
1:152 Crawford vs Albu supra (475:475) 
1:153 Suid Afrikaanse Uitsaai Ko-ope.. (479:479) 
1:154 Suid Afrikaanse Uitsaai Ko-ope.. (481:481) 
1:155 The attachments to those e-mai.. (489:489) 
1:156 IS CONTEMPT OF COURT ESTABLISH.. (505:505) 
1:157 : Fakie N.O vs CC11 Systems (P.. (507:507) 
1:158 Jayiya vs MEC for Welfare East.. (509:509) 
1:159 Clement vs Clement 1961 (3) SA.. (510:510) 
1:160 S vs Van der Meyden 1999 (1) S.. (512:512) 
1:161 R vs De Villiers 1944 AD 493 a.. (514:514) 
1:162 e: S vs Sauls and Others 1981 .. (516:516) 
1:163 Court must consider the nature.. (525:530) 
1:164 Media 24 Ltd and Others vs SA .. (553:553) 
1:165 AA Alloy Foundry (Pty) Ltd vs .. (555:555) 
1:166 Setlogelo vs Setlogelo 1914 AD.. (559:559) 
1:167 Hix Networking Technologies vs.. (560:560) 
1:168 Le Roux and Others vs Dey [201.. (562:562) 
 
Codes 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Background {10-0} 
CE {3-0} 
CE1 {4-2} 
CE2 {9-2} 
CE3 {8-2} 
CE4 {9-4} 
CE5 {9-2} 
IE1 {5-3} 
IE2 {3-3} 
IE3 {4-1} 
IE4 {2-1} 
IE5 {6-1} 
IE6 {12-2} 
IE7 {13-1} 
IE8 {33-8} 
IE9 {2-1} 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR 
EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Appendix 6: Case Study 2: Atlas.ti Coding Summary Report 233 
LE1 {3-3} 
LE2 {8-6} 
LE3 {4-10} 
LE4 {33-1} 
LE5 {3-1} 
Ruling - eEvidence Accepted. {1-0} 
 
Memos 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Alignment of Industry to Law - LE2: IE2 {0-0 Commentary} - Super 
Comment: 
Electronic evidence presented was obtained using forensically sound tools and methods, 
as prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Act.  
CIRT Technical Duties IE1-8: LE3 {0-0 Commentary} - Super 
Comment: 
Law enforcement and independent computer forensic expert/s demonstrated to the courts 
that evidence obtained was done by following forensic standards and processes. The 
courts admitted all electronic evidence presented. 
Demonstrate Procedural Compliance - CE3: LE2: IE8 {0-0 Commentary} - Super 
Comment: 
Employees testified on the existence of organisational policies and procedures, and how 
these were based on best practice and industry standards.  The resulting evidence was 
admitted by the court.  
Evidence Processing - CE4: IE2: LE3 {0-0 Commentary} - Super 
Comment: 
Bytes employees demonstrated competence and offered testimony proving that evidence 
was collected using forensically sound manner.  Evidence obtained by law enforcement 
during the execution of an Anton Pillar and that obtained from Bytes was admitted by the 
court.  
Evidentiary Value Preservation - CE5: IE1: LE2 {0-0 Commentary} - Super 
Comment: 
Bytes was able to demonstrate that their systems maintained data integrity, and presented 
system logs and email records which the court admitted. The items seized during Anton 
Piller execution were also admitted as evidence in support of Bytes' argument.  
Expert Witness Preparation CE4: LE2: IE8 {0-0 Commentary} - Super 
Comment: 
The witnesses demonstrated competence and due preparation for court proceedings. The 
courts concluded that Bytes' witnesses were credible.  
Justice Duties LE5: IE3 {0-0 Commentary} - Super 
Comment: 
The justice system sought to have a fair trial, interpreted evidence presented and imposed 
fines against the defendant.  
Policy Framework CE2: LE1: IE8 {0-0 Commentary} - Super 
Comment: 
Bytes demonstrated existence of forensic ready policies, and employees testified of how 
the defendant's fraud allegations were false, leading to the KPMG (system) audit. The 
audit showed that  the system maintained data integrity and made improvement 
recommendations.  
Prosecution of e-crimes - LE4: IE8 {0-0 Commentary} - Super 
Comment: 
Justice personnel extensively cross-examined electronic evidence presented, referred to 
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prior case law and sought assistance of external experts (KPMG) to verify findings.  
Standards Framework - CE1: IE8:LE1 {0-0 Commentary} - Super 
Comment: 
Employees at Bytes testified that Policies were developed in line with best practice and 
Industry Standards.  Standards were in compliance with the law (Privacy 
Law/Competition Law). 
 
Network Views 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Alignment of Industry to Law - LE2: IE2 (3)  
CIRT Technical Duties IE1-8: LE3 (11)  
Demonstrate Procedural Compliance - CE3: LE2: IE8 (4)  
Evidence Processing - CE4: IE2: LE3 (4)  
Evidenciary Value Preservation - CE5: IE1: LE2 (4)  
Expert Witness Preparation CE4: LE2: IE8 (4)  
Justice Duties LE5: IE3 (3)  
M-DiFoRe Network Links - Case 2 (19)  
Policy Framework CE2: LE1: IE8 (4)  
Prosecution of e-crimes - LE4: IE8 (3)  
Standards Framework - CE1: IE8:LE1 (4)  
 
Code-Links 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
CE1 <is property of> LE1 
CE2 <comply with> IE8 
CE2 <comply with> LE1 
CE3 <is property of> LE2 
CE4 <comply with> IE2 
CE4 <comply with> LE2 
CE4 <Cooperate with> LE3 
CE4 <must achieve> IE8 
CE5 <comply with> LE2 
CE5 <must achieve> IE1 
IE2 <comply with> LE2 
IE8 <comply with> CE1 
IE8 <comply with> CE3 
IE8 <comply with> LE1 
IE8 <comply with> LE2 
LE2 <is associated with> IE1 
LE3 <comply with> IE1 
LE3 <comply with> IE2 
LE3 <comply with> IE3 
LE3 <comply with> IE4 
LE3 <comply with> IE5 
LE3 <comply with> IE6 
LE3 <comply with> IE7 
LE3 <comply with> IE8 
LE3 <comply with> IE9 
LE4 <comply with> IE8 
LE5 <is associated with> IE6 
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Appendix 7: Case Study 3: Atlas.ti Coding Summary Report 
 
List of all objects 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
HU 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
POST BANK CASE_CH6 
 
Primary Doc 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
P 1: POST BANK CASE REPORT.rtf {110} 
 
Quotations 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
1:1 Respondent (31:31) 
1:2 The applicants have instituted.. (38:38) 
1:3 arrested (41:41) 
1:4 applicants were charged with c.. (41:41) 
1:5 section 2(1)(e)(f) read with s.. (41:41) 
1:6 racketeering activity, money l.. (41:41) 
1:7 section 49 G (3) of The Act. (44:44) 
1:8 trial which commenced on 27 Ja.. (44:44) 
1:9 (4) Section 49G (1) of The Act.. (47:47) 
1:10 (i)section 49G (3) provides: ‘.. (48:48) 
1:11 (5)In terms of article 2(b), J.. (50:50) 
1:12 (i)article 6(2) provides: “In .. (51:51) 
1:13 (4) Section 49G (1) of The Act.. (47:48) 
1:14 (6)The charges preferred again.. (54:54) 
1:15 RESPONDENT’S (56:56) 
1:16 Captain Jacobus Hansen, the in.. (57:57) 
1:17 respondent’s opposition to the.. (57:57) 
1:18 application (38:38) 
1:19 (2) The first to the seventh a.. (41:41) 
1:20 Subsequent to their arrest the.. (41:41) 
1:21 (3) Subsequent to their arraig.. (43:43) 
1:22 On 26 August 2013, the first t.. (44:44) 
1:23 THE LEGAL FRAME WORK (46:46) 
1:24 (ii)article 8(1) regarding the.. (52:52) 
1:25 THE RESPONDENT’S PRIMA FACIE C.. (56:56) 
1:26 affidavit (57:57) 
1:27 except the fourth and sixth ap.. (57:57) 
1:28 made submissions through their.. (57:57) 
1:29 affidavit (59:59) 
1:30 The applicants were arrested a.. (59:59) 
1:31 (9)The details of some of the .. (61:61) 
1:32 The discovery of the various b.. (63:63) 
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1:33 The details relating to these .. (63:63) 
1:34 After his arrest, the first ap.. (63:63) 
1:35 The first applicant has allege.. (65:65) 
1:36 evidence (67:67) 
1:37 The rest of the applicants hav.. (67:67) 
1:38 The applicants are charged wit.. (68:68) 
1:39 documentary evidence (68:68) 
1:40 Post Office branches where the.. (68:68) 
1:41 found on the second to ninth a.. (68:68) 
1:42 Cell phone communications betw.. (70:70) 
1:43 (14) Cell phone communications.. (70:70) 
1:44 Cell phone communications (70:70) 
1:45 The respondent intends to lead.. (72:72) 
1:46 If one of the applicants shoul.. (72:72) 
1:47 Counsel argued that the first .. (75:75) 
1:48 He will not conceal or destroy.. (77:77) 
1:49 The trial has now commenced, c.. (80:80) 
1:50 He joined in the initial secti.. (80:80) 
1:51 interpretation (83:83) 
1:52 Further counsel elected not to.. (84:84) 
1:53 (19) Counsel elected to addres.. (83:83) 
1:54 unsuccessfully launched a bail.. (87:87) 
1:55 unsuccessfully launched a bail.. (87:87) 
1:56 and is set down for the entire.. (89:89) 
1:57 trial (89:89) 
1:58 In her capacity as the acting .. (89:89) 
1:59 (22) Her release will not enda.. (91:91) 
1:60 (23) She is a single parent. H.. (93:93) 
1:61 unsuccessful bail application... (99:99) 
1:62 (25) Although the trial has co.. (101:101) 
1:63 (26) The prolonged trial is ex.. (103:103) 
1:64 She will not influence or inti.. (103:103) 
1:65 If released she can afford to .. (108:108) 
1:66 Organized Crime Act, (110:110) 
1:67 cell phone records (110:110) 
1:68 prof that they communicated wi.. (110:110) 
1:69 she only executed three transa.. (110:110) 
1:70 documentary evidence linking (112:112) 
1:71 scope of her duties as a telle.. (112:112) 
1:72 cell phone records show (112:112) 
1:73 incriminating evidence found o.. (118:118) 
1:74 linking (118:118) 
1:75 He launched an unsuccessful ba.. (120:120) 
1:76 There is no legal justificatio.. (120:120) 
1:77 section 35 of The Constitution.. (123:123) 
1:78 Counsel further submitted that.. (124:124) 
1:79 (34) The enactment of section .. (126:126) 
1:80 (35) The purpose of section 49.. (128:128) 
1:81 (36) Pursuant to section 35(1).. (130:132) 
1:82 (37) The continued further det.. (134:134) 
1:83 It follows that although secti.. (136:138) 
1:84 section 49 G (3) of The Act, (141:141) 
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1:85 (39) The charges against the a.. (142:142) 
1:86 (40) In considering the releas.. (144:144) 
1:87 (41) Because of the inquisitor.. (146:146) 
1:88 (42) Because the applicants ar.. (148:148) 
1:89 (43) The court is obliged to i.. (150:150) 
1:90 led evidence (152:152) 
1:91 cogent and credible and has th.. (152:152) 
1:92 The applicants have all made a.. (152:152) 
1:93 Post Office banking (152:152) 
1:94 cellular telephone records (154:154) 
1:95 establishing that the applican.. (154:154) 
1:96 cellular telephone records app.. (154:154) 
1:97 inference (154:154) 
1:98 cellphones (154:154) 
1:99 cellular (154:154) 
1:100 the inference may be drawn tha.. (154:154) 
1:101 affidavit. (156:156) 
1:102 Having regard to the strength .. (157:157) 
1:103 (47) A court in considering th.. (159:159) 
1:104 (48) The factual status quo ma.. (160:161) 
1:105 strength of the respondent’s c.. (142:142) 
1:106 In considering the release or .. (144:144) 
1:107 (40) In considering the releas.. (144:144) 
1:108 evidence is cogent and credibl.. (152:152) 
1:109 possibility of establishing an.. (152:152) 
1:110 In considering whether the rel.. (163:171) 
 
Codes 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
(2) The first to the seventh a.. {1-0} 
(5)In terms of article 2(b), J.. {1-0} 
(i)section 49G (3) provides: ‘.. {1-0} 
applicable law/elaw {13-0} 
Arrest/verdict {1-0} 
CE {4-0}~ 
Comment: 
Postbank fraud case involving access to bank acc, data etc.  use of cell phone evidence 
key in identifying fraudsters.  state accepted tech used by postbank to have preserved call 
data etc. strong case.  
CE1 {1-2} 
CE2 {1-2} 
CE3 {1-2} 
CE4 {5-4}~ 
Comment: 
accused were employees of Post Office 
CE5 {8-2} 
charges {1-0} 
electronic data compromised {1-0} 
IE1 {4-3} 
IE1-9 {3-0}~ 
Comment: 
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eData compromised and uncovered during investigation. Accepted evidence by court 
IE2 {1-3} 
IE3 {4-1} 
IE4 {3-1} 
IE5 {6-1} 
IE6 {17-2} 
IE7 {1-1} 
IE8 {9-8} 
IE9 {3-1} 
intro {1-0}~ 
Comment: 
accused in correctional facility. evidence upheld.  
L2 {1-0} 
LE {1-0} 
LE1 {7-3} 
LE2 {14-6} 
LE3 {8-10}~ 
Comment: 
arrested, state linked to prior matter.  
tried to escape. 
LE4 {2-1} 
LE5 {11-1}~ 
Comment: 
able to link suspects to prior frauds. 
LE6 {0-0} 
Modus operandi {1-0} 
section 49 G (3) of The Act. {1-0} 
trial {1-0} 
verdict {3-0}~ 
Comment: 
no evidence against her/employee 
 
Network Views 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
CE4-IE2 (2)  
CE5-LE2 (2)  
CE5-LE2-IE1 (3)  
IE2-LE2 (2)  
IE8-CE4 (2)  
LE2-CE4 (5)  
LE2-IE1 (2)  
LE3-CE4 (2)  
LE3 - others (17)  
LE5-IE6 (2)  
 
Code-Links 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
CE1 <is property of> LE1 
CE2 <comply with> IE8 
CE2 <comply with> LE1 
CE3 <is property of> LE2 
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CE4 <comply with> IE2 
CE4 <comply with> LE2 
CE4 <Cooperate with> LE3 
CE4 <must achieve> IE8 
CE5 <comply with> LE2 
CE5 <is cause of> IE1 
IE2 <comply with> LE2 
IE8 <comply with> CE1 
IE8 <comply with> CE3 
IE8 <comply with> LE1 
IE8 <comply with> LE2 
LE2 <is associated with> IE1 
LE3 <comply with> IE1 
LE3 <comply with> IE2 
LE3 <comply with> IE3 
LE3 <comply with> IE4 
LE3 <comply with> IE5 
LE3 <comply with> IE6 
LE3 <comply with> IE7 
LE3 <comply with> IE8 
LE3 <comply with> IE9 
LE4 <comply with> IE8 
LE5 <is associated with> IE6 
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Appendix 8: Case Study 4: Atlas.ti Coding Summary Report  
 
List of all objects 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
HU 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Rejected case - Anton Piller on IP theft 
 
Primary Doc 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
P 1: FRIEDSHELF 1509_Main.rtf {81} 
 
Quotations 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
1:1 C Whitcutt SC (with S Ebrahim).. (12:12) 
1:2 G Kairinos SC (with B Stevens (12:12) 
1:3 Applicants (21:21) 
1:4 respondent's (21:21) 
1:5 order (21:21) 
1:6 search (21:21) 
1:7 seizure (21:21) 
1:8 preservation (21:21) 
1:9 defamation and unlawful compet.. (21:21) 
1:10 Applicants alleged that respon.. (21:21) 
1:11 order allowing for the search .. (21:21) 
1:12 C Whitcutt SC (with S Ebrahim).. (40:41) 
1:13 search, seizure and preservati.. (42:42) 
1:14 Order . (a)  The extended rule.. (43:49) 
1:15 This is the extended return da.. (53:53) 
1:16 The order permitted the applic.. (53:53) 
1:17 'Originals or copies of any em.. (54:55) 
1:18 supervising attorneys (56:56) 
1:19 forensic experts (56:56) 
1:20 to search and examine all elec.. (56:56) 
1:21 The order granted is in line w.. (57:57) 
1:22 Clause 3.3 of the order permit.. (57:57) 
1:23 [4] Pursuant to the order, the.. (61:61) 
1:24 [5] Unlike the order appearing.. (65:72) 
1:25 range of warehousing and distr.. (76:76) 
1:26 sophisticated software (76:76) 
1:27 first applicant's management t.. (76:76) 
1:28 [9] The respondent was employe.. (77:77) 
1:29 The respondent was employed by.. (77:77) 
1:30 It is I common cause that duri.. (77:77) 
1:31 It is I common cause that duri.. (77:80) 
1:32 restraint of trade agreement, (81:81) 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR 
EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Appendix 8: Case Study 4: Atlas.ti Coding Summary Report 242 
1:33 C (a) The respondent resigned .. (83:83) 
1:34 (b) the respondent breached hi.. (84:84) 
1:35 [13] On 19 July 2014 an anonym.. (89:89) 
1:36 The applicants attribute the e.. (90:91) 
1:37 The applicants had no direct e.. (92:92) 
1:38 [17] The applicants allege tha.. (95:101) 
1:39 simultaneously (103:103) 
1:40 According to the report of the.. (104:104) 
1:41 she surrendered he (104:104) 
1:42 The order does not permit the .. (105:105) 
1:43 The order does not permit the .. (105:105) 
1:44 sheriff (105:105) 
1:45 The sheriff should have refuse.. (105:111) 
1:46 It also appears that 12 docume.. (115:116) 
1:47 It also appears that 12 docume.. (115:115) 
1:48 The inventory compiled by the .. (116:116) 
1:49 The inventory compiled by the .. (116:116) 
1:50 evidence was C obtained and se.. (116:116) 
1:51 copying of the cellphone driv (117:117) 
1:52 affidavit (117:117) 
1:53 It does not appear from the af.. (117:117) 
1:54 supervising attorney (117:117) 
1:55 The inventory of items seized .. (118:118) 
1:56 [32] Whilst the respondent ini.. (120:121) 
1:57 No prima facie case was made o.. (126:126) 
1:58 (a) No prima facie case was ma.. (126:126) 
1:59 The applicants failed to make .. (131:131) 
1:60 Anton Piller relief is not app.. (133:133) 
1:61 ) The restraint of trade cove.. (135:135) 
~1:62 [37] Certain of the respondent.. (138:140) 
Comment: 
justice correctly applying the law and interpreted facts.  
1:63 irregularities in the executio.. (143:144) 
1:64 What is of concern is the fact.. (145:145) 
1:65 C [42] What is of concern is t.. (145:149) 
~1:66 [49] An Anton Piller search-an.. (158:169) 
Comment: 
Specific process on application of Anton Pillers...this was not executed correctly.  
Scope issues rendering evidence inadmissible. imaged wrong data, not that belonging to 
suspect as per order. 
1:67 Both sets of counsel are agree.. (172:198) 
1:68 The applicants failed to discl.. (206:206) 
1:69 The applicants failed to discl.. (206:206) 
1:70 While the applicants put up a .. (207:207) 
1:71 The respondent has stated that.. (208:208) 
1:72 The applicants' counsel in rep.. (211:211) 
1:73 As there is no evidence linkin.. (216:216) 
1:74 As there is no evidence linkin.. (216:216) 
1:75 In the draft order the applica.. (220:220) 
1:76 A difficulty which arises in t.. (221:221) 
1:77 '[9.1] What the Practice Manua.. (225:235) 
1:78 In my view the practice needs .. (236:236) 
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1:79 In my view the practice needs .. (236:239) 
1:80 Documents and information are .. (116:116) 
1:81 restore (46:46) 
 
Codes 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Analysis (IE5) {1-1}~ 
Comment: 
Analysis of evidence and its attributes. 
failed to find evidence linking suspect to email in question. 
Applicant {1-0} 
Case of defamation  & interference with contract obligations {1-0} 
CE {1-0} 
Charge {1-0} 
CO {1-0} 
Collection (IE2) {2-3}~ 
Comment: 
Correct method/tools to collect evidence without compromising forensic integrity. 
Technical experts used correct tools but not correct process, thereby compromising 
forensic integrity. 
imaged but imaged the wrong items.  
imaged before checking for existence of relevant data, thus going against court order. 
Criminal Process (LE2) {13-6}~ 
Comment: 
Correct application of the Criminal Process in ensuring evidence discovery, maintaining 
integrity of evidence seized, and adherence to due process 
Failed to operate within scope set by court order. 
Failed to operate within scope by taking wife's tablet, phone etc. 
Failed to identify key items to be imaged, failed to follow correct process in imaging (did 
not review relevance of content before imaging, as per Anton Piller order) 
DFR Technologies (CE5) {2-2}~ 
Comment: 
Digital Forensic Ready technology to maintain forensic attributes in all data stored.  
 
Organisation demonstrated existed of industry forensic ready technology 
Documentation (IE7) {4-1}~ 
Comment: 
Thorough documentation and chain of custody relating to the case. 
 
Sherriff and CF Expert failed to keep detailed inventory re contents of drive etc.  
 
Sup attorney failed to review and correct.  
Electronic Laws (LE1) {3-3}~ 
Comment: 
Comprehensive legislation detailing compliance specifications  
 
Anton Pillar order was issued in line with electronic laws, in favor of the organisation.  
email in question {1-0} 
Human Resources (CE4) {7-4}~ 
Comment: 
Ability to operate forensic ready technology, and provide expert witness. 
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RTT representatives failed to disclose key info during testimony. 
Identification (IE4) {1-1}~ 
Comment: 
Identification of key evidence attributes for analysis. 
 
Failed to identify key attributes to ensure compliance with court order. 
 
didn't look at identities registry to confirm user of devices. resulting in items out of scope 
being included/imaged.  
IE1-7 {4-0}~ 
Comment: 
failed to identify key items to be imaged, failed to follow correct process in imaging (did 
not review relevance of content before imaging, as per Anton Piller order) 
IE1-8 {2-0}~ 
Comment: 
failure to apply digital forensic investigation process to correctly identify correct sources 
of evidence, preserve, analyze and validate on data sources to correctly place suspect 
behind the computer and prove all identities. 
 
failure to hypothesize during analysis and interpretation to ensure all findings are tested.  
 
Interpretation (IE6) {1-2}~ 
Comment: 
Correct intepretation of findings during investigation and analysis stage. 
 
CIRT failed to find evidence linking suspect to email in question. not all logs and 
pertinent data (IP address, email headers, etc.) was verified to link suspect to email. 
Justice Personnel (LE5) {11-1}~ 
Comment: 
Correct interpretation of digital forensic results during prosecution stage. 
 
magistrate correctly applied the law and identified all the tech flaws in the case and made 
valid recommendations to improve the process.  
 
lack of full disclosure re relationship to suspect impacted case negatively.  
 
Justice System (LE3) {2-10}~ 
Comment: 
Ability to interpret and prosecute cases involving electronic evidence. 
 
Supervising attorneys demonstrated a lack of E.T.C in the overseeing the correct 
processing of electronic evidence. 
 
scope of order was not complied to as items outside scope were imaged etc.  
correct process was not followed in identifying items to be seized and imaged etc  
Law Enforcement Agents (LE4) {5-1}~ 
Comment: 
Knowledge and willingness to investigate e-crimes. 
 
Error not with police but sup attorney and staff 
 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR 
EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Appendix 8: Case Study 4: Atlas.ti Coding Summary Report 245 
Supervising attorney failed to ensure electronic evidence is processed as per the court 
order 
 
Supervising attorney role was to ensure law is upheld. 
 
Policies (CE2) {4-2}~ 
Comment: 
Organisation to develop policies that govern forensic readiness. 
 
Organisation demonstrated existence of industry policies, technology and ETC of staff.  
Presentation (IE8) {6-8}~ 
Comment: 
Demonstration/Application of education, training and certification  of CIRT/Witnesses on 
presentation of evidence. 
 
Witnesses/respondents failed to disclose all relevant facts, resulting in charges being 
dropped.  
 
Respondent denied charges. strong testimony.  
 
Applicant failed to disclose that respondent was employed at RTT prior to case. affects 
judgment on nature of relationship and how respondent received access to email list. 
 
RTT representatives failed to present a strong case. too many mistakes on scope and 
application of order. 
Preservation (IE1) {4-3}~ 
Comment: 
Evidence preserved in accordance with industry standards and aligned to legislative 
requirements. 
 
Evidence preserved (some) was outside the scope of the court order, and was not done 
following correct procedure.  
Procedures (CE3) {7-2}~ 
Comment: 
Organisation to develop procedures that govern forensic readiness. 
 
Organisation demonstrated existence of procedures 
 
applicant and responded agreed to cooperate  
 
Respondent {1-0} 
Retention (IE9) {1-1}~ 
Comment: 
Retention of evidence as required by law. 
 
court ordered to restore what was retained. 
Standards (CE1) {2-2}~ 
Comment: 
Organisational standards developed in harmony with legislative requirements. 
 
Organisation demonstrated existence of industry standards 
Summary of case {1-0} 
DEVELOPING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS MODEL FOR 
EVIDENTIARY DATA HANDLING 
Appendix 8: Case Study 4: Atlas.ti Coding Summary Report 246 
Validation (IE3) {1-1}~ 
Comment: 
Validating evidence for relevance and corroboration. 
 
Failed to validate evidence for reliance 
 
Network Views 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Evidence Collection IE2 | LE2 (2)  
Evidence Handling CE4 | LE3 | IE2 (3)  
Evidence Preservation CE5 | IE1 | LE2 (3)  
Justice System Implementation LE5 | IE6 (2)  
M-DiFoRe Network Links (19)  
Methodology  Evaluation LE3 - IE1 to IE9 (10)  
Policy Alignment CE2 | IE8 | LE1 (3)  
Procedural Implementation IE8 | CE3 | LE2 (3)  
Prosecution of e-crimes LE4 IE8 (2)  
Standards Localisation IE8 | CE1 | LE1 (3)  
Witness Preparation CE4 | IE8 | LE2 (3)  
 
Code-Links 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Collection (IE2) <comply with> Criminal Process (LE2) 
Criminal Process (LE2) <is associated with> Preservation (IE1) 
DFR Technologies (CE5) <comply with> Criminal Process (LE2) 
DFR Technologies (CE5) <is cause of> Preservation (IE1) 
Human Resources (CE4) <comply with> Collection (IE2) 
Human Resources (CE4) <comply with> Criminal Process (LE2) 
Human Resources (CE4) <Cooperate with> Justice System (LE3) 
Human Resources (CE4) <must achieve> Presentation (IE8) 
Justice Personnel (LE5) <is associated with> Interpretation (IE6) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Analysis (IE5) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Collection (IE2) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Documentation (IE7) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Identification (IE4) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Interpretation (IE6) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Presentation (IE8) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Preservation (IE1) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Retention (IE9) 
Justice System (LE3) <comply with> Validation (IE3) 
Law Enforcement Agents (LE4) <comply with> Presentation (IE8) 
Policies (CE2) <comply with> Electronic Laws (LE1) 
Policies (CE2) <comply with> Presentation (IE8) 
Presentation (IE8) <comply with> Criminal Process (LE2) 
Presentation (IE8) <comply with> Electronic Laws (LE1) 
Presentation (IE8) <comply with> Procedures (CE3) 
Presentation (IE8) <comply with> Standards (CE1) 
Procedures (CE3) <is property of> Criminal Process (LE2) 
Standards (CE1) <is property of> Electronic Laws (LE1)	 	
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D P S A D P S A (7.1) Links (7.2) Link Type
(Co, Coo, Pr, Ac, As)
(7.3) Arrow Type 
(Uni-D, Bi-D)
D P S A
IE2: Collection Y 1, 4 1, 23 -25
LE2: Criminal Process Y 1, 6, 21
LE5: Justice Personnel Y 2
IE6: Interpretation Y 1 11, 12 1
LE4: Law Enforcement Y 2
IE8: Presentation Y 1, 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1
CE4: Human Resources Y 8. 9 CE4, LE3 Coo Uni-D F
1, 2, 5
7, 8, 9
26 
32
LE3: Justice System Y
1, 2, 5, 
7, 26
32 CE4, IE2 Co Uni-D P
1, 4, 
8, 9
1, 23-25
IE2: Collection Y 1, 4 1, 23 - 25 LE3, IE2 Co Uni-D F
1, 2, 4, 
5, 7, 26
32 1, 23-25
IE8: Presentation Y 1, 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1 IE8, CE1 Co Uni-D F 1, 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1
CE1: Standards Y 1 CE1, LE1 Pr Uni-D F 1, 3, 22
LE1: Electronic Laws Y 1, 3, 22 IE8, LE1 Co Uni-D P
1, 3, 22,
 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
CE2: Policies Y 1, 10 CE2, IE8 Co Uni-D F 1, 10, 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1
IE8: Presentation Y 1, 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1 IE8, LE1 Co Uni-D P
1, 3, 22, 
30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1
LE1: Electronic Laws Y 1, 3, 22 CE2, LE1 Co Uni-D F
1, 3, 10,
 22
CE4: Human Resources Y 8. 9 CE4, LE2 Co Uni-D P
1, 6, 8, 9, 
21
IE8: Presentation Y 1, 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1 CE4, IE8 Ac Uni-D P
1, 8, 9, 
30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1
LE2: Criminal Process Y 1, 6, 21 IE8, LE2 Co Uni-D P
1, 6, 21,
 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1
IE8: Presentation Y 1, 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1 IE8, CE3 Co Uni-D P 1, 10, 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1
CE3: Procedures Y 1, 10 IE8, LE2 Co Uni-D P
1, 6, 21, 
30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1
LE2: Criminal Process Y 1, 6, 21 CE3, LE2 Pr Uni-D F
1, 6, 10, 
21
CE5: DFR Technologies Y 9, 15 CE5, IE1 Ac Uni-D N 1, 4 27, 28 14
1, 9, 15, 
23-25
IE1: Preservation Y 1, 4 27, 28 14 1, 23-25 LE2, IE1 As Bi-D F 1, 6, 4, 21 27, 28 14 1, 23-25
LE2: Criminal Process Y 1, 6, 21 CE5, LE2 Co Uni-D F 1, 6, 21 9, 15
LE3: Justice System Y
1, 2, 5, 
7, 26
32 - - - - - - - -
IE1: Preservation Y 1, 4 27, 28 14 1, 23-25 LE3, IE1 Co Uni-D P
1, 2, 4, 5, 
7, 26
27, 28 14, 32 1, 23-25
IE2: Collection Y 1, 4 1, 23-25 LE3, IE2 Co Uni-D F
1, 2, 4, 5, 
7, 26
32 1, 23-25
IE3: Validation Y 1 1 LE3, IE3 Co Uni-D P
1, 2, 5, 
7, 26
32 1
IE4: Identification Y 1 1 LE3, IE4 Co Uni-D P
1, 2, 5, 
7, 26
32 1
IE5: Analysis Y 1 1 LE3, IE5 Co Uni-D P
1, 2, 5, 
7, 26
32 1
IE6: Interpretation Y 1 11, 12 1 LE3, IE6 Co Uni-D P
1, 2, 5, 
7, 26
11, 12, 32 1
IE7: Documentation Y 1, 31 29 1 LE3, IE7 Co Uni-D P
1, 2, 5, 
7, 26, 31
29 32 1
IE8: Presentation Y 1, 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1 LE3, IE8 Co Uni-D P
1, 2, 5, 
7, 26, 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 32-36
1
IE9: Retention Y 1, 22 1 LE3, IE9 Co Uni-D F
1, 2, 5, 
7, 22, 26
32 1
1, 23-25
1, 4, 6, 21
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1
1, 4, 6, 21 27. 28 14
1, 9, 15,
23-25
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1
1, 6, 8-
9, 21, 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1
32 1, 23-25
1, 3, 22, 30
1, 2
1, 2, 30
Methodology Evaluation 
(LE3, IE1-IE9)
Y
6.3.3.3.  Application of digital forensic 
process on evidence that falls within 
scope of court order.  Correct 
documentation of process followed, 
especially inventory lists. Forensic 
methodology to be applied correctly.
1, 4, 6, 21 1, 23-25
1, 2
Procedural Implementation 
(IE8, CE3, LE2)
Y
6.3.3.2(v).  Testimony to demonstrate 
compliance with organisational 
procedures and the criminal process.
Evidence Preservation 
(IE8, CE3, LE2)
Y
6.3.3.2(vi). Correct implementation and 
configuration of DFR technologies, 
including event logging.
1, 6, 10,
 21, 30
Policy Alignment 
(CE2, IE8, LE1)
Y
6.3.3.2(iii).  Present evidence that is 
within scope of court order.  Full 
disclosure of facts.
Witness Preparation 
(CE4, IE8, LE2)
1, 2, 4, 
5, 22, 
26, 30, 31
27-29
11, 12, 
14-20, 
32-36
Y
6.3.3.2(iv).  Employees to present all 
facts to the court.  Testimony given to 
court to be based on evidence within 
scope of court order.  Criminal process 
to be fully complied with.
1, 3, 10, 
22, 30
Evidence Handling 
(CE4, LE3, IE2)
Y
6.3.3.2(i). Strict adherance to court order 
on evidence to be collected.
Standards Localisation 
(IE8, CE1, LE1)
Y
6.3.3.2(ii).  Present evidence that is 
within scope of court order.  Full 
disclosure of facts.
1, 2, 4, 5
7-9, 26
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1
e-Crime Prosecution 
(LE4, IE8)
Y Co Uni-D F 6.3.3.1(iii)1, 2, 30
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1
11, 12, 15-
20, 33-36
1LE4, IE8
Evidence Collection 
(IE2, LE2)
Y Co Uni-D F 6.3.3.1(i)
Justice System Implementation 
(LE5, IE6)
Y As Bi-D F 6.3.3.1(ii)11 ,12 1
1, 23-25
11 ,12 1
L2, IE2
LE5, IE6
Component Existance
(Step 1)
System Existance 
(Step 2)
Remediation 
(Step 4)
(1) M-DiFoRe Systems (2) Component Name
(3) Exist
(Y/N)
(4) Supporting Evidence Type & Source (5) Exist
(Y/N)
(6) Supporting Evidence Type & Source (8) Model 
Compliance 
(N,P,F)
(9) Supporting Evidence Type  & Source
(10) Model Reference
(7) Nature of dependency 
System Interdependencies
(Step 3)
